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October 1, 1982
5211-82-239

Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289
Fire Protection

This letter transmits updated information which reflects our continuing effort to refine the engineering and implementation phases of Appendix R at TMI-1. We have included a summary page of revisions made to Attachment 1 of our July 1, 1982 submittal (Letter 5211-82-156) along with the associated changed pages. Revision bars have been used on the majority of these pages to highlight the updated portions. Also included is additional information regarding the alternate shutdown facility electrical systems.

Table I lists all the power circuits that connect to sources which supply power to alternate shutdown system components. This table is our response to item 1a of Table II of Attachment 2 of our July 1, 1982 submittal.

Table II lists those circuits whose spurious actuation could adversely affect shutdown. As stated in that table, these circuits shall be either physically separate from the fire area and/or circuit isolation facilities shall be provided to allow control of the components independent of circuit located in the fire area. Table II responds to item 1b of Table II of Attachment 2 of our July 1, 1982 submittal.

Table III is a list of valves whose spurious actuation was evaluated as indicated in Section 3.12 of Attachment 1 of our July 1, 1982 submittal and determined to not pose a threat to safe shutdown. Table III also identifies the consequences and corrective actions for these valves maloperation or failure as a result of the postulated relay/control room fire. Evaluation of DH-VI as listed in Table III responds to Item 2b and 2c of Table II of Attachment 2 of our July 1, 1982 submittal.


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Table IV, when completed, will identify the associated circuits which share a common enclosure with alternate shutdown facility circuits (Item 1c of Table II of Attachment 2 of our July 1, 1982 submittal). The computer program developing this information is complex and work is still in progress debugging software and assembling input data. We will provide this information by December, 1982.

Finally, control of alternate shutdown facility isolation devices solely from the distribution panels, as was proposed in SDD 614B Rev. 0 has been further reviewed against required plant staffing and time constraints during the postulated control room/relay room fire. It has been concluded that providing circuit breaker control for some critical components at the central area near the remote shutdown panel will allow a smoother plant shutdown with fewer operating personnel and with less risk of an adverse plant transient occurring during this postulated fire. The attached "Conceptual System Criteria Document for TMI-1 Alternate Shutdown Facility External to Remote Shutdown Panel" provides more information on this change.

Sincerely,



H. D. Hukill
Director, TMI-1

HDH:CJS:vjf

Enclosure

cc: R. C. Haynes, w/o attachment
R. Conte, w/o attachment
R. Jacobs