

AUG 10 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director  
Division of Licensing

FROM: G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Safety Assessment  
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS MEETING  
ON AUGUST 6, 1981

On August 6, 1981, an Operating Reactor Event meeting was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors, and their representatives on events which occurred since the last meeting. The list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Attachment 2. In addition to these events, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Attachment 3.

The next Operating Reactor Events meeting is scheduled for August 12, 1981

*G.C. Lainas*  
G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Safety Assessment  
Division of Licensing

Attachments:  
As stated

cc w/attachments:  
Meeting Attendees

ORAB Members	G. Zech
H. Denton	T. Novak
E. Case	G. Lainas
R. Mattson	R. Tedesco
R. Vollmer	J. Olshinski
S. Hanauer	G. Holahan
T. Murley	H. Thompson

8210050212 820628  
PDR FOIA  
UDELL82-261 PDR

A83  
(17)

OFFICE	DL:ORAB	DL:ORAB/SL	DL:ORAB/BC	DL:AD/SA			
SURNAME	RFrahm:sah	GHolahan:sah	JOlshinski	GLainas			
DATE	8/10/81	8/10/81	8/11/81	8/10/81			

ATTACHMENT 1

MEETING ATTENDEES

E. Case  
L. Engle  
G. Holahan  
J. Olshinski  
B. Mills  
G. Schwenk  
R. Woods  
S. Rubin  
T. Novak  
G. Imbro  
B. Kreger  
T. Murley  
D. Crutchfield  
D. Muller  
V. Moore  
C. Neison  
T. Wambach  
R. Baer  
M. Conner  
R. Frahm  
J. VanVliet

OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS MEETING

AUGUST 6, 1981

- PALISADES, JULY 15, 1981, LOSS OF DHR, SHUTDOWN (IE)
  - RHR HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE CLOSED
  - DEMAND SIGNAL SHOWED VALVE OPEN
  - FAILURE DUE TO MOISTURE IN VALVE CONTROL LINE!
  - HEAT UP FROM 130°F TO 197°F
  
- NORTH ANNA UNIT 2, JULY 25, 1981, MAIN TRANSFORMER FAILURE (PM)
  - "C" PHASE CASING SPLIT
  - OIL SPILLED, NO FIRE RESULTED
  - FAULT DUE TO POSSIBLE WINDING FAILURE
  - NOTE: FOURTH FAILURE IN ABOUT 8 MONTHS
  
- MILLSTONE UNIT 2, JULY 31, 1981, ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP (IE)
  - TURBINE STOP VALVE SHUT
  - REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH PRZR PRESSURE
  - POSSIBLE GENERIC PROBLEM WITH REACTOR TRIP BY FLUID PRESSURE MONITORING
  
- ST. LUCIE, UNIT 1, AUGUST 2, 1981, PRIMARY SYSTEM LEAK (PM)
  - PORV BLOCK VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE
  - MANUALLY CLOSED TO SATISFY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
  - 1 GPM PACKING LEAK ON BLOCK VALVE
  - T/S CHANGE PERMITTED TO BACKSEATING BLOCK VALVE TO ISOLATE LEAK AND TO DEENERGIZE THE PORV

- BRUNSWICK, UNIT 2, AUGUST 4, 1981, REACTOR SCRAM WITH SAFETY RELIEF VALVE FAILURE
  - REACTOR SCRAM FROM LOW CONDENSER VACUUM
  - SRV MANUALLY OPENED, FAILED OPEN
  - HPCI/RCIC INITIATED, HPCI VALVE FAILED
  - ONE TRAIN RHR FAILED
  
- PLANT REACTOR TRIP SURVEY FOR 1981 (1E)

VENDOR	TOTAL TRIPS	CAUSED BY SURVEILLANCE		CAUSED BY FEEDWATER CONTROL	
		NO	%	NO	%
WESTINGHOUSE	164	23	15	54	33
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING	22	5	23	7	32
BABCOCK & WILCOX	24	2	10	1	10
GENERAL ELECTRIC	104	20	20	3	3
TOTAL	314	50	16	65	21

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Items of Interest

Week Ending July 24, 1981

1. The following Preliminary Notifications were dispatched during the week:
  - a. PNO-I-81-81 Technical Operations, Burlington, Mass. - Radiography Source Reported Lost in Transit
  - b. PNO-I-81-82 National Bureau of Standards Reactor (DN 50-184) - Valve Malfunction Resulting in Draining Moderator
  - c. PNO-II-81-55 Turkey Point 4 - Pressurizer Spray Valve Leakage Into Containment
  - d. PNO-II-81-56 Surry Unit No. 2 - Spurious Safety Injection and Reactor Trip
  - e. PNO-II-81-57 Brunswick Unit 2 - Plant Shutdown Due to Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure
  - f. PNO-III-81-64 LaSalle County Station - Structural Damage to Reactor Building Roof
  - g. PNO-IV-80-34B South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2 - Update-Expansion of Previously Authorized Complex Concrete Placement
  - h. PNO-V-81-39A San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1 - Gaseous Waste Decay Tank Failure from Apparent Hydrogen Ignition
  - i. PNO-V-81-42 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1 - Gaseous Waste Decay Tank Failure from Apparent Hydrogen Ignition
  - j. PNS-V-81-07 Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 - Pre-Operational Physical Security Inspection Testing
  - k. Notice of Non-Routine Event Involving Agreement State or Agreement Materials - 81-06 Analytic Inspection, Inc., Lafayette, Louisiana - Offshore Radiography Incident
2. The following IE Circulars were issued:
  - a. IE Circular 81-11, "Inadequate Decay Heat Removal During Reactor Shutdown", was issued on July 24, 1981, to all holders of BWR operating licenses or construction permits.
  - b. IE Circular 81-12, "Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Protection System", was issued on July 22, 1981, to all nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a construction permit.

3. The following IE Information Notice was issued:

- a. IE Information Notice 81-21, "Potential Loss of Direct Access to Ultimate Heat Sink", was issued on July 21, 1981, to all nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or construction permit.

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Items of Interest

Week Ending July 31, 1981

1. The following Notification of Significant Enforcement Action was dispatched during the past week:
  - a. EN-81-24 Power Authority of the State of New York (James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant) - A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of \$40,000 was issued to subject licensee on July 31, 1981. This action was based on alleged violations relating to a change in Safety/Relief Valves which resulted in a violation of a Technical Specification Limiting Safety System Setting. This change was made without seeking prior Commission approval and without conducting a formal evaluation of the safety significance of the change in order to determine whether an unreviewed safety question was involved.
2. Preliminary Notifications relating to the following actions were dispatched during the week:
  - a. PNO-I-81-83 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit-1 - Personnel Skin Exposure
  - b. PNO-I-81-84 Three Mile Island, Unit 1 - NRC Investigation of TMI-1 Operator Examinations
  - c. PNO-II-81-58 Brunswick 2 - Overexposure of Worker
  - d. PNO-II-81-59 Phipps Bend Units 1 & 2, Yellow Creek Unit 1, and Hartsville Units A1 & A2 - Construction Delays
  - e. PNO-II-81-61 Oconee 1 - Iodine-131 Uptake in Workers
  - f. PNO-III-81-65 Davis-Besse - Shutdown in Excess of 48 Hours
  - g. PNO-IV-81-04C General Public - Possible Serious Radiation Exposure Update
  - h. PNO-V-81-43 Washington Nuclear Power Project No. 3 - Significant Voids in Concrete Placement at WNP-3
  - i. PNO-TMI-81-16 Three Mile Island, Unit 2 - Leakage from Processed Water Storage Tank
  - j. PNS-I-81-16 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station - Bomb Threat
  - k. PNS-I-81-16A Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station - Update on Bomb Threat, PNS-I-81-16
  - l. PNS-III-81-08 Clinton Nuclear Plant - Bomb Threat

3. The following IE Information Notice was issued:
  - a. IE Information Notice 81-22, "Section 235 and 236 Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954", was issued on July 31, 1981 to all power and research reactor, fuel fabrication and reprocessing, and spent fuel storage licensees and applicants.
4. Other Items:
  - a. Activities of the Division of Emergency Preparedness:

July 24, 1981

Deputy Director participated in an emergency preparedness closeout exit briefing at Browns Ferry.

Section Leader, EPLB, participated in an emergency preparedness closeout exit briefing at LaCrosse.

Director, DEP, IRB staff members, and Director Region III briefed Chairman on Zion exercise.

July 28, 1981

Chief, EPDB, observed the Regional participation in the emergency preparedness exercise at Zion on July 29.

July 29, 1981

Headquarters and Region III participated in a joint exercise held at the Zion facility. Although the licensee scenario was not detailed enough to allow completely realistic interplay with respect to reactor systems analysis, a realistic decisionmaking atmosphere was obtained with respect to offsite protective measures. The Region III Director flew by helicopter to the site and after about two hours was ready to accept responsibility as the NRC Site Director. Authority to make recommendations to the licensee and offsite organizations was transferred while the authority to issue orders to the licensee was retained by Headquarters except where time for consultation did not exist. Chairman Palladino participated in the exercise and subsequent Headquarters critique and expressed interest in participating in the next Operations Center exercise. M. Reilly, Pennsylvania and F. Mancuso, Connecticut, assisted to critique the Headquarters response as observers in the Operations Center.