NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | O H D B S 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)
LICENSEE CODE 9–14 | LICENSE NUMBER 15–25 | LICENSE TYPE 26–30 | CAT 57–58

CON'T 01 REPORT SOURCE L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6 (7) | EVENT DATE 0 8 2 7 8 2 (8) | REPORT DATE 0 9 2 4 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 (NP-33-82-46) On 8/27/82 during a plant startup, the Once Through Steam Generator 1
03 (OTSG) level reached a maximum of 360" on full range instrumentation. The unit
04 entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.4.5. The Technical Specifi-
05 cation limit of 348" was exceeded for approximately 45 minutes. There was no danger
06 to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. No water entered main
07 steam lines, and the boron concentration was sufficient to maintain adequate shutdown
08 margin in the event of a main steam line break.

09	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	C H (11)	A (12)	A (13)	V A L V E X (14)	E (15)	P (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 2	—	0 4 2	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	H (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause was operator error during a plant shutdown on 8/23/82. Operators began the
11 cooldown at a point in the Plant Shutdown/Cooldown Procedure PP 1102.10 which they fel
12 corresponded to the current plant status. Starting from this point did not address
13 checking the OTSG tube sheet drains to ensure all were open. A memo will be sent to
14 operators advising caution when entering procedures at points other than the beginning to ensure that preprequisites of previous sections are satisfied.

15 FACILITY STATUS C (28) | % POWER 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operator Observation

16 ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
17 NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES
18 NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
19 TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION NA

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PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

PUBLICITY
20 ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA | NRC USE ONLY

(419) 259-5000, Ext. 5

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-46

DATE OF EVENT: August 27, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Steam Generator (SG) 1-1 level greater than 348 inches

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: The plant had reached Mode 3 on August 23, 1982. All but one tube sheet drain on each Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) were closed. Operators proceeded with a plant cooldown per PP 1102.10, Plant Shutdown/Cooldown procedure. Due to the expected short duration of the cooldown, the OTSGs were not placed in wet layup but instead maintained at 97-99% on the operate range with the startup feedpump. During the subsequent heatup on August 27, 1982, the startup feedwater valve SP7B to OTSG 1 was unisolated, and a slight overfeed condition existed due to leakage by the startup valve. At approximately 1140 hours, operators noticed the increasing OTSG level. It was determined that an insufficient number of lower tube sheet drains were open and operators were sent to isolate SP7B and to ensure the OTSG drains were open. Level reached a maximum of 360 inches on full range instrumentation for OTSG 1, placing the unit in Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.4.5. The Technical Specification limit of 348 inches was exceeded for approximately 45 minutes.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Operators began a plant cooldown at a point in the shutdown procedure which they felt corresponded to the current plant status. However, proceeding from this point in the procedure did not address checking the OTSG tube sheet drains to ensure all were open. As a result, during startup several days later, SG level increased due to an insufficient number of drains being open to handle increased feedwater flow from the leaking startup feedwater valve. The primary cause of this occurrence can be attributed to operator error during shutdown. Preceding steps in the shutdown procedure should have been more carefully reviewed to determine what conditions were applicable and to ensure all prerequisites for that section of the shutdown procedure had been satisfied. The procedure addresses a normal cooldown from power assuming all previous steps have been properly taken by operators.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Operators promptly reduced level to less than 348 inches. No water entered main steam lines, and the boron concentration was sufficient (1732 ppm) to maintain adequate shutdown margin in the event of a main steam line break. The plant was already in Hot Standby at the time of the occurrence as required by Technical Specification 3.4.5, action (b).

Corrective Action: Operators isolated the startup feedwater valve and opened the remaining lower tube sheet drains to reduce SG level to normal. To prevent a recurrence of this situation, procedure modification T-6768 was made to PP 1102.10, Plant Shutdown/Cooldown Procedure to ensure that all OTSG drains will be opened at the point where OTSG levels are maintained manually using startup feedwater control valves. A memo is to be issued advising operators to exercise more caution when entering procedures at any point other than the beginning to ensure a thorough review of all previous steps in the procedure.

Failure Data: A previous occurrence of OTSG level exceeding Technical Specification limits due to a personnel error was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-77-72.

LER #82-042