THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY
P.O. BOX 5000 ■ CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 ■ TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 ■ ILLUMINATING BLDG. ■ 55 PUBLIC SQUARE
Serving The Best Location in the Nation

Dalwyn R. Davidson
VICE PRESIDENT
SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION

September 24, 1982

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Standby Diesel Generator ASME
Code Piping Welds [RDC 52(82)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter will serve as the Final Report as required by 10CFR50.55(e) on the potential significant deficiency concerning Transamerica Delaval Standby Diesel Generator ASME Section III, Class 3, piping. This matter was first reported by Mr. E. Riley of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company to Mr. J. Neisler of your office, on March 29, 1982. An Interim Report was then submitted on April 28, 1982.

This report contains a description of the deficiency, an analysis of safety implication, and corrective action.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated, is supplying four (4) diesel generator units, Model DSRV16, to be used as a standby power source for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. During a pre-installation inspection program conducted by the installing contractor, diesel generator jacket water pipe 02.717.02DV/75051 was found to have a fillet weld overlap which violated the surface condition of welds for ASME Section III Class 3 pipe. In addition, lube oil pipe 02.717.01TH/75051 had weld reinforcement which violated ASME Section III Class 3 requirements for weld reinforcement. These nonconformances were documented on site nonconformance report PO 39-0477. Upon the detection of these two nonconforming welds, a sampling of all code piping welds was initiated. This inspection consisted of approximately 20 pipes (100 welds) and approximately 10 welds were nonconforming.

IE27

SEP 30 1982

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Failure of any welds in this piping could result in diesel generator unavailability. However, failure of these welds is unlikely due to the low operating pressures of the systems and the large design margin used in system design.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As a result of the identified deficiencies, an inspection of all ASME code pipe supplied by Delaval was initiated. At this time, weld inspection and any required repair and/or rework has been completed for nearly all code piping on one engine and approximately twenty-five percent for a second engine. It is estimated that all corrective action will now be completed by April 1, 1983.

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Dalwyn R. Davidson

Dalwyn R. Davidson
Vice President
System Engineering and Construction

DRD:pab

cc: Mr. M. L. Gildner
NRC Site Office

Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
c/o Document Management Branch
Washington, D.C. 20555

temperature, compare it to a previous reading to determine the heatup rate, and store the present information for subsequent comparisons. Of course, a pool temperature monitoring system requires a thorough temperature measurements program to correlate pool bulk mean temperatures to indicated temperatures on distributed local sensors. A microprocessor is a logical integrating device for such a situation.

2.7 Add Suppression Pool Temperature Trip and Change Reactor Low Water Level Trip Setpoint to TAF (Option 7)

The seventh option adds a suppression pool high temperature trip in parallel with the high drywell pressure trip and lowers the low reactor water level trip setpoint to the top of the active fuel. For this option the ADS would be initiated by either high drywell pressure or an elevated suppression pool temperature. The reactor low water level initiation setpoint is also lowered to TAF. The remainder of the logic for this alternative is unchanged from the current design. This concept becomes more complex and is not treated further.

2.8 Add Manual ADS Inhibit Switch (Option 8)

The eight option adds a manual switch to the present logic which allows the operator to prevent (inhibit) automatic ADS initiation. As previously discussed in Section 2.2, the manual inhibit feature assists the operator in the execution of certain steps in some EPGs. To inhibit the ADS with the present logic the operator must repetitiously reset the two-minute delay timer or lock out all of the low pressure ECCS pumps. With the implementation of the symptom oriented EPGs this option satisfies