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March 30, 1994

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David L. Meyer
Chief, Rules, Review and Directives Branch
Division of Freedom of Information and Publication Services
Office of Administration
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Comments on the Draft NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines - 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," Revision 1

This letter provides Southern California Edison's (Edison) comments on the subject draft NUREG-1022, Revision 1. Edison appreciates the opportunity to comment on the document. You will find our detailed comments enclosed with this letter. However, Edison would like to strongly emphasize our first two comments in particular.

The first comment involves the definition of "seriously degraded" and "significantly compromised". Because these two terms are qualitative in nature, they are often the subject of speculation and judgement. However, for those licensees who have Individual Plant Evaluations (IPE), their existing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methodology can be used to quantitatively assess the impact of inoperable systems, components, and structures. Edison recommends the definition of "seriously degraded" and "significantly compromised" include, for plants with IPEs, that "conditions which result in incremental increases in risk below those levels established in the EPRI/NEI Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Applications Guide as screening criteria for permanent plant changes, do not constitute conditions which are seriously degraded or instances where plant safety was significantly compromised." This guide is under development as a cooperative effort by the industry and NRC staff and is targeted for completion by year's end with subsequent NRC acceptance.


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The second comment involves the continuing problems associated with actuations of ESF systems. Although spurious actuations were addressed in previous rule making, confusion still exists about the reportability of manual actuations in accordance with Technical Specification action statement requirements of ESF systems such as Control Room Isolation System (CRIS) and Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) when there is no valid actuation signal or initiating event which requires mitigation. A recent example can be found in our LER 2-94-001 (Docket No. 50-361).

Edison recommends that the guidance explicitly exempt routine, non-event mitigating operation of these systems as a pre-planned operation in accordance with the Technical Specifications. To do otherwise will produce a flood of reports resulting from prudent practices to validate OPERABILITY of one train of safety equipment prior to taking the other train out of service for preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or surveillance testing; and from manual actuations required as a preplanned action for some ESF systems in such circumstances.

Edison supports a continued dialogue between the industry and the NRC, and we remain available to discuss these issues. We appreciate the opportunity to provide our views. If you have any questions regarding our comments, please let me know.

Sincerely



Enclosure

cc: J. L. Callan, Regional Administrator, Region IV
K. E. Perkins, Jr., Acting Regional Administrator, NRC
Region V
J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units
2 & 3
M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3

ENCLOSURE

COMMENTS ON NUREG-1022, REVISION 1
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Reference: R. D. Binz IV (BWR Owners' Group) letter to David L. Meyer (NRC), Draft NUREG-1022, Revision 1 Comments, dated January 30, 1992

1. Comment:

Edison recommends the definition of "seriously degraded" and "significantly compromised" include, for plants with IPES, that "conditions which result in incremental increases in risk below those levels established in the EPRI/NEI Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Application Guide as screening criteria for permanent plant changes, do not constitute conditions which are seriously degraded or instances where plant safety was significantly compromised." This guide is under development as a cooperative effort by the industry and NRC staff and is targeted for completion by years end with subsequent NRC acceptance.

Comment Basis:

Because these two terms are qualitative in nature, they are often the subject of speculation and judgement. However, for those licensees who have their IPE, existing probabilistic risk assessment methodology can be used to assess the impact of inoperable systems, components, and structures.

2. Comment:

Although spurious actuations were addressed in previous rule making, confusion still exists about the reportability of manual actuations of ESF systems such as Control Room Isolation System (CRIS) and Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) when there is no valid actuation signal or initiating event which requires mitigation. A recent example can be found in our LER 2-94-901 (Docket No. 50-361). Edison recommends that the guidance explicitly exempt routine, non-event mitigating operation of these systems as a pre-planned operation in accordance with the Technical Specifications. To do otherwise will produce a flood of reports resulting from prudent practices to validate OPERABILITY of one train of safety equipment prior to taking the other train out of service for preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or surveillance testing; and from manual actuations required as a preplanned action for some ESF systems in such circumstances.

Comment Basis:

The guidance provided in Section 3.3.2, Pages 57 & 58, for actuations of an engineered safety feature is lacking as to what the Commission considers to be "preplanned," and what intentional manual actuations are reportable.

We recently made a 4-hour notification regarding an intentional manual actuation of the TGIS Train "A" [Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)] to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation." This notification was subsequently retracted following a reportability evaluation of the events surrounding this incident.

Based on a review of existing NUREG-1022, Supplement 1 and this draft Revision 1 guidance, along with discussions with other utilities and AEOD staff, it was concluded that this intentional manual ESF actuation to comply with our Technical Specifications was not reportable based on the following:

- a. The manual actuation was not in response to actual plant conditions requiring an ESF system for accident mitigation,
- b. The manual actuation was required by TSS in order to demonstrate sufficient system functional capability in response to a degradation in system redundancy only, and
- c. The intentional manual ESF actuation was considered to have been a "pre-planned" evolution. Based on NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, Q&A 6.7, this action was considered pre-planned in that it was a controlled (discussed with and approved by the Operations Shift Superintendent) and expected result of a procedure (Operating Instruction SO23-3-2.27, Section 6.2, "Manual Actuation of the Control Room Isolation and Emergency Ventilation System" outlines the steps to take when manually initiating TGIS to meet the TS requirements).

However, this position conflicted with the Senior Resident Inspector's understanding of the reporting requirements. As a result of the inspector's concerns, we subsequently submitted a voluntary abstract only LER.

3. Comment:

In Section 2.10, Page 15, revise the sentence: "Sound, logical bases for the withdrawal should be communicated with the request" by deleting the words "with the request."

Comment Basis:

The ENS notification retraction or LER cancellation by the licensee would not be a request.

4. Comment:

Section 2.11, Page 16 implies that the "discovery date" is the date when someone in the plant recognizes that the event has occurred (starts the 30-day clock and should be entered in Item 5 of the LER (event date) if the event date cannot be clearly defined). However, just because someone in the plant recognizes that the event has occurred doesn't necessarily mean that the event is reportable. Edison agrees with the previously submitted BWR Owners' Group (Referenced letter) comment to add the following additional date definition:

"Reportability Date: The day on which the licensee determines that the event/condition is reportable (starts the 30-day clock and should be entered in Item 5 of the LER (event date) if the event date cannot be clearly defined)."

Comment Basis:

As indicated in the draft NUREG, many events are discovered when they occur and are easily categorized as a reportable event. However, there are other events (e.g., component failures whose cause is unknown, design basis review identified issues, etc.) which require engineering evaluations, formal engineering calculations, and management involvement prior to making reportability determinations. For these cases, it would be rare that an adequate engineering evaluation/reportability determination could be made and the subsequent LER drafted and submitted within 30 days from the "discovery date." Thus, with the proposed NUREG-1022, Revision 1 guidance, the licensee would be consistently cited for failure to meet the 30-day LER submittal time limit.

5. Comment:

Section 2.11, Page 17 indicates that the guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability," which applies primarily to operability determinations, is appropriate for reportability determinations as well.

This appears to be the NRC's attempt to address the concerns raised by the BWR Owners' Group concerning a reportability start date. However, it does not provide a clear understanding as to when either the immediate notification or 30-day reporting clock would start.

Comment Basis:

Clearer guidance is needed as to when the 30-day reporting clock should start for those events which require engineering evaluations, formal engineering calculations, and management involvement prior to making reportability determinations.

6. Comment:

Revise the second paragraph in Section 3.2.1, Page 24 under Discussion to read:

"For §50.72 reporting purposes, the phrase "initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown" means the point in time when the addition of negative reactivity begins to achieve a nuclear plant shutdown required by TS.

Comment Basis:

This better defines the point at which the initiation of a plant shutdown begins.

7. Comment:

Pages 25, 26, 52, 71, 72, 73 and elsewhere refer to examples from the existing NUREG-1022 and its Supplement. However, Section 1.3, "Revised Reporting Guidelines," indicates that Revision 1 updates and supersedes NUREG-1022 and its Supplements 1 and 2. Therefore, Revision 1 should be a "stand alone" document and not refer to the superseded guidance.

Comment Basis:

The exiting reporting guidance documents will no longer provide applicable guidance when superseded by Revision 1. Thus, they should not be referenced in the new guidance document.

8. Comment:

Section 3.2.2(3), Page 27 should only address violations of Technical Specification Action Statements and not Technical Specification Section 5 and 6 issues since this would be contrary to the intent of the Rule as indicated by the Statements of Consideration.

Comment Basis:

Note 3, Page 29 states in part: "The proposed rule would have required reporting when "a TS action statement is not met." The wording of the final rule requires reporting "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

The Statements of Consideration for the final rule indicate that this change was made to accommodate plants that did not have requirements specifically defined as action statements...."

If this is the case, reporting of operations or conditions prohibited by Technical Specifications does not apply to Section 5 and 6 of the Licensee's Technical Specifications.

9. Comment:

Remove references in Section 3.2.2(5), Page 29, to 10 CFR 20.403 and 20.405.

Comment Basis:

There is no need to refer to the old Part 20 sections since the new 10 CFR 20.2202 and 20.2203 became effective as of January 1994.

10. Comment:

Section 3.2.4(3), Page 37 should indicate that meeting the design basis of the plant means staying within the design basis of the principle safety barriers.

Comment Basis:

The discussion on being outside the design basis of the plant should include the definition provided in comments to the earlier draft NUREG by the BWR Owners' Group (Referenced letter), i.e., meeting the design basis of the plant means staying within the design basis of the principle safety barriers. Typical safety barrier parameters include: 1) offsite dose, 2) fuel clad temperature, 3) fuel clad oxidation, 4) hydrogen generation, 4) core geometry, 5) primary containment integrity, and 5) reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity.

11. Comment:

Section 3.2.7, Page 47 indicates that the unavailability of one non-redundant component or train such as a meteorological tower, radiation monitor, plant computer or ERF, for a short period of time, generally is not reportable. For this type of equipment, the staff would consider period of time less than 8 hours to be short. This example is not consistent with current Technical Specification reporting requirements and should be deleted.

Comment Basis:

The staff's example is not consistent with our Technical Specification allowed outage times and/or reporting requirements, e.g.:

TS 3.3.3.4, "Meteorological Instrumentation," Action 'a' only requires a Special Report be submitted within 10 days when one or more meteorological monitoring channels are inoperable for greater than 7 days.

TS 3.3.3.1, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation," typically only requires implementation of alternate monitoring methods and submittal of a Special Report within 14 days if the 72 hours action is exceeded.

12. Comment:

Section 3.2.8, Page 51 states in part: "Fairly common events such as minor spills, ... are not reportable unless the ability of site personnel to perform necessary safety functions is (or would be) significantly hampered." The words "or would be" should be removed.

Comment Basis:

The NRC's proposed wording infers that having "a potential" is reportable whereas the reporting criteria is for any event that "actually poses/posed" a threat or significantly hampers/hampered site personnel.

13. Comment:

The following example provided in Section 3.3.3(9), Page 73 should be deleted:

"... one wire of the pigtail ... was so loose that there was no electrical connection ... all safety-related breakers utilizing the trip coil were inspected ... No lugs were found with loose electrical connections ... The event is reportable because the incompatible pigtails and lugs could have caused one or more safety systems to fail...."

Comment Basis:

Since all other wiring connections were found not to be loose, the one loose connection should not have been considered as a condition "that alone could have caused" the system to fail. There is no evidence in this example to indicate that a potential common failure mode existed. A better example should be provided.