# SSAR MODIFICATION PAGES

# List of Figures (Continued)

Figure 3B-18	Test Sensors Unique to FS* and SS Tests	3B-54
Figure 3B-19	Envelope PSD at 019P for SST-1,2,3,9,11 and 12	3B-55
Figure 3B-20	Six-Test and Key-Segment Envelope PSDs at 019P	3B-56
Figure 3B-21	ABWR CO Source Load Methodology	3B-57
Figure 3B-22	ABWR Typical Pressure Fluctuation Due to CO	3B-58
Figure 3B-23	Mark III Typical Pressure Fluctuation Due to CO	3B-59
Figure 3B-24	Typical Large Chug (025P)	3B-60
Figure 3B-25	PSD of Typical Large Chug (025P)	3B-61
Figure 3B-26	ABWR Chug Source Load Methodology	3B-62
Figure 3B-27	Comparison of PSDs Between Analysis and Test	3B-63
Figure 3B-28	Spatial Load Distribution for CH	3B-64
Figure 3B-29	Typical Wall Pressure Time History Due to CH	3B-65
Figure 3B-30	Circumferential Pressure Distribution on Access Tunnel Due to CH	3B-66
Figure 3B-31	Typical Test Result of Upward Load on Horizontal Vent Due to CH	3B-67
Figure 3B-32	Typical Test Result of Moment Due on Horizontal Vent to CH	3B-68
Figure 3B-33	Horizontal Vent Upward Loading for Vent Pipe and Pedestal	3B-69
Figure 3B-34	Horizontal Vent Upward Loading for Structure Response Analysis	3B-70
Figure 3E-1	Schematic Representation of Material J-Integral R and J-T Curves	3E-38
Figure 3E-2	Carbon Steel Test Specimen Orientation Code	3E-39
Figure 3E-3	Toughness Anisotropy of ASTM 106 Pipe (152 mm Sch. 80)	3E-40
Figure 3E-4	Charpy Energies for Pipe Test Material as a Function of Orientation and Temperature	3E-41
Figure 3E-5	Charpy Energies for Plate Test Material as a Function of Orientation and Temperature	3E-42
Figure 3E-6	Comparison of Base Metal. Weld and HAZ Charpy Energies for SA 333 Grade 6	3E-43
Figure 3E-7	Plot of 288°C True Stress-True Strain Curves for SA 333 Grade 6 Carbon Steel	3E-44

# List of Figures (Continued)

Figure 3E-8	Plot of 288°C True Stress-True Strain Curves for SA 516 Grade 70 Carbon Steel
Figure 3E-9	Plot of 117°C True Stress-True Strain Curves for SA 333 Grade 6 Carbon Steel
Figure 3E-10	Plot of 177°C True Stress-True Strain Curves for SA 516 Grade 70 Carbon Steel
Figure 3E-11	Plot of 288°C Test J-R Curve for Pipe Weld
Figure 3E-12	Plot of 288°C J <sub>mod</sub> , T <sub>mod</sub> Data from Test J-R Curve
Figure 3E-13	Carbon Steel J-T Curve for 216°C
Figure 3E-14	Schematic Illustration of Tearing Stability Evaluation3E-51
Figure 3E-15	A Schematic Representation of Instability Tension and Bending Stresses as a Function of Flaw Strength
Figure 3E-16	SA 333 Grade 6 Stress-Strain Data at 288°C in the Ramberg-Osgood Format3E-53
Figure 3E-17	Carbon Steel Stress-Strain Data at 177°C in the Ramberg-Osgc od Format 3E-54
Figure 3E-18	Comparison of PICEP Predictions with Measured Leak Rate
Figure 3E-19	Pipe Flow Model
Figure 3E-20	Mass Flow Rates for Steam/Water Mixtures
Figure 3E-21	Friction Factors for Pipes
Figure 3E-22	Leak Rate as a Function of Crack Length in Main Steam Pipe (Example) 3E-59
Figure 3G-1	Horizontal Beam Model for AP Load
Figure 3G-2	Nodal Point (R/B Horizontal/Vertical Shell Model)
Figure 3G-3	Nodal Point No. (RPV/Internal Vertical Shell Model)
Figure 3G-4	Floor Response Spectrum—Case: APA1, Node: 33, Horizontal
Figure 3G-5	Floor Response Spectrum—Case: APA1, Node: 81, Horizontal
Figure 3G-6	Floor Response Spectrum—Case: APA1, Node: 85, Horizontal
Figure 3G-7	Floor Response Spectrum—Case: APA2, Node: 33, Horizontal
Figure 3G-8	Floor Bossess Constant Constant APAS Node St. Horizontal SC-15
	Floor Response Spectrum—Case: APA2, Node: 81, Horizontal




Figure 3E-14 Schematic Illustration of Tearing Stability Evaluation




Figure 3E-15 A Schematic Representation of Instability Tension and Bending Stresses as a Function of Flaw Strength




Figure 3E-16 SA 333 Grade 6 Stress-Strain Data at 288°C in the Ramberg-Osgood Format




Figure 3E-17
Carbon Steel Stress-Strain Data at 177°C in the Ramberg-Osgood Format




Figure 6D-1 Injection Flow

Certain localized events are evaluated at other than the above-mentioned conditions. These conditions are discussed pertinent to the appropriate event.

The power/flow operating map for a plant may differ from that used in the system response analysis given in this chapter. Differences in the map will not change the designation of limiting events. The operating map used at a plant will be provided by the COL applicant to the USNRC for information (Subsection 4.4.2.1).

#### 15.0.4.5 Evaluation of Results

The results of the system response analyses are presented in Table 15.0-2. Based on these results, the limiting events have been identified. Reasons why the other events are not limiting are given in the event documentation. The limiting events which establish CPR operating limit include:

- (1) Limiting Pressurization Events: Inadvertent closure of one turbine control valve and generator load rejection with all bypass valve failure.
- (2) Limiting Decrease in Core Coolant Temperature Events: Feedwater Controller Failure—Maximum Demand

For the core loading in Figure 4.3-1, the resulting initial core MCPR operating limit is 1.17. The operating limit based on the plant loading pattern will be provided by the COL applicant to the USNRC for information (Subsection 15.0.5.2 for COL license information requirement).

Results of the transient analyses for individual plant reference core loading patterns will differ from the results shown in this chapter. However, the relative results between core associated events do not change. Therefore, only the results of the identified limiting events given in Table 15.0-4 will be provided by the COL applicant to the USNRC for information (Subsection 15.0.5.1).

# 15.0.4.5.1 Effect of Single Failures and Operator Errors

The effect of a single equipment failure or malfunction or operator error is provided in Appendix 15A.

# 15.0.4.5.2 Analysis Uncertainties

The analysis uncertainties meet the criteria in Appendix 4B.

A summary of applicable accidents is provided in Table 15.0-5, which compares GE calculated amount of failed fuel to that used in worst-case radiological calculations for the core shown in Figure 4.3-1. Radiological calculations for a plant initial core will be provided by the utility to the USNRC for information (see Subsection 15.0.5 for COL license information requirements).

#### 15.0.4.5.3 Barrier Performance

The significant areas of interest for internal pressure damage are the high-pressure portions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (i.e., the reactor vessel and the high pressure pipelines attached to the reactor vessel). The plant shall meet the criteria in Appendix 4B.

#### 15.0.4.5.4 Radiological Consequences

This chapter describes the consequences of radioactivity release for the core loading in Figure 4.3-1 during three types of events: (1) incidents of moderate frequency (anticipated operational occurrences); (2) infrequent incidents (abnormal operational occurrences); and (3) limiting faults (design basis accidents). For all events whose consequences are limiting, a detailed quantitative evaluation is presented. For nonlimiting events, a qualitative evaluation is presented or results are referenced from a more limiting or enveloping case or event.

#### 15.0.5 COL License Information

#### 15.0.5.1 Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOO)


The results of the events identified in Subsection 15.0.4.5 for plant core loading will be provided by the COL applicant referencing the ABWR design to the USNRC for information.

#### 15.0.5.2 Operating Limits

The operating limit resulting from the analyses normally provided in this subsection will be provided by the COL applicant referencing the ABWR design to the USNRC for information.

#### 15.0.5.3 Design Basis Accidents

Results of the design basis accidents, including radiological consequences, will be provided by the COL applicant referencing the ABWR design to the USNRC for information.



#### 15.2.7.3 Core and System Performance

The results of this transient simulation are presented in Figure 15.2-12. Feedwater flow terminates at approximately 5 seconds. Subcooling decreases, causing a reduction in core power level and pressure. As power level is lowered, the turbine steam flow starts to drop off because the pressure regulator is attempting to maintain pressure for the first 10 seconds. Water level continues to drop until, first, the recirculation flow is runback at Level 4 (L4) and then the vessel level (L3) scram trip setpoint is reached, whereupon the reactor is shut down and the four RIPs are tripped. Vessel water level continues to drop to the L2 trip. At this time, the remaining six RIPs are tripped and the RCIC operation is initiated. MCPR remains considerably above the safety limit, because increases in heat flux are not experienced. Therefore, this event does not have to be reanalyzed for specific core configurations.

#### 15.2.7.4 Barrier Performance

The consequences of this event do not result in any temperature or pressure transient in excess of the criteria for which the fuel, pressure vessel or containment are designed; therefore, these barriers maintain their integrity and function as designed.

#### 15.2.7.5 Radiological Consequences

The consequences of this event do not result in any fuel failure. Therefore, no analysis of the radiological consequences is required.

#### 15.2.8 Feedwater Line Break

Refer to Subsection 15.6.6.

# 15.2.9 Failure of RHR Shutdown Cooling

The RHR System performs low pressure core cooling, containment heat removal, containment spray and shutdown cooling functions. The RHR System has three independent divisions, each of which contains the necessary piping, pumps, valves, heat exchangers, instrumentation and electrical power for operation. Each division also has its own cooling water supply, diesel generator and room cooling system. For the shutdown cooling function, each division has its own suction line from and return line to the RPV. Thus, each of the three RHR divisions is completely independent of the other divisions in its shutdown cooling function. The RHR System reduces the primary system temperature to 51.7°C within 24 hours of plant shutdown.

Normally, in evaluating component failure considerations associated with RHR System shutdown cooling mode operation, active pumps, valves or instrumentation would be

assumed to fail. If the single active failure criterion is applied to the RHR System, one of the three RHR divisions would be inoperable. However, the two operable RHR divisions could achieve cold shutdown to 100°C within 36 hours after reactor shutdown.

Failure of offsite power is another case which could affect the shutdown cooling function. The plant will have two independent offsite power supplies. If either or both offsite power supplies are lost, each RHR division has its own diesel generator which will permit operating that division at its rated capacity. Application of the single active failure criterion would still leave two RHR divisions operational.

The RHR System description and performance evaluation in Subsection 5.4.7 describes the models, assumptions and results for shutdown cooling with two RHR divisions operational.

#### 15.2.10 COL License Information

#### 15.2.10.1 Radiological Effects of MSIV Closures

COL applicants will evaluate the radiological effect<sup>2</sup> of the inadvertent closure of MSIVs for the final plant design and the site parameters (Subsection 15.2.4.5.3).

#### 15.2.11 References

- 15.2-1 F. G. Brutshscy, et al., Behavior of Iodine in Reactor Water During Plant Shutdown and Startup, August 1972 (NEDO-10585).
- 15.2-2 H. Careway, V. Nguyen, and P. Stancavage, Radiological Accident—The CONAC03 CODE, December 1981 (NEDO-21143-1).

# 15.3 Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate

### 15.3.1 Reactor Internal Pump Trip

#### 15.3.1.1 Identification of Causes and Frequency Classification

#### 15.3.1.1.1 Identification of Causes

Reactor internal pump (RIP) motor operation can be tripped off by design for intended reduction of other transient core and RCPB effects, as well as randomly by unpredictable operational failures. Intentional tripping will occur in response to:

- (1) Reactor vessel water level L3 setpoint trip (4 RIPs)
- (2) Reactor vessel water level L2 setpoint trip (the other 6 RIPs)
- (3) TCV fast closure or stop valve closure (the same 4 RIPs as L3 trip)
- (4) High pressure setpoint trip (the same 4 RIPs as L3 trip)
- (5) Motor overcurrent protection (single pump)
- (6) Motor overload and short circuit protection (single pump)

Random tripping will occur in response to:

- (1) Operator error.
- (2) Loss of electrical power source to the pumps.
- (3) Equipment or sensor failures and malfunctions which initiate the above intended trip response. However, all trip logics use redundant digital designs. Single failures in the UAT or MPT and/or their protection circuits can result in loss of preferred power source to the plant.

Thus, the worst single-failure event is a loss of electrical power bus, which supplies power to RIPs. Since four buses are used to supply power to the RIPs, the worst single failure can only cause three RIPs to trip.

A loss of AC power to station auxiliaries may cause RIPs to trip. However, not all RIPs would be tripped at the same time due to the M-G sets. Transients caused by a loss of AC power are discussed in Subsection 15.2.6.

The effect of an additional single failure on this event (i.e., trip of three RIPs) is the tripping of additional RIPs. For example, if an additional power bus fails at the same time, the number of RIPs tripped are five or six, instead of three. However, the

probability of this occurring is low. This event should be classified as a limiting fault. In this analysis, the trip of all RIPs is provided to bound the events of low probability.

When a rapid core flow reduction caused by a trip of all RIPs is sensed, a reactor scram is initiated to terminate the power generation. The core flow reduces rapidly due to the relatively small inertia of the RIPs. However, natural circulation is still available to keep the reactor core covered and cooled.

#### 15.3.1.1.2 Frequency Classification

#### 15.3.1.1.2.1 Trip of Three Reactor Internal Pumps

This transient event is categorized as one of moderate frequency.

#### 15.3.1.1.2.2 Trip of All Reactor Internal Pumps

This event is categorized as an infrequent low probability event with special acceptance for fuel failure (see Subsection 15.3.1.5.2).

#### 15.3.1.2 Sequence of Events and Systems Operation

#### 15.3.1.2.1 Sequence of Events

#### 15.3.1.2.1.1 Trip of Three Reactor Internal Pumps

Table 15.3-1 lists the sequence of events for Figure 15.3-1.

#### 15.3.1.2.1.2 Trip of All Reactor Internal Pumps

Table 15.3-2 lists the sequence of events for Figure 15.3-2.

#### 15.3.1.2.1.3 Identification of Operator Actions

#### 15.3.1.2.1.3.1 Trip of Three Reactor Internal Pumps

Because no scram occurs for trip of three RIPs, no immediate operator action is required. As soon as possible, the operator should verify that no operating limits are being exceeded. The operator should also determine the cause of failure prior to returning the system to normal operation.

#### 15.3.1.2.1.3.2 Trip of All Reactor Internal Pumps

The operator should ascertain that the reactor scram is initiated. If the main turbine and feedwater pumps are tripped resulting from reactor water level swell, the operator should regain control of reactor water level through RCIC operation, monitoring reactor water level and pressure after shutdown. When both reactor pressure and level are under control, the operator should secure RCIC as necessary. The operator should also determine the cause of the trip prior to returning the system to normal operation.

transients. Maintenance planned for performance during refueling outages must be conducted in such a way that it will have little or no impact on plant safety, on outage length or on other maintenance work.

The COL applicant will provide a complete O-RAP to be reviewed by the NRC. See Subsection 17.3.13.3 for COL license information

# 17.3.10 Owner/Operator's Reliability Assurance Program

The O-RAP that will be prepared and implemented by the ABWR owner/operator will make use of the information provided by GE-NE. This information will help owner/operator determine activities that should be included in the O-RAP. Examples of elements that might be included in an O-RAP are:

- (1) Reliability Performance Monitoring: Measurement of the performance of equipment to determine that it is accomplishing its goals and/or that it will continue to operate with low probability of failure.
- (2) Reliability Methodology: Methods by which the plant owner/operator can compare plant data to the SSC data in the PRA.
- (3) Problem Prioritization: Identification, for each of the risk-significant SSCs, of the importance of that item as a contributor to its system unavailability and assignment of priorities to problems that are detected with such equipment.
- (4) Root Cause Analysis: Determination, for problems that occur regarding reliability of risk-significant SSCs, of the root causes, those causes which, after correction, will not recur to again degrade the reliability of equipment.
- (5) Corrective Action Determination: Identification of corrective actions needed to restore equipment to its required functional capability and reliability, based on the results of problem identification and root cause analysis.
- (6) Corrective Action Implementation: Carrying out identified corrective action on risk-significant equipment to restore equipment to its intended function in such a way that plant safety is not compromised during work.
- (7) Corrective Action Verification: Post-corrective action tasks to be followed after maintenance on risk significant equipment to assure that such equipment will perform its safety functions.
- (8) Plant Aging: Some of the risk-significant equipment is expected to undergo age related degradation that will require equipment replacement or refurbishment.

- (9) Feedback to Designer: The plant owner/operator will periodically compare performance of risk-significant equipment to that specified in the PRA and D-RAP, as mentioned in item 1, above, and, at its discretion, may feedback SSC performance data to plant or equipment designers in those cases that consistently show performance below that specified.
- (10) Programmatic Interfaces: Reliability assurance interfaces related to the work of the several organizations and personnel groups working on risk-significant SSCs.

The plant owner/operator's O-RAP will address the interfaces with construction, startup testing, operations, maintenance, engineering, safety, licensing, quality assurance and procurement of replacement equipment.

## 17.3.11 D-RAP Implementation

An example of implementation of the D-RAP is given for the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS). The purpose of the SLCS is to inject neutron absorbing poison into the reactor, upon demand, providing a backup rector shutdown capability independent of the control rods. The system is capable of operating over a wide range of reactor pressure conditions. The SLCS may or may not be identified by the final PRA as a significant contributor to CDF or to offsite risk. For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that the SLCS is identified as a significant contributor to CDF or to offsite risk.

# 17.3.11.1 SLCS Description

During normal operation, the SLCS is on standby, only to function in event the operators are unable to control reactivity with the normal control rods. The SLCS consists of a boron solution storage tank, two positive displacement pumps, two motor operated injection valves (provided in parallel for redundancy), and associated piping and valves used to transfer borated water from the storage tank to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The borated solution is discharged through the "B" high pressure core flooder (HPCF) subsystem sparger. A schematic diagram of the SLCS, showing major system components, is presented in Figure 17.3-7. Some locked open maintenance valves and some check valves are not shown. Key equipment performance requirements are:

- (1) Pump flow per pump 11.35 m<sup>3</sup>/h per pump
- (2) Maximum reactor pressure (for 8.6 MPa injection)
- (3) Pumpable volume in storage tank 23,090.9 L (minimum)

Design provisions to permit system testing include a test tank and associated piping and valves. The tank can be supplied with demineralized water which can be pumped in a closed loop through either pump or injected into the reactor.

The SLCS uses a dissolved solution of sodium pentaborate as the neutron-absorbing poison. This solution is held in a heated storage tank to maintain the solution above its saturation temperature. The SLCS solution tank, a test water tank, the two positive displacement pumps, and associated valving are located in the secondary containment on the floor elevation below the operating floor. This is a Seismic Category I structure, and the SLCS equipment is protected from phenomena such as earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes and floods as well as from internal postulated accident phenomena. In this area, the SLCS is not subject to conditions such as missiles, pipe whip, and discharging fluids.

The pumps are capable of producing discharge pressure to inject the solution into the reactor when the reactor is at high pressure conditions corresponding to the system relief valve actuation. Signals indicating storage tank liquid level, tank outlet valve position, pump discharge pressure and injection valve position are available in the control room.

The pumps, heater, valves and controls are powered from the standby power supply or normal offsite power. The pumps and valves are powered and controlled from separate buses and circuits so that single active failures will not prevent system operation. The power supplied to one motor-operated injection valve, storage tank discharge valve, and injection pump is from Division 1, 480 VAC. The power supply to the other motor-operated injection valve, storage tank outlet valve, and injection pump is from Division II, 480 VAC. The power supply to the tank heaters and heater controls is connectable to a standby power source. The standby power source is Class 1E from an onsite source and is independent of the offsite power.

All components of the system which are required for injection of the neutron absorber into the reactor are classified Seismic Category I. All major mechanical components are designed to meet ASME Code requirements as shown below.

	ASME Code Class	Design Conditions	
Component		Pressure	Temperature
Storage Tank	2	Static Head	66°C
Pump	2	10.8 MPaG	66°C
Injection Valves	1	10.8 MPaG	66°C
Piping Inboard of Injection Valves	1	8.6 MPaG	302°C

#### 17.3.11.2 SLCS Operation

The SLCS is initiated by one of three means: (1) manually initiated from the main control room; (2) automatically initiated if conditions of high reactor pressure and power level not below the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) permissive power level exist for 3 minutes; or (3) automatically initiated if conditions of RPV water level below the Level 2 setpoint and power level not below the ATWS permissive power level exist for 3 minutes. The SLCS provides borated water to the reactor core to introduce negative reactivity effects during the required conditions.

To meet its negative reactivity objective, it is necessary for the SLCS to inject a quantity of boron which produces a minimum concentration of 850 ppm of natural boron in the reactor core at 20°C. To allow for potential leakage and imperfect mixing in the reactor system, an additional 25% (220 ppm) margin is added to the above requirement. The required concentration is achieved accounting for dilution in the RPV with normal water level and including the volume in the residual heat removal shutdown cooling piping. This quantity of boron solution is the amount which is above the pump suction shutoff level in the storage tank, thus allowing for the portion of the tank volume which cannot be injected.

# 17.3.11.3 Major Differences from Operating BWRs

The SLCS design is very similar to that of operating BWRS. Automatic actuation of the ABWR SLCS is similar to that incorporated in some operating BWRS. Because of the larger ABWR RPV volume, the pumping capacity has been increased from 9.8 to 11.4 m<sup>3</sup>/h per pump. Injection of SLCS solution through the HPCF sparger has been shown by boron mixing tests to give better mixing than the operating plant injection through a standpipe.

Injection valves of operating plants are leak-proof explosive valves to keep boron out of the reactor during SLCS testing. In the ABWR the injection valves are motor operated

and a suction pipe fill system keeps the lines filled with distilled water at slightly higher pressure than that of the boron storage tank to preclude entry of boron into the reactor.

The motor-operated injection valves provide the following advantages over explosive valves:

- Radiation exposure to personnel is potentially reduced during testing and maintenance because less work will be required at the valves.
- (2) Post-injection containment isolation capability is enhanced because the motor operated valves can be closed following boron injection. Explosive valves cannot be reclosed to provide containment isolation.

#### 17.3.11.4 SLCS Fault Tree

The top level fault tree for the SLCS is shown in Figure 17.3-8, with the top gate defined as failure to deliver  $11.4~\mathrm{m}^3/\mathrm{h}$  of borated water from the storage tank to the RPV. Details providing input to most of the events in Figure 17.3-8 are contained in the several additional branches to the fault tree.

It is assumed that the SLCS has been identified by the PRA as a system making significant contribution to CDF. A listing of the SLCS components or events by Fussell-Vesely Importance was made, and those SSCs with greatest importance are given in Table 17.3-1. No SSCs appear to be risk-significant because of aging or common cause considerations. The seven most significant components are listed in Table 17.3-2, so these SSCs should be considered as risk-significant candidates for O-RAP activities

#### 17.3.11.5 System Design Response

The seven SLCS risk-significant components identified in Table 17.3-2 as having high importance in the SLCS fault tree are now considered for redesign or for O-RAP activities, as noted above. The flow chart of Figure 17.3-1 guides the designer.

Two of the events in Table 17.3-2 result from flow of SLCS fluid being diverted through relief valves back to pump suction rather than into the RPV. Since gate and check valve failures (which could result in relief valve operation) are accounted for by separate events, the relief valve failures of concern can be considered to be valve body failures or inadvertent opening of the relief valves. Plugging of the suction lines from the storage tank could result from some contamination of the tank fluid or collection of foreign matter in the tank. The pump failures to start upon demand could result from electrical or mechanical problems at the pumps or their control circuits.

Two AC electrical system failures that contribute to SLCS failure are identified in Table 17.3-2. No further details of electrical system failures or maintenance are

included here. That leaves the five components noted above for special attention with regard to reducing the risk of system failure.

#### (1) Redesign

The design evaluation of Figure 17.3-1 is used by the designer. The design assessment shows that the component failure rates are the same as those used in the PRA, so there is no need to recalculate the PRA. Also, no one SSC has a major impact on SLCS unavailability, so redesign or reselection of components is not required and the seven components are identified for consideration by the O-RAP.

Redesign considerations, if they had been required, would have included trying to identify more reliable relief valves and pumps and suction lines less likely to plug. The latter might be achieved by using larger diameter pipes or multiple suction lines. Pump and valve reliability might be enhanced by specific design changes or by selection of a different component. Any such redesign would have to be evaluated by balancing the increase in reliability against the added complication to plant equipment and layout.

#### (2) Failure Mode Identification

If redesign is not necessary, or after redesign has been completed, the appropriate O-RAP activities would be identified for the three SLCS component types identified by the fault tree and discussed above. This begins with determining the likely failure modes that will lead to loss of function, following the steps in Figure 17.3-2. The components of SLCS have adequate failure history to identify critical failure modes, so Assessment Paths A and C (Figures 17.3-3 and 17.3-5, respectively) would be followed to define the failure modes for consideration.

For the SLCS relief valves, past experience with similar valves shows that the major failure modes are fluid leakage from the valve body and a spurious opening as result of failure of the spring, the spring fastener, the valve stem or the disk. Past pump failures fall into two general categories, electrical problems resulting in failure to start on demand and mechanical problems that cause a running pump to stop or fail to provide rated flow. The plugging of fluid lines generally results from presence of sediment or precipitation of compounds from saturated fluid.

Following the flow chart of Figure 17.3-3, the designer would determine more details about each failure mode, including pieceparts most likely to fail and the frequency of each failure mode category or piecepart failure. This would result in a list of the dominant failure modes to be considered for the O-RAP.


# 18.5 Remote Shutdown System

The Remote Shutdown System (RSS) provides a means to safely shut down the plant from outside the main control room. It provides control of the plant systems needed to bring the plant to hot shutdown, with the subsequent capability to attain cold shutdown, in the event that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

The RSS design is described in Subsections 7.4.1.4 and 7.4.2.4. All of the controls and instrumentation required for RSS operation are identified in Subsection 7.4.1.4.4 and in Figure 7.4-2.

The RSS uses conventional, hardwired controls and indicators to maintain diversity from the main control room. These dedicated devices are arranged in a mimic of the interfacing systems process loops.

Evaluation of alternate design approaches for reliability and confirmation of the adequacy of the RSS design is COL license information (Subsection 18.8.6).



Side View





Figure 19ED-2 Temperature Profile in Channel Region



- A. Villemeur, et al. (Electricite de France), Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment of a French 1300 MWe PWR Nuclear Power Plant Unit: Methodology, Results and Teachings, Published at TUV-Workshop on Living PSA Application, Hamburg, FRG, May 7-8, 1990.
- 191-6 Advanced Light Water Reactor Requirements Document, Appendix A: PRA Key Assumptions and Ground Rules, Draft, EPRI, August 1988.
- 19L-7 Recommended Technical Specifications for Fuel Loading, service information letter No. 372, General Electric, June 1982.



Mode*	Title	Reactor Mode Switch Position	Average Reactor Coolant Temperature, K (°C)
1	Power Operation	Run	Any temperature
2	Startup	Startup/Hot Standby	Any temperature
3	Hot Shutdown	Shutdown	>366.45 K (> 93.3°C)
4	Cold Shutdown	Shutdown	≤366.45 K (≤ 93.3°C)
5	Refueling	Shutdown or Refuel	≤366.45 K ( ≤93.3°C) <sup>†</sup>

- \* In Modes 1 through 4, fuel is in the reactor vessel with the reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. In Mode 5, fuel is in the reactor vessel with the reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.
- † Technical specification states "any temperature", but in this mode the temperature will be below boiling point.



The following assumed system unavailabilities were determined to be important in minimizing shutdown risk and are included in the ABWR Reliability Assurance Program:

System	Unavailability (Per Demand)
RHR (SDC)	7E-2 per division
RHR (LPFL)	4E-2 per division
HPCF	5E-2
CRD	5E-4
CTG	5E-2
EDG	4E-3
Offsite Power	1E-3
ADS	6E-6
DC Power	7E-6

#### 19Q.12.5 Conclusions

The ABWR has been evaluated for risks associated with shutdown conditions and for all postulated events, the risk has been determined to be low. Multiple means of removing decay heat and supplying inventory makeup have been identified that along with appropriate Technical Specifications and outage procedures result in acceptably low shutdown risk levels for the ABWR.

# Table 19Q-1 ABWR Features That Minimize Shutdown Risk

Category	Feature	Shutdown Risk Capability
Decay Heat Removal (DHR)	Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System	Three independent (100% capacity) divisions of RHR and support systems for normal DHR. Each RHR division has several DHR modes (e.g., SDC, SPC).
	Reactor Coolant Temperature Measurement	During shutdown, reactor coolant temperature is determined by measuring Reactor Water Cleanup (CUW) inlet water temperature.
	Shutdown Cooling Nozzle	The shutdown cooling mode of RHR uses suction piping that connects directly to a nozzle on the RPV instead of to an external piping system. This reduces the probability of losing RHR pump suction due to air entrapment or cavitation.
	Safety Relief Valves	Can be used as alternate means of decay heat removal by venting steam to the suppression pool. They are also actuated to depressurize the RPV to allow use of low pressure RHR or other low pressure systems.
	Suppression Pool	A potential heat sink and makeup source for decay heat removal. Pool temperature is monitored in the control room to indicate trends in pool temperature. This large heat sink allows sufficient time for appropriate operator actions.
	Reactor Water Cleanup System (CUW)	Can be used under certain conditions to remove decay heat. See Subsection 19Q.7 and Attachment 19QB for more details on this feature.
	RPV Boiling	When the RPV head is removed, boiling is an effective (although not preferred) heat transfer method as long as RPV water level can be maintained by available makeup sources.
	Condenser	The main condenser (if available) can be used for DHR.
	Remote Shutdown Panel (Two Divisions)	Cold Shutdown can be achieved and maintained from outside the control room if the control room is uninhabitable due to fire, toxic gas, or other reasons. The remote shutdown panel is powered by Class 1E power to ensure availability following a Loss Of Preferred Power (LOPP). Controls are hard wired and thus not dependent on multiplexing systems. A minimum set of monitored parameters and controls are included to ensure the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

# CDM MODIFICATION PAGES




Figure 2.15.10o Reactor Building Arrangement-Elevations 34500 mm and 38200 mm





Figure 3.2n Reactor Building Radiation Zone Map for Full Power and Shutdown Operations—Elevations 34500 mm and 38200 mm

# ENGINEERING DRAWING ADDITIONS (SSAR)

Military - world



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(REMARKS) EQUIPMENT


PRE COAT PUMP FUEL HANDLING MACHINE TEST PIT DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS 412, 423, AND 432 HAVE A SUNKEN PLOOR AT 12,000mm WITH A GRATING PLOOR AT 12,300mm.

#### INSTRUMENT BACK LIST


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H22-P033 2. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE RECOVERY RACK
H22-P035 3. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING LOCAL OPERATING PANEL
H22-P036 6. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (B)
H22-P037 7. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE HODINE SAMPLE RACK
H22-P038 8. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE HODINE SAMPLE RACK
H22-P039 9. CONTAINMENT VESSEL PRESSURE, LEAK TEST RACK
H22-P040 10. REACTOR CONTAINMENT VESSEL DEW POINT RECORDER RACK

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



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
SPECTION POOL
EMPORARY INSTALLED RAIL
CRO-RAIL
EMPORARY INSTALLED RAIL STORAGE AREA
EMPORARY RISTALLED RAIL STORAGE AREA
PELLER SHAFT GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
FEUSER WEAR KING GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
FEUSER STRETCH TUBE GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
PEUPER STORAGE AREA
PUPPER PURS STORAGE AREA
PUPPER PURS STORAGE AREA
PUPPER PORTION HANDLING CONNECTOR ROO STORAGE AREA

EQUIPMENT DIS POCIL SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

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







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D U43-D U41-D U41D U41D U41C U41C U41-

> TABLE 4 : TYPE EQ. [ U41-E 141-041-D U41-0 041-

HT:			

WO.	HVH HAME	HVH HITIATION SIGNAL (A)	(B)	(C)	HO. (D)		# HO. (E)	# NO. (C)	# NO. (H)	# NO. (1)	# NO.	CONF (K)
ior	ROSC PUMP ROOM HVH	ROIC PLANT START SIGNAL			F504	F 505	20A-HYAC -506	20-HVAC -509	2G-MYAC -510	20-HVAC -511	40-HVAC -512	8101
102	HPCF PLANT (C) POOK HYH	HPCF Plage ICL START SICHAL			F508	7507	-513	-514	-515	-516	-517	8102
2103	THE PLANT (A) ROOM HYH	RHR PLANT (A) START SIGNAL			F508	F509	-518	-519	-520	-521	-522	810.
2004	BHR FUMP ICI ROOM HVH	PHR PLANT ICI START SIGNAL			F 5 10	7511	-523	-524	-525	-526	-527	E104
105	THE PLANT ISS MOON HITH	RAR PLANT ON START SIGNAL			F 5.12	F513	-528	-529	-530	-531	-5.32	8105
108	HPCF PUMP RBI ROOM INVH	HPCF PLAGE (8) START SIGNAL			F534	F515	-533	~534	-535	-536	-537	9106
9807	FCS HOOM HVH IC)	SECONDARY CONTARMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL			F 5.16	7517	-538	-539	-540	~541	-542	9307
sore	FCS ROOM HVH (B)	SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL			F516	F519	-543	~5ee	-545	-546	-547	DWA
1111	SG1S ROOM HYH IC)	SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL			F524	F525	-558	-559	-580	-561	-562	5111
1112	SGTS ROOM HYN (B)	SECONDARY CONTAMMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL			F.526	1527	~563	-564	-565	-566	-567	8112
1113	CAMS (A) ROOM HYR	SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISSUATION SIGNAL			F528	F529	-568	-569	-570	~57t	-572	B77.5
ette	CAMS ON ROOM HVH	SECONDARY CONTARMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL			£530	F531	-573	-574	-575	~576	-577	8114
-	Anna Carrier Control of the Control											

#### FOR-ESSENTIAL HOW SHOW-SAFETY RELATED

NO.	HYH HAME	PAMEL NO. (A)	MO B		PPRING SIZE & NO. (D)	PRPRIC SIZE A NO. (I)	PRING SIZE & HO. (F)	PIPPING SIZE & NO. (S)	PAPAG SIZE & HD. (H)	COOK MG
H21A	RVA SES TURNEL HVH (A) HOTE 3		7536	£537	20A-HYAC -588	20A-HVAC -569	20A-NYAC -590	30A-HYAC -591	40A-HVAC -592	8121A
12 19	RVA MS TURNEL HON (B) NOTE 3		7538	7539	20A-HYAC -593	20A-HYAC -594	20A-HVAC -595	20A-HYAC -596	107.~HVAC -597	912 19
115	REA SPOU IAI ROOM		£	1	20A-HVAC -1503	20A-HYAC -1504	20A-HVAC -1505	20A-HYAC -1506	40A-HYAC -1507	B115
12.3	N/A REFLECTING MACHINE CONTROL ROOM HVH		Ŧ	F	20A-HYAC -598	20A-HYAC -599	20A-HVAC -1500	20A-HVAC -1501	40A-HVAC -1002	8123
109	FPC PIMP IAI ROOM HVH		7520	F521	-548	-549	-550	~551	-552	8109
710	FPC PUMP ISI ROOM HVH		£522	F523	-553	-554	-555	-556	-557	9110

#### HOTES

- S PPING MATERIALS FOR VENT AND DRAW SHALL BE CS.
- 2. PRPMG DESIGN. QUALITY CLASSFICATION SHALL BE 7G EXCEPT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.
- 1. THESE HVH'S CAN BE COMBINED INTO A COMMON CON.
- A. THESE FOURS ARE IN CONTROL BUILDING.

#### REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

MPL WO

- 1 PIPPING AND INSTRUMENT SYMBOLS DIAGRAM A10-3030
- 2. REACTOR BLDG COOLING WATER SYS PAID P21-1010 3. HYAC MORNAL COOLING WATER SYS PINO R24-1010

ABLE 5 - HON-ESSENTIAL FAN COIL LINET FELT MON-SAFETT RELATEDE


EQ. NO.	HYH MAME	RIPE SIZE	000LWG
41-0131A	REPATINCED AUTO EXCHANGER CONTROL PANEL ROOM FOU IAI	20A-HYAC -1514	@131A
#1-013 <i>1</i> 8	REPITMERD AUTO EXCHANGER CONTROL PAMEL ROOM FOU (S)	20A-HVAC -1515	812.68
41-913%	REPIFMEND AUTO EXCHANGER CONTROL PAMEL ROOM FOU (C)	20A-HYAC -1516	B131C
41-0132A	MC SET ROOM IN FEU HOTE &	20A-HYAG -1517	B132A
41-01328	MG SET ROOM HO! FOU HOTE &	20A-HVAC -1518	91528
41-0133A	HON-DIVISIONAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ZONE FEU HOTE 4	20a-HVAC ~1519	813.3
A F DESA A	EL ROOM FCU (A)	20A-HVAC ~1517	9134.4
41-01348	ISI ROOM FOU (B)	20A~HVAC =1515	81348

ANSTEC

R/A HON-ESSENTIAL FAN COL LAST TYPE MYSON

RYB AND CYB HVAC

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# ANSTEC APERTURE

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(REMARKS) EQUIPMENT


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
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3. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING LOCAL OPERATING PANEL
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6. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (B)
7. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE HOLINE SAMPLE RACK
8. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE HOLINE SAMPLE RACK
9. CONTAINMENT VESSEL PRESSURE, LEAK TEST RACK
10. REACTOR CONTAINMENT VESSEL DEW POINT RECORDER RACK H22-P032 H22-P035 H22-P036 H22-P037 H22-P038 H22-P040

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MANNY WATER



RACK NAME

STALLED RAIL


STALLED RAN, STORAGE AREA
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FING GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
FTCH TURE GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
TORAGE AREA
THON HANDLING CONNECTOR ROD STORAGE AREA

D/S POOL SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

Also Available on Aperture Card

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# ANSTEC

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(REMARKS) EQUIPMENT PRE COAT FUMP FUEL HANDLING MACHINE TEST PIT DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS 412, 423, AND 432 HAVE A SUNKEN FLOOR AT 12,000mm WITH A GRATING FLOOR AT 12,300mm.

#### INSTRUMENT BACK LIST


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6. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (B)
7. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE IODINE SAMPLE RACK
8. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE IODINE SAMPLE RACK
9. CONTAINMENT VESSEL PRESSURE, LEAK TEST RACK
10. REACTOR CONTAINMENT VESSEL DEW POINT RECORDER RACK H22-P032 H22-P033 H22-P035 H22-P036 H22-P037 H22-P038 H22-P039


#### ZONE DOSE RATE ( JUSY/h)

A ± 6 B < 10 C < 50 D < 250 E < 1000 F ≥ 1000


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FUEL HANDLING MACHINE TEST PIY
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SUNKEN FLOOR AT 12,000mm WITH A GRATING FLOOR AT 12,300mm.

#### INSTRUMENT RACK LIST

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H2S-P032

2. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE RECOVERY RACK
H2S-P035

3. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE RECOVERY RACK
H2S-P036

6. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (A)
H2S-P037

7. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (B)
H2S-P038

8. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE IDDINE SAMPLE RACK
H2S-P039


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H2S-P040


10. REACTOR CONTAINMENT VESSEL DEW POINT RECORDER RACK

#### [3] ZONE DOSE WATE (GyZh)

A ≤ 0.005 B < 0.05 C < 0.5 D < 5 € < 50 F ≥ 50

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PLACK NAME

PECTION POOL

PORARY INSTALLED RAIL

BORARY INSTALLED RAIL STORAGE AREA

BUERARY INSTALLED RAIL STORAGE AREA

BLEER SHAFT GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA

FUSER HAER RING GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA

FUSER STRETON TIME GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA

BEREA STORAGE AREA

LEPPER PORTION HANDLING CONNECTOR ROD STORAGE AREA

LEPPER PORTION HANDLING CONNECTOR ROD STORAGE AREA

[3] ZONE DOSE RATE (Gy/h)

A ± 0.005

8 < 0.05

C < 0.5

D < 5

E < 50


F ≥ 50

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(REMARKS). ECLIPMENT

SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

DVS POOL



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## ANSTEC APERTURE CARD Aled Available on Aperture Card

AREA RADIATION MONITOR SYMBOL

(R7)

[3]

1,300

[TAG\_TT]00] PAGE WATER CONTRACT

THE 130501

THESE INDICATES

BG CONTROL PANEL

Distriction)

(432)

(F4300) [Mil.] (NO)

(DANTERAS)

(TAX DAY)

X 412

(1300)

8500


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EQUIPMENT
PHE COAT PUMP
FUEL RANDLING MACHINE TEST PIT
DISSEL GENERATOR ROOMS 413, 423, AND 432 HAVE A
SUNKEN FLOOR AT 12,000mm WITH A GRATING FLOOR AT 12,300mm.


#### INSTRUMENT BACK LIST

#### (NO) NAME

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H32-P032 2. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE RECOVERY RACK
H32-P033 3. POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING LOCAL OPERATING PANEL
H32-P035 5. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (A)
H32-P036 6. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR GAS SAMPLER RACK (B)
H32-P037 7. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE IODINE SAMPLE RACK
H32-P038 6. STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM RADIATION MONITOR PARTICULATE IODINE SAMPLE RACK
H32-P039 9. CONTAINMENT VESSEL PRESSURE, LEAK TEST RACK
H32-P040 10. REACTOR CONTAINMENT VESSEL DEW POINT RECORDER RACK

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RACK NAME


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DRARY INSTALLED RAIL
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BRARY INSTALLED RAIL STORAGE AREA
LER SHAPT GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
SER WEAR RING GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
SER STRETO TUBE GRAPPLE STORAGE AREA
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LER PORTION HANDLING CONNECTOR ACC STORAGE AREA

(REMARKS) EQUIPMENT D/S POOL SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL AREA RADIATION MONTOR SYMBOL

S a ■ MONITOR ASSIGNED NUMBER

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## FIXED-POS



MERCON AND

## ANSTEC APERTURE CARD

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#### SITION DISPLAY




Figure 18C-7 FIXED-POSITION DISPLAY

Amendment 34 ABWR SSAR 23A6100 21-644

# REVISED CHANGE PAGE INSTRUCTION (SSAR)



Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

The following pages have been changed, please make the specified changes in your SSAR. Pages are listed as page pairs (front & back), exception Chapter 16. Bold page numbers represent a page that has been changed by Amendment 34.

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 2 TAB 2.0		CHAPTER 3 (Cont'd)	
1AB 2.0		TAB 3.3	
2.0-1 thru 3/4 2.0-3/4	2.0-1 thru 3/4 2.0-3/4	3.3-1 thru 4	3.3-1 thru 4
TAB 2.2		TAB 3.4	
2.2-3/4	2.2-3/4	3.4-1 thru 16	3.4-1 thru 18
TAB 2.3		TAB 3.5	
2.3-1, 2 2.3-5, 6	2.3-1, 2 2.3-5, 6	3.5-5 thru 12 3.5-5 thru 17/18 15 TAB 3.6	3.5-5 thru 12 3.5-5 thru 17/18
CHAPTER 3 TAB 3.0		3.6-1, 2 3.6-7 thru 12 3.6-31, 32	3.6-1, 2 3.6-7 thru 12 3.6-31, 32
3.0-i thru vi 3.0-ix thru xii 3.0-xv thru xviii	3.0-i thru vi 3.0-ix thru xii 3.0-xv thru xviii	3.6-37, 38 3.6-41, 42	3.6-37, 38 3.6-41, 42
3.0-xxi thru xxiv 3.0-xxii thru xxiv	3.0-xxi thru xxiv 3.0-xxvii,xxviii	TAB 3.7	
3.0-xxix,xxx TAB 3.1	3.0-XXIX, XXX	3.7-3, 4 3.7-15 thru 26 3.7-45 thru 48	3.7-3, 4 3.7-15 thru 26 3.7-45 thru 48
3.1-1, 2 3.1-9, 10	3.1-1, 2 3.1-9, 10	3,7-55 thru 78	3.7-55 thru 78
3.1-13, 14 3.1-19, 20	3.1-13, 14 3.1-19, 20	TAB 3.8	
3.1-35 thru 62	3.1-35 thru 62	3.8-1 thru 26 3.8-29, 30	3.8-1 thru 26 3.8-29, 30
TAB 3.2		3.8-37, 38 3.8-41 thru 48	3.8-37, 38 3.8-41 thru 48
3.2-5 thru 10 3.2-17 thru 62	3.2-5 thru 10 3.2-17 thru 62	3.8-51, 52 3.8-59, 60	3.8- <b>51</b> , 52 3.8- <b>59</b> , 60

\* Page 3.0-xxix should be Amendment 32 not 31 as provided in this modification package.

## ABWP, SSAR

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

The following pages have been changed, please make the specified changes in your SSAR. Pages are listed as page pairs (front & back), exception Chapter 16. Bold page numbers represent a page that has been changed by Amendment 34.

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 3 (Cont'd)		TAB App. 3B	
TAB 3.9		3B-5 thru 70	3B-5 thru 73/74
3.9-1 thru 156	3.9-1 thru 155/156	TAB App. 3E	
TAB 3.10		3E-7, 8	3E-7, 8
3.10-1, 2	3.10-1, 2	3E-9 thru 12 3E-15 thru 26 3E-33 thru <del>59/60</del> 50	3E-9 thru 12 3E-15 thru 26 3E-33 thru <del>59/60</del> 50
TAB 3.11		3E-55 thru 59/60 TAB App. 3G	3E-55+hrn 59/60*
3.11-3, 4 TAB 3.12	3.11-3, 4	3G-5, 6 3G-9 thru 115/116	3G-5, 6 3G-9 thru 115/116
3.12-1 thru 3/4	3.12-1 thru 4	TAB App. 3H	
TAB 3.13		3H.0-iii thru viii	3H.0-iii thru viii
3.13-1, 2 3.13-7 thru 10 3.13-13 thru 16 TAB App. 3A	3.13-1, 2 3.13-7 thru 10 3.13-13 thru 21	3H.1-3 thru 10 3H.1-13 thru 86 3H.1-89 thru 92 3H.1-97 thru 102 3H.1-105 thru 113/114	3H.1-3 thru 10 3H.1-13 thru 86 3H.1-89 thru 92 3H.1-97 thru 102 3H.1-105 thru 113/114
3A-3 thru 8 3A-11, 12 3A-27, 28	3A-3 thru 8 3A-11, 12 3A-27, 28	3H.2-1 thru 10 3H.2-13 thru 30	3H.2-1 thru 10 3H.2-13 thru 30
3A-31 thru 50 3A-59 thru 62 3A-71, 72	3A-31 thru 50 3A-59 thru 62 3A-71, 72	3H.3-1 thru 8 3H.3-11 thru 38	3H.3-1 thru 8 3H.3-11 thru 39
3A-75 thru 94 3A-97 thru 296	3A-75 thru 94 3A-97 thru 296	3H.4-1 thru 6	3H.4-1 thru 6
3A-97 turu 290	30-77 (11) (1 47)	3H.5-1, 2	3H.5-1, 2
		TAB App. 3I	
		3I-1 thru 18	3I-1 thru 18

<sup>\*</sup> Pages 3E-51,52 and 53,54 provided in this modification package in the event they were discarded earlier.

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

The following pages have been changed, please make the specified changes in your SSAR. Pages are listed as page pairs (front & back), exception Chapter 16. Bold page numbers represent a page that has been changed by Amendment 34.

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 5 (Cont'd)		CHAPTER 6 (Cont'd	Ď.
TAB 5.2		TAB 6.1	
5.2-1 thru 20	5.2-1 thru 20	6.1-1 thru 4	6.1-1 thru 4
5.2-25 thru 36 5.2-39, 40	5.2-25 thru 36 5.2-39, 40	6.1-7, 8	6.1-7, 8
5.2-45 thru 50	5.2-45 thru 50	TAB 6.2	
5.2-53 thru 56 5.2-71, 72	5.2- <b>53 thru 56</b> 5.2- <b>71, 72</b>	6.2-1 thru 228	6.2-1 thru 241/242
5.2-75, 76 5.2-81, 82	5.2- <b>75</b> , <b>76</b> 5.2- <b>81</b> , <b>82</b>	TAB 6.3	
TAB 5.3		6.3-1 thru 8	6.3-1 thru 8
And addition of the		6.3-11 thru 14	6.3-11 thru 14
5.3-5 thru 8	5.3-5 thru 8	6.3-17 thru 86	6.3-17 thru 87/88
5.3-11 thru 18 5.3-21, 22	5.3-11 thru 18 5.3-21, 22	TAB 6.4	
5.3-25/26	5.3-25/26	6.4-1 thru 10	6.4-1 thru 10
TAB 5.4		0.4-1 thru 10	0.4-1 then 10
		TAB 6.5	
5.4-3, 4	5.4-3, 4		
5.4-7 thru 73	5.4-7 thru 75	6.5-1 thru 17/18	6.5-1 thru 18
TAB App. 5A		TAB 6.6	
54.1.2	54.1.2	6.6-5,6 6.6-1,2	6.6-5,6 6.6-1,2
5A-1, 2	5A-1, 2	6.6-11, 12	6.6-11, 12
5A-7, 8	5A-7, 8	6.6-29/30	6.6-29/30
TAB App. 5B		6.6-39 thru 42	6.6-39 thru 42
5B-1 thru 5	5B-1 thru 5	TAB 6.7	
		6.7-1 thru 6	6.7-1 thru 6
CHAPTER 6			


TAB 6.0

6.0-i thru xii

6.0-i thru xii

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPER 6 (Cont'd)		CHAPTER 7 (Cont'd)	
TAB App. 6A		TAB 7.2	
6A-3, 4 6A-9 thru 12	6A-3, 4 6A-9 thru 12	7.2-5 thru 24 7.2-47, 48 (7.2-47, 48)	7.2-5 thru 24
		TAB 7.2 (cor	nt'd)
TAB App. 6B 6B-1, 2 6B-5, 6	6B-1, 2 6B-5, 6	7.2-53, 54 7.2-57, 58 TAB 7.3	7.2-53, <b>54</b> 7.2-57, <b>58</b>
TAB App. 6C			7714
6C-1 thru 3/4	6C-1 thru 3/4	7.3-1 thru 4 7.3-7 thru 16 7.3-19 thru 22	7.3-1 thru 4 7.3-7 thru 16 7.3-19 thru 22
TAB App. 6D 6D-1,2) 3/4	6D-1(2) 3/	7.3-33, 34 7.3-49, 50 7.3-53 thru 68 7.3-71, 72	7.3-33, 34 7.3-49, 50 7.3-53 thru 68 7.3-71, 72
TAB App. 6E		7.3-81, 82 7.3-87 thru 96	7.3-81, 82 7.3-87 thru 97/98
Add	6E-1 thru 3	TAB 7.4	
CHAPTER 7		7.4-1 thru 4 7.4-7, 8	7.4-1 thru 4 7.4-7, 8
TAB 7.0		7.4-17, 18 7.4-27 thru 30	7.4-17, 18 7.4-27 thru 30
7.0-i thru vii/viii	7.0-1 thru vii/viii	TAB 7.5	
TAB 7.1		7.5-1, 2	7.5-1, 2
7.1-1 thru 4 7.1-15 thru 24 7.1-27, 28 7.1-33, 34	7.1-1 thru 4 7.1-15 thru 24 7.1-27, 28 7.1-33, 34	7.5-7 thru 14 7.5-21 thru 24 7.5-27 thru 29	7.5-7 thru 14 7.5-21 thru 24 7.5-27 thru 29
7.1-37, 38	7.1-37, 38		



Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 9 (Cont'd)	1	CHAPTER 9 (Cont's	D.
TAB 9.1		TAB App.	9A (cont'd)
9.1-3, 4	9.1-3, 4	9A.4-1 thru 507	9A.4-1 thru 502
9.1-9 thru 18	9.1-9 thru 18		
9.1-23 thru 32	9.1-23 thru 32	9A.5-9 thru 14	9A.5-9 thru 14
9.1-35 thru 50	9.1-35 thru 50	9A.5-25, 26	9A.5-25, 26
9.1-55 thru 60	9.1-55 thru 60		
9.1-65, 66	9.1-65, 66	9A.6-99, 100	9A.6-99, 100
9.1-69, 70	9.1-69, 70		
		TAB App.	<u>9B</u>
TAB 9.2		9B-3 thru 14	9B-3 thru 14
9.2-1 thru 4	9.2-1 thru 4		
9.2-11 thru 70	9.2-11 thru 70	TAB App.	9C
9.2-73 thru 76	9.2-73 thru 76		
		9C-1 thru 12	9C-1 thru 12
TAB 9.3			
		TAB App	9D
9.3-3 thru 6	9.3-3 thru 6		
9.3-11 thru 14	9,3-11 thru 14	9D-1, 2	9D-1, 2
9.3-17 thru 36	9.3-17 thru 36	9D-5, 6	9D-5, 6
9.3-39 thru 42	9.3-39 thru 42		
9.3-45 thru 48	9.3-45 thru 48		
		CHAPTER 10	
TAB 9.4			
		TAB 10.0	
9.4-1 thru 57	9.4-1 thru 57	1001/11/1	1001/21/41
70.00.00		10.0-i/ii thru v/vi	10.0-i/ii/ thru v/vi
TAB 9.5		TAB 101	
		TAB 10.1	.8
9.5-1 thru 90	9.5-1 thru 90	8	10.1-1 thru
T + D + 0		10.1-1 thru 🕡 💆	10.1-1 tara (10)
TAB App. 9	A	TAB 10.2	
9A.2-3 thru 9/10	9A.2-3 thru 9/10	albelia Australia Salis	
J. 110 0 110 0 7/ 10		10.2-1 thru 21/22	10.2-1 thru 21/22
9A.3-3	9A.3-3		

Amendment 34 - Page change instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 14		TAB 14.2 (C	ontinued)
TAB 14.0			
		14.2-61,62	14.2-61,62
14.0-i thru v/vi	14.0-i thru v/vi	14.2-71,72	
		14.2-75 thru 170	14.2-75 thru 170
TAB 14.2		14.2-179 thru 182	14.2-179 thru
			182
14.2-11 thru 18	14.2-11 thru 18	14.2-185,186	14.2-185,186
14.2-21,22	14.2-21,22	14.2-193 thru 200	14.2-193 thru
	14.2-25 thru3 0		2 0 0
	14.2-33, thru 34		
14.2-39 thru 42		TAB 14.3	
	14.2-47 thru 50		
14.2-53,54	14.2-53,54	14.3-5 thru 59	14.4-5 thru 60

Amendment 34 - Page change instruction (continued)

The following pages have been changed, please make the specified changes in your SSAR. Pages are listed as page pairs (front & back), exception Chapter 16. Bold page numbers represent a page that has been changed by Amendment 34.

	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 15		TAB 15.6 (cc	ontinued)
TAB 15.0		15.6-45 thru 47/48	15.6-45 thru 47/48
15.0-i thru xviii	15.0-i thru xvi		
15.0-5 thru 19	15.0-5 thru 19*	TAB 15.7	
TAB 15.1		15.7-1,2	15.7-1,2
15.1-3 thru (8)	15.1-3 thru (8)	15.7-5 thru 20	15.7-5 thru 20
15.1-15 thru 18 15.1-21 thru 24	15.1-15 thru 18	TAB 15.8	
	73.1-21 000 24	15.8-1.2	15.8-1,2
TAB 15.2		TAR 15A	
15.2-1 thru 12	15.2-1 thru 1.2	TAB 15A	
15.2-15 thru 24		15 A-i/ii	15 A - 1/11
15.2-27 thru 55/56	15 2 - 27	15A-v thru viii	
COLUMN CO	thru 55/56 **	15A-7 thru 10	
		15A-23/24	
TAB 15.3		15A-35/36	
15.3-1 thru 19/20	15.3-1 thru 18***	15A-41 thru 48	
15.4-3 thru 10	15 4 3 three 10 .	15A-57 thru 88	
		15A-91 thru 110	
TAB 15.4		15A-113 thru 118	
15.4-3 thru 10	15.4-3 thru 1.0	15A-121 thru	15A-121 thru
	15.4-19 thru 23/24	127/128	127/128
	***	TAB L'B	
TAB 15.5			
distribution A.K. diffe		15B-11 thru 15	15B-11 thru 16
15.5-1 thru 4	15.5-1 thru 4	15B-35/36	15B-35/36
TAB 15.6		TAB 15D	
15.6-11,12	15.6-3 thru 8 15.6-11,12 15.6-17 thru 42	15D-1,2	15D-1,2
000 15.0-5 6	provided in +1	nis modification	package

\* Pages 15.0-5,6 provided in this modification package

\*\* Page 15.2-25,26 provided in this modification package

\*\*\* Page 15.3-1,2 provided in this modification package

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPER 16 Pages p	printed on one side.	CHAPER 16 (Cont'	<u>d)</u>
TAB 16.0		TAB 16.3	4
iii	iii	3.4-3	3.4-3
vii	vii	3.4-4	3.4-4
***		3.4-6	3.4-6
16.0-2	16.0-2	3.4-8	3.4-8
		3.4-12 thru 17	3.4-12 thru 17
TAB 16.2		3.4-23	3.4-23
2.0-1	2.0-1	TAB 16.3	5
TAB 16.3		3.5-1 thru 6	3.5-1 thru 6
A. S.		3.5-10	3.5-10
3.0-2	3.0-2		
J.07.4		TAB 16.3	.6
TAB 16.3.1		a constitution of the cons	
J. L. M. C B. M. L. M. L. M B. M. L. M. L. M. M. L. M.		3.6-2	3.6-2
3.1-6	3.1-6	3.6-7	3.6-7
3.1-12 thru 14	3.1-12 thru 14	3.6-12	3.6-12
3.1-16	3.1-16	3.6-15 thru 18	3.6-15 thru 18
3.1-21	3.1-21	3.6-21 thru 23	3.6-21 thru 23
		3.6-28	3.6-28
TAB 16.3.3		3.6-29	3.6-29
3.3-6	3.3-6	3.6-34	3.6-34
3.3-1 thru 3	3.3-1 thru 3		
3.3-560°	3.3-5(6)	TAB 16.3	3.7
33-8	3.3-8		
3.3-10 thru 16	3.3-10 thru 16	3.7-16	3.7-16
3.3-21	3.3-21	3.7-17	3.7-17
3.3-24	3.3-24		
3.3-28 thru 32	3.3-28 thru 32	TAF. 16.	3.8
3.3-34 thru 38	3.3-34 thru 38		
3-42	3.3-42	3.8-1	3.8-1
J.3-52	3.3-52	3.8-3	3.8-3
3.3-68 thru 71	3.3-68 thru 71	3.8-5 thru 8	3.8-5 thru 8
3.3-74	3.3-74	3.8-10 thru 13	3.8-10 thru 13

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

The following pages have been changed, please make the specified changes in your SSAR. Pages are listed as page pairs (front & back), exception Chapter 16. Bold page numbers represent a page that has been changed by Amendment 34.

REMOVE	ADD	REMOVE	ADD
PAGE No.	PAGE No.	PAGE No.	PAGE No.
		CONT. PROPERTY AND ADDRESS.	
CHAPTER 16 (Cont's	<u>d)</u>	CHAPTER 16 (Cont'd	
		TAB 16B.3	
TAB 16.3.8	(cont'd)	2200	D 20 F
		B 3.0-5	B 3.0-5
3.8-15	3.8-15	B 3.0-11	B 3.0-11
3.8-17	3.8-17	71 D 17 D 27	
3.8-18	3.8-18	TAB 16B.3.	83.3-39
3.8-25 thru 27	3.8-25 thru 27	8 3.3-39 B 3.3-40	83.3-40
3.8-42 thru 44	3.8-42 thru 44		B 3.3-10
3.8-50	3.8-50	B 3.3-12	B 3.3-12
		B 3.3-13	B 3.3-13
TAB 16.3.9		B 3.3-17	B 3.3-17
		B 3.3-18	B 3.3-18
3.9-2	3.9-2	B 3.3-34	B 3.3-34
3.9-3	3.9-3	B 3.3-35	B 3.3-35
3.9-7	3.9-7	B 3.3-54	B 3.3-54
3.9-9	3.9-9	В 3.3-57	B 3.3-57
3.9-11	3.9-11	B 3.3-60 thru 84	B 3.3-60 thru 84
		B 3.3-100	B 3.3-100
TAB 16.5		B 3.3-102 thru 104	B 3.3-102 thru 104
		B 3.3-107	B 3.3-107
5.0-14	5.0-14	B 3.3-110	B 3.3-110
5.0-18	5.0-18	B 3.3-120 thru 124	B 3.3-120 thru 124
		B 3.3-126	B 3.3-126
TAB 16B.3.	1	B 3.3-129	B 3.3-129
		B 3.3-130	B 3.3-130
B 3.1-11	B 3.1-11	B 3.3-134	B 3.3-134
B 3.1-14	B 3.1-14	B 3.3-136	B 3.3-136
B 3.1-23 thru 25	B 3.1-23 thru 25	B 3.3-139	B 3.3-139
B 3.1-27	B 3.1-27	B 3.3-161 thru 163	B 3.3-161 thru 163
B 3.1-31 thru 33	B 3.1-31 thru 33	B 3.3-165 thru 167	B 3.3-165 thru 167
B 3.1-41	B 3.1-41	B 3.3-182	B 3.3-182
		B 3.3-183	B 3.3-183
TAB 16B.2		B 3.3-211	B 3.3-211
		B 3.3-215	B 3.3-215
B 2.0-2	B 2.0-2	B 3.3-217	B 3.3-217
B 2.0-3	B 2.0-3	B 3.3-238	B 3.3-238
B 2.0-8	B 2.0-8	B 3.3-240	B 3.3-240

## CHAPTER 17

\* All pages provided in this modification package

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	
CHAPTER 18		CHAPTER 18 (Cont	<u>'d)</u>	
TAB 18.0		TAB App.	18B	
18.0-i, ii 18.0-iii/iv 18.0-v/vi	18.0-i, ii 18.0-iii/iv 18.0-v/vi	18B-1 thru 50  TAB App.	18B-1 thru 48	
TAB 18.1			18C-1, 2	
18.1-1/2	18.1-1/2	18C-1, 2 18C-7, 8 18C-9, 10	18C-7, 8 18C-9, 10	
TAB 18.3				
18.3-1, 2	18.3-1, 2	TAB App. 18D		
TAB 18.4		18D-1 thru 16	18D-1 thru 16	
18.4-3 thru 10	18.4-3 thru 10	TAB App	18E	
TAB 18.5 18.5-1/2	18.5-1/2**	18E-1, 2 18E-5 thru 32 18E-39 thru 44	18E-1, 2 18E-5 thru 32 18E-39 thru 44	
TAB 18.6			TAB App. 18F	
18.6-1, 2	18.6-1, 2	18F-1 thru 14	18F-1 thru 14	
TAB 18.8		TAB App	. 18G	
18.8-1, 2	18.8-1, 2	18G-1 thru 10	18G-1 thru 10	
TAB App. 18	A	TAB App	. 18H	
18A-1 thru 3	18A-1 thru 3 A	Add	18H-1 thru 4.3	

<sup>\*</sup> Page 18.5-1/2 provided in this information. It should be Amendment 33.

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

	THE PARTY AND	
PAGE No.	PAGE No. PAGE No.	
	CHAPTER 19 (Cont'd)	
	TAB, 19.10	
19-8 thru xxxiv	19.10-1 thru 4	19.10-1 thru 4
	TAB 19.11	
19.1, 2	19.11-1/2	19.11-1/2
	TAB App. 1	19A
19.2-1 thru 10	19A-7, 8	19A-7, 8
	19A-17, 18	19A-17, 18
	19A-19, 20	19A-19, <b>20</b>
19.3-1 thru 24	TAB App.	19B
	19B-1 thru 6	19B-1 thru 6
19.5-1 thru 3/4	19B-11, 12 19B-17 thru 62 19B-65 thru 124	19B-11, 12 19B-17 thru 62 19B-65 thru 124
	T.D.	100
10.6-1 then 7/8	TAB App.	190
12.072 1010 170	19D-i thru xvi	19D-i thru xvii/xviii
	19D.3-13 thru 16	19D.3-13 thru 16
19.7-5 thru 10		
		19D.4-7 thru 13
	19D.4-17 thru 24	19D.4-17 thru 24
19.8-3 thru 6	19D.5-7 thru 16	19D.5-7 thru 16
19.8-9, 10	19D,5-27 thru 30	19D.5-27 thru 30
19.8-23 thru 28	19D.5-41, 42	19D.5-41, 42
19.8-33 thru 41/42	19D.5-49, 50	19D.5-49, 50 19D.5-65, 66
	190.5-65, 66	1917.5-05, 00
	19D.6-7.8	19D.6-7, 8
19.9-1 thru 13/14	19D.6-11 thru 20	19D.6-11 thru 19
	19.4 thru xxxiv  19.1, 2  19.2-1 thru 10  19.3-1 thru 24  19.5-1 thru 3/4  19.6-1 thru 7/8  19.7-5 thru 10  19.8-3 thru 6 19.8-9, 10 19.8-23 thru 28 19.8-33 thru 41/42	PAGE No. PAGE No. PAGE No. CHAPTER 19 (Cont'd)  TAB. 19.10  19-8 thru xxxiv  19.10-1 thru 4  TAB 19.11  19.1, 2  19.11-1/2  TAB App. 1  19.2-1 thru 10  19A-7, 8 19A-17, 18 19A-19, 20  19.3-1 thru 24  TAB App. 1  19B-1 thru 6 19B-11, 12 19B-17 thru 62 19B-65 thru 124  TAB App. 1  19.6-1 thru 7/8  19D-i thru xvi 19D.3-13 thru 16  19D.4-7 thru 13 19D.4-17 thru 24  19.8-3 thru 6 19D.5-7 thru 16 19.8-9, 10 19B-3-3 thru 16 19D.5-7 thru 16 19D.5-7 thru 30 19B-3-3 thru 41/42 19D.5-41, 42 19D.5-49, 50 19D.5-65, 66

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 19 (Cont'd)		CHAPTER 19 (Cont'd)	
TAB 19D (cont	('d)	TAB 19ED	
19D.7-1, 2 19D.7-7 thru 18 19D.7-20, 20-21, 2.2 19D.7-27 thru 30	19D.7-1, 2 19D.7-7 thru 18 19D.7-20, 2) - 21, 22 19D.7-27 thru 30	19ED-1 thru 28 TAB 19EE	19ED-1 thru 35/36*
19D.9-1, 2	19D.9-1, 2	19EE-1, 2 19EE-7 thru 18	19EE-1, 2 19EE-7 thru 18
19D.10-1, 2	19D.10-1, 2	TAB 19F	
19D.12-1 thru 3/4	19D.12-1 thru 3/4	19F-1 thru 19	19F-1 thru 19
19D.13-1, 2	19D.13-1, 2	TAB 19FA	
TAB 19E		19FA-1 thru 5/6	19FA-1 thru 5/6
19E.2-5 thru 250	19E.2-5 thru 300	TAB 19H	
19E.3-3 thru 12 TAB 19EA	19E.3-3 thru 12	19H-5 thru 8 19H-11 thru 16 19H-19, 20 19H-23 thru 32	19H-5 thru 8 19H-11 thru 16 19H-19, 20 19H-23 thru 32
19EA-3 thru 6 19EA-15, 16 19EA-21 thru 44 TAB 19EB	19EA-3 thru 6 19EA-15, 16 19EA-21 thru 47	TAB 19I 19I-3 thru 12 19I-19, 20	19I-3 thru 12 19I-19, 20
19EB-9 thru 22	19EB-9 thru 22	TAB 19J	
TAB 19EC 19EC-3, 4	19EC-3, 4	19K-5 thru 18 19K-21 thru 31/32	19K-5 thru 18 19K-21 thru 31/32
19EC-25, 26 19EC-29 thru 32 19EC-37 thru 39/40	19EC-25, 26 19ED-29 thru 32 19EC-37 thru 39/40		

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

The following pages have been changed, please make the specified changes in your SSAR. Pages are listed as page pairs (front & back), exception Chapter 16. Bold page numbers represent a page that has been changed by Amendment 34.

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER 19 (Cont'd)		CHAPTER 19 (Cont'd)	
TAB 19L			
	*	TAB 19QC	
19L-7 thru 12 28	19L-7 thu 12 28*		1000001 10
19L-21 thru(27)	19L-21 thru (27)	19QC-3 thru 18	19QC-3 thru 18
19L-47, 48	19L-47, 48	19QC-35, 36	19QC-35, 36
		19QC-39, 40	19QC-39, 40
TAB 19M		19QC-43, 44	19QC-43, 44
		19QC-47, 48	19QC-47, 48
19M-1, 2	19M-1, 2	19QC-51 thru 56	19QC-51 thru 56
19M-7, 8	19M-7, 8		
19M-11 thru 22	19M-11 thru 22	TAB 19R	
19M-31, 32	19M-31, 32		
19M-43 thru 48	19M-43 thru 48	19R-1 thru 53/54	19R-1 thru 53/54
TAB 19N			
		CHAPTER 20	
19N-3 thru 20	19N-3 thru 20		
		TAB 20.0	
TAB 19P			
		20.0-v, vi	20.0-v, vi
19P-1 thru 24	19P-1 thru 24		
19P-29 thru 31/32	19P-29 thru 31/32	TAB 20.1	
TAB 19Q		20.1-1 thru 12	20.1-1 thru 12
	190-7 thru 85 46 **	20.1-19, 20 37/38	20.1-19, 20 _37/38
190-7 thru 43 46	19Q-7 thru (15)	20.1-23 thru	20.1 23 thru 28
19Q-57, 58	19Q-57, 58	-20.1 29, 30	20.1-29, 30
19Q-63 thru 68	19O-63 thru 68	20.1-31 thru 37/38	20.1 31 thru 37/38
19Q-73, 74	19Q-73, 74		
		TAB 20.2.8	
TAB 19QB			
Andread Control of the St.		20.2.8-11, 12	20.2.8-11, 12
19QB-1 thru 6	19QB-1 thru 6		
With Middle of British Mar No.	A COMPANY OF SERVICES OF		

\* page 19L-27,28 provided in this modification package \*\* page 19Q-45,46 provided in this modification package

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
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CHAPTER (19 (Cont'd)		CHAPTER (9 (Cont'd)	
TAB 20.2.10		TAB 20.3.3	
20.2.10-1/2	20.2.10-1 thru 7/8	20.3.3-9, 10	20.3.3-9, 10
TAB 20.2.14		20.3.3-25, 26	20.3.3-25, 26
1AD 20.2.14		TAB 20,3.4	
20.2.14-1/2	20.2.14-1/2	with a control of the	
		20.3.4-1 thru 4	20.3.4-1 thru 4
TAB 20.2.16		20.3.4-9, 10	20.3.4-9, 10
		20.3.4-13, 14	20.3.4-13, 14
20.2.16-1/2	20.2.16-1/2	20.3.4-19, 20	20.3.4-19, 20
		20.3.4-25 thru 28	20.3.4-25 thru 28
TAB 20.2.19		20.3.4-31 thru 39/40	20.3.4-31 thru 39/40
20.2.19-27, 28	20.2.19-27, 28	TAB 20.3.6	
TAB 20.3.1		20.3.6-5 thru 16	20.3.6-5 thru 16
		20.3.6-21, 22	20.3.6-21, 22
20.3.1-3 thru 6	20.3.1-3 thru 6		
20.3.1-15 thru 22	20.3.1-15 thru 22	TAB 20.3.7	
TAB 20.3.2		20.3.7-5, 6	20.3.7-5, 6
ALLER AND		20.3.7-9, 10	20.3.7-9, 10
20.3.2-9, 10 \$	20.3.2-9, 10 >	20.3.7-19, 20	20.3.7-19, 20
20.3.2-17(18) thrus 26	20.3.2-17(18) thru 26	20.3.7-29 thru 36	20.3.7-29 thru 36
20.3.2-23 thru 26	20.3.2-23 thru 26		
20.3.2-37, 38	20.3.2-37, 38	TAB 20.3.8	
20.3.2-41, 42	20.3.2-41, 42		
20.3.2-47, 48	20.3.2-47, 48	20.3.8-9 thru 14	20.3.8-9 thru 14
20.3.2-59, 60	20.3.2-59, 60	20.3.8-21, 22	20.3.8-21, 22
20.3.2-71 thru 77/78	20.3.2-71 thru 77/78	20.3.8-45, 46	20.3.8-45, 46
		20.3.8-65 thru 68	20.3.8-65 thru 68
		20.3.8-83, 84	20.3.8-83, 84
		20.3.8-89, 90	20.3.8-89, 90

Amendment 34 - Page Change Instruction (continued)

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REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.	REMOVE PAGE No.	ADD PAGE No.
CHAPTER (9 (Cont'd)		CHAPTER (9 (Cont's	<u>n</u>
TAB 20.3.9		TAB 20.3.1	(cont'd)
20.3.9-3 thru 6	20,3.9-3 thru 6	20.3.15-39, 40	20.3.15-39, 40
20.3.9-27, 28 20.3.9-35 thru 44	20.3.9-27, 28 20.3.9-35 thru 44	TAB 20.3.16	6
TAB 20,3.10		20.3.16-5, 6 20.3.16-13 thru 16	20.3.16-5, 6 20.3.16-13 thru 16
20.3.10-1 thru 24	20.3.10-1 thru 24	TAB 20.3.1	7
TAB 20,3.11			20.3.17-3, 4
20.3.11-1, 2 20.3.11-11, 12	20.3.11-1, <b>2</b> 20.3.11, 12	20.3.17-3, 4 20.3.17-7, 8 20.3.17-21, 22	20.3.17-7, 8 20.3.17-21, 22
TAB 20.3.12			
20.3.12-1 thru 4	20.3.12-1 thru 4	CHAPTER 21	
20.3.12-7, 8 20.3.12-23, 24	20.3.12-7, 8 20.3.12-23, 24	*	All new figures

#### TAB 20.3.13

20.3.13-5 thru 22 20.3.13-5 thru 22

#### TAB 20.3.14

20.3.14-1, 2 20.3.14-39, 40 20.3.14-39, 40

#### TAB 20.3.15

20.3.15-9, 10 20.3.15-9, 10 20.3.15-13, 14 20.3.15-13, 14 20.3.15-17 thru 20 20.3.15-17 thru 20 20.3.15-23, 24 20.3.15-23, 24

\* Replace old figures with new figures (figure-by-figure and sheet-by-sheet) except remove and do not replace Figure 12.3-6.