



**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70776

AREA CODE 504 535-8094 346-8651

November 5, 1990  
RBG- 33946  
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-029 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell  
Manager-Oversight  
River Bend Nuclear Group

*LAE* / *PDG* / *DEJ* / *DCH* / *CEB* / *pg*

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 5 1 8	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 3
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TITLE (4)  
Safety Relief Valve Air Supply System Removed From Service  
Resulting in Violation of Technical Specifications

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)															
1	0	0	6	9	0	9	0	0	0	2	9	0	0	1	1	0	5	9	0			0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 0	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)							
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)							
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER
NAME L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing	AREA CODE 5 0 4	3 3 1 - 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1010 on 10/06/90 with the plant in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), the Control Operating Foreman (COF) authorized the removal of the safety relief valve air supply system from service. This rendered the high pressure core spray (HPCS) suppression pool level transmitters (1E22\*NG55C and 1E22\*NG55G) inoperable which in turn defeated the HPCS suction automatic transfer function. This condition persisted until 0625 on 10/07/90 when the COF placed trip unit 1E22\*NG55C in the tripped condition. Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1.C.1.e, action 35 requires placing the trip unit in the tripped condition within 1 hour or declaring the HPCS system inoperable. Since this action was violated this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the Technical Specifications. The root cause of this event was the COF not recognizing the relationship between the safety relief valve air supply system, the suppression pool level instrumentation and the high pressure core spray system. The increased operation and maintenance activities during the refueling outage contributed to this oversight. Training on this event has been provided for all licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators with a review of Technical Specification 3.3.3.b. In addition, procedure SOP-0011 ("Main Steam System") was revised to provide guidance for safety relief valve air supply shutdown and to identify Technical Specification 3.3.3.b.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5   0   0   0 4   5   8 9   0 --   0 2   9 --   0 1 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

**REPORTED CONDITION**

At 1010 on 10/06/90 with the plant in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), the Control Operating Foreman (COF) authorized the removal of the safety relief valve air supply system (\*LE\*) from service. This rendered the high pressure core spray (HPCS) suppression pool level transmitters (\*LT\*) (1E22\*N655C and 1E22\*N655G) inoperable which in turn defeated the HPCS suction automatic transfer function (automatic transfer from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool). This condition persisted until 0625 on 10/07/90 when the COF placed trip unit 1E22\*N655C in the tripped condition. Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1.C.1.e, action 35 requires placing the trip unit in the tripped condition within 1 hour or declaring the HPCS system (\*BG\*) inoperable. Since this action was violated, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the Technical Specifications.

**INVESTIGATION**

The root cause of this event was the COF not recognizing the relationship between the safety relief valve air supply system (\*LE\*), the suppression pool level instrumentation and the high pressure core spray system (\*BG\*). The increased operation and maintenance activities during the refueling outage contributed to this oversight.

The two HPCS suppression pool level transmitters (\*LT\*), 1E22\*N655C and 1E22\*N655G are bubbler transmitters and actuate on high level to automatically transfer the HPCS suction path from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool. With the air supply valved out, the automatic transfer function is defeated.

**CORRECTIVE ACTION**

Training on this event has been provided for all licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators with a review of Technical Specification 3.3.3.b.

All COFs and Shift Supervisors have been reminded to thoroughly review and take the extra time required to identify the interrelationships between systems and Technical Specifications.

The procedure, SOP-0011 ("Main Steam System") was revised to provide guidance for safety relief valve air supply shutdown and to identify Technical Specification 3.3.3.b.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555; AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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		9   0	--   0   2   9	--   0   0	0   3	OF 0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

**SAFETY ASSESSMENT**

During this event the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system (\*BG\*) would still fulfill its safety function with a suction path aligned to the condensate storage tank (\*TK\*) (CST). A licensed operator was available to align the HPCS suction to the suppression pool. All required backup systems were fully operable during this time. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).