

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
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September 24, 1982

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Reports
Licensee Event Reports No. 82-100 and 82-101
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Operating License NPF-10, for San Onofre Unit 2, this submittal provides the required 30-day written reports and copies of licensee Event Reports (LER's) for two occurrences involving the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.

On August 25, 1982, while in Mode 3, turbine-driven AFW pump 2P-140 was found to be inoperable. The drive turbine was tripping on overspeed during the starting sequence. Accordingly, Action Statement "a" of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2 was entered. This LCO requires that while in Mode 1, 2 or 3, at least three independent AFW pumps and associated flowpaths shall be operable. If one train becomes inoperable, operation may continue provided the inoperable train is restored to operable status within 72 hours.

Tripping was caused by condensate in the steam supply header and throttle valve. A watch was posted on the turbine and steam traps were blown down on the steam supply header and throttle valve every two hours. This removed the unwanted condensation and permitted the pump to be tested and declared operable on August 27, 1982. LER 82-100 addresses this occurrence.

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Later, on August 27, 1982 pump 2P-140 was again declared inoperable due to tripping caused by a defective speed sensor associated with the drive turbine overspeed protection. The sensor was replaced and the pump restored to operability on August 28, 1982. LER 82-101 addresses this occurrence.

With respect to the occurrence described in LER 82-100, it appears that drains may not have been configured to properly remove the condensation causing the problem. Some drains have been modified and will be tested for effectiveness when plant operation resumes. Additional drain configurations are under study as is the operating procedure for the drive turbine. These may be changed as a result of these studies at a later date not yet established.

In both these events, there was no consequence to the public health and safety since any one of the remaining two AFW operable pumps would have performed the necessary decay heat removal function if required to do so.

If there are any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

HB Ray / JY (MPC)

Enclosure: LER's 82-100 and 82-101

cc: A.E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre, Unit 2)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information & Program Control (MIPC)

INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations)