

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

September 23, 1982

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

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SCE
REGION V TCE
TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Interim Report
Licensee Event Report 82-103
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Reference: Letter, H.B. Ray (SCE) to R.H. Engelken (NRC),
dated September 7, 1982 (LER 82-094)

This submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 6.9.1.13b of Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-10. It describes a reportable condition involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3 associated with containment isolation valves. A preliminary copy of LER 82-103 is enclosed.

While in Mode 3, at 0001 on August 25, 1982, the Semiannual Engineered Safety Features (ESF) subgroup relay test in accordance with procedure S023-3-3.43 was in progress. During this test, hot leg sample isolation valve 2HV-0517's breaker 2BJ-23 tripped on overload, while attempting to close the valve. The valve was declared inoperable and LCO 3.6.3 Action Statement b was initiated. As required by this Action Statement, the penetration was isolated by shutting redundant valve 2HV-0509.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the trouble was a burned out motor on the operator associated with the valve. This motor was replaced and the valve was returned to service in accordance with S023-3-3.30 at 1602 on August 26, 1982.

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R. H. Engelken

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September 23, 1982

The burned out motor may be attributable to adjustments made on the limit/torque switches as outlined in the referenced letter. This problem will be included in the on-going engineering investigation to determine if a problem actually exists in the switch adjustment procedures or in their implementation. Consistent with our commitment in the referenced transmittal letter for LER 82-094, a revised LER 82-103 will be provided by October 15, 1982 based on the results of this investigation.

Since the penetration was isolated by securing the redundant valve in the closed position, there was no impact on health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,

HB Berg / M. M. M. M.

Enclosure: LER 82-103

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control

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