DRC FORM 206 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7 771 CENSEE EVENT REPORT 5. CONTROL BLOCK: | (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 - 0 51 CACONT L 6 0 5 0 0 2 5 9 0 0 9 0 2 8 2 0 9 3 0 8 2 0 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 0 1 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10 During normal operation, while performing SI 4.7.A.2.g-3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, "A" hydrogen analyzer for unit 1 became inoperable (T.S. 3.7.H.2). There was no effect on public health and safety. 141 "B" hydrogen analyzer was available and operable. T.S. 3.7.H.2 permits operation for 30 days with one hydrogen analyzer inoperable. "A" analyzer was inoperable for about 16 hours. SYSTEM 80 CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMP VALVE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE E (12) A (13) E L A Y X (14) A R 1Z 1(16) A 1(15 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION REPORT NO. CODE TYPE REPORT 18 0 6 8 0131 0 L NUMBER SHUTDOWN METHOD EFFECT ON PLANT ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER HOURS (22 FORM SUB. 10 10 1 01 Z (21) 1 L (25 Χ IY 1 6 0 (26 Α CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Test engineer inadvertently had wires lifted to 1-FSV-76-57. On return to service, hydrogen sample inlet pump "A" power relay contacts were found failed. Allen Bradley | 700-N400Al contacts were replaced and successfully tested. Engineer was reinstructed. Panelwill be labeled. Procedure will be revised. Relay contact investigation results expected by 3/1/83. 80 FACILITY STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVENY (30)S. P.D. A.L. Dr. OTHERSTATION DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 0 9 8 1 B (31) Surveillance test 13 RO THE ACED AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (15) LOCATION OF HELEASE (36) NA 44 80 DESCRIPTICA (29) 0_ NA PENNICULAT PROVIDED 80 8210060422 820930 PDR ADOCK 05000259 Esserentine (41) April Area . A 0 PDR TOTALLENY 80 (43) TESCHIPTI 710 NA PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION (F) FTN NAC USE ONLY N (14 NA 1.1 1.16 13.8 80 Stanley D. Carter (205) 729-0800 NAME OF PREPARED. PHONE ..

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17 BF 15.2 2/19/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-__259 / 82068 Technical Specification Involved ______3.7.H.2 Reported Under Technical Specification ____6.7.2.b.(2) Date Due NRC _____10/02/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 97-percent power and unit 2 was in a refueling outage. These units were unaffected by this event. With unit 1 operating at 98-percent power, during the performance of SI 4.7.A.2.g-3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen analyzer became inoperable when test personnel inadvertently lifted the power supply lead wires for 1-FSV-76-57 instead of 2-FSV-76-57. The wires involved are located in adjacent panels 1-9-54 and 2-9-54 in the units 1 and 2 control room. FSV-76-57 is a hydrogen-oxygen analyzer "A" sample return valve which closed when the wires were lifted. There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.H.2 allows operation for thirty days with one hydrogen analyzer operable. "B" hydrogen analyzer was available and operable. Upon return to service, during the performance of Surveillance Instruction 4.7.H, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen sample inlet pump was discovered to have failed after FSV-76-57 closed. Investigation revealed that the relay R2 contacts had failed. Relay R2 contacts were replaced and Special Maintenance Instruction 176 and SI 4.7.H were successfully completed. The test engineer involved was reinstructed. The panels involved (1-9-54 and 2-9-54) are being relabelled to clearly identify each unit. The procedure is being revised for clarity. The failure of relay R2 contacts is being investigated in conjunction with LER 259/82031. The results of the investigation are expected by March 1, 1983.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFR0-50-259/82031 R2

Retenti n: Period - Lifetime: Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor