

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V A S P S | 2 | 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 | 4 | 1 1 1 1 1 | 5 | \_\_\_\_\_

CONT | 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 | 7 | 0 9 0 5 8 2 | 8 | 0 9 2 7 8 2 | 9 | \_\_\_\_\_

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 1 2 | With the unit at full power, an unattended portable pump which was being used to  
0 1 3 | clean the 'C' waterbox swung around and flooded the service water pit containing  
0 1 4 | MOV-SW-202B. MOV-SW-202B was found to be grounded with the valve in the open  
0 1 5 | position. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S.6.6.2.b(2). An operator was  
0 1 6 | assigned administrative control of the valve and the pit was immediately dewatered.  
0 1 7 | The health and safety of the public were not affected.  
0 1 8 | \_\_\_\_\_

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | W A | 11 | CAUSE CODE | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | C | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | V A L L V O P | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | A | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | 2 | 16 |  
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 2 | 21 | EVENT YEAR | 8 2 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 5 4 | 24 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 3 | 28 | REPORT TYPE | I | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32 |  
ACTION TAKEN | X | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | F | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 0 0 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | L 2 0 0 | 26 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of this event is personnel error. The individual assigned to operate  
1 1 | the pump left it unattended. MOV-SW-202B was dried and returned to service.  
1 2 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 3 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 4 | \_\_\_\_\_

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 1 0 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator Observation | 32 |

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED | Z | 33 | CONTENT | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36 |

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 0 0 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 39 |

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 0 0 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 41 |

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | Z | 42 | TYPE | Z | 43 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 44 |

2 0 | PUBLICITY | N | 44 | ISSUED DESCRIPTION | \_\_\_\_\_ | 45 | PDR ADOCK 05000280 S PDR | \_\_\_\_\_ | 46 | NRC USE ONLY | \_\_\_\_\_ | 47 |

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 82-054/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 09-05-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: MOV-SW-202B Flooded

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With the unit at full power, an unattended portable pump which was being used to clean 2C waterbox, swung around and flooded the service water valve pit containing MOV-SW-202B. An operator was dispatched as soon as the flood alarm was received and the pit was immediately dewatered. The MOV-SW-202B was found to be grounded with the valve in the open position. This event is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

Service water valves MOV-SW-202A & B are designed to close to conserve intake water level when that level drops to 18 feet or when a blackout occurs coincident with a CLS signal.

An operator was assigned administrative control of the valve and it was returned to service in less than 3 hours, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The cause of this event is personnel error. While pumping the condenser inlet water boxes, during cleaning, the individual assigned to operate the pump left it unattended.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

An operator was assigned administrative control of the valve and the valve pit was immediately dewatered.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The electricians dried out the motor, cleaned the limit switch contacts and replaced the torque switch. The motor was then bridged and meggered and returned to service.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The service water valve pits for both units have been scheduled to have dikes and handrails constructed around them.

Maintenance service personnel have been made aware of the potential problems associated with waterbox cleaning evolutions.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

Service water valve pit flooding has been a recurring problem. The steps listed in 6 are already in progress and should prevent a repeat of this event.