



LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82068 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.H.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) Date Due NRC 10/02/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 97-percent power and unit 2 was in a refueling outage. These units were unaffected by this event. With unit 1 operating at 98-percent power, during the performance of SI 4.7.A.2.g-3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen analyzer became inoperable when test personnel inadvertently lifted the power supply lead wires for 1-FSV-76-57 instead of 2-FSV-76-57. The wires involved are located in adjacent panels 1-9-54 and 2-9-54 in the units 1 and 2 control room. FSV-76-57 is a hydrogen-oxygen analyzer "A" sample return valve which closed when the wires were lifted. There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.H.2 allows operation for thirty days with one hydrogen analyzer operable. "B" hydrogen analyzer was available and operable. Upon return to service, during the performance of Surveillance Instruction 4.7.H, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen sample inlet pump was discovered to have failed after FSV-76-57 closed. Investigation revealed that the relay R2 contacts had failed. Relay R2 contacts were replaced and Special Maintenance Instruction 176 and SI 4.7.H were successfully completed. The test engineer involved was reinstructed. The panels involved (1-9-54 and 2-9-54) are being relabelled to clearly identify each unit. The procedure is being revised for clarity. The failure of relay R2 contacts is being investigated in conjunction with LER 259/82031. The results of the investigation are expected by March 1, 1983.

\* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/82031 R2

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

\*Revision: JRP