

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | G | A | E | I | H | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

01 | I | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 9  
7 8 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  
02 | On 8/25/82, with Unit 2 in hot shutdown and a scram recovery in progress  
03 | the "H" ADS safety relief valve failed to open manually (DR 2-82-219)  
04 | and the drywell pressure (DR 2-82-220) and temperature (DR 2-82-221)  
05 | exceeded Tech. Specs. requirements of .75 psig and 135°F. High drywell  
06 | pressure prevented the suppression chamber/drywell vacuum breakers from  
07 | opening (DR 2-82-222). The health and safety of the public were not  
08 | affected by this non-repetitive event.

09 | S | A | 11 | X | 12 | X | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16  
7 8 SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 13 14 COMPONENT CODE 15 16 COMP. SUBCODE 17 18 VALVE SUBCODE 19 20  
17 | 8 | 2 | 21 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 24 | 0 | 3 | 28 | L | 30 | 0 | 32  
7 8 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 EVENT YEAR 23 24 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 25 26 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 28 REPORT TYPE 29 30 REVISION NO. 31 32  
X | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | Z | 25 | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26  
7 8 ACTION TAKEN 33 34 FUTURE ACTION 35 36 EFFECT ON PLANT 37 38 SHUTDOWN METHOD 39 40 HOURS 41 42 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 43 44 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 45 46 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 47 48 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 49 50

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  
10 | The cause of the event is unknown. It is believed that the "A" SRV tail  
11 | pipe vacuum breaker remained open when the "A" SRV was actuated for a  
12 | second time. This would allow a steam release to the drywell. The dry-  
13 | well pressure and temperature were returned to allowable levels. All SRV  
14 | vacuum breakers were inspected and were found to be operable.

15 | X | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | Scram Recovery | A | 31 | Operator Observation  
7 8 FACILITY STATUS 9 10 % POWER 11 12 OTHER STATUS 13 14 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 15 16 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 17 18

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | NA  
7 8 ACTIVITY CONTENT 9 10 RELEASED OF RELEASE 11 12 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 13 14 LOCATION OF RELEASE 15 16

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA  
7 8 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 9 10 NUMBER 11 12 TYPE 13 14 DESCRIPTION 15 16

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA  
7 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES 9 10 NUMBER 11 12 DESCRIPTION 13 14

19 | Z | 42 | NA  
7 8 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 9 10 TYPE 11 12 DESCRIPTION 13 14

20 | N | 44 | 8210050064 820923 | NRC USE ONLY  
7 8 ISSUED DESCRIPTION 9 10 PDR ADOCK 05000366 PDR  
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE (912) 367-7851

LER No: 50-366/1982-091  
Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch  
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report  
for LER 50-366/1982-091

On 8/25/82, with Unit 2 in hot shutdown and a scram recovery in progress, the "H" ADS safety relief valve failed to open manually and the drywell pressure and temperature exceeded Tech. Specs. requirements. T.S. 3.6.1.6 requires that drywell pressure be maintained less than .75 psig; however, drywell pressure reached 2.7 psig. T.S. 3.6.1.7 requires that average drywell air temperature be maintained less than 135°F. The high drywell pressure also prevented the suppression chamber/drywell vacuum breakers from opening during the "SUPPRESSION CHAMBER TO DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER SYSTEM OPERABILITY" procedure. T.S. 4.6.4.1.a. requires that the suppression chamber/drywell vacuum breakers be proven operable within 2 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety-relief valves. The plant was placed in cold shutdown within the 24 hours as required by T.S. 3.6.4.1, Action b. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

The cause of the "H" valve failure has been attributed to component failure. The manual control switch for the failed valve was found to have worn parts. The faulty switch was replaced. It is believed that the "A" SRV tailpipe vacuum breaker failed to shut when the "A" SRV was actuated for a second time. This would allow a steam release to the drywell. The pressure differential between the suppression chamber and the drywell was equalized. Cooling via the drywell chillers was restored. Subsequently, the drywell pressure and temperature returned to allowable levels. All SRV tailpipe vacuum breakers were inspected and found to be operable. The suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker was satisfactorily functionally tested per the "SUPPRESSION CHAMBER TO DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER SYSTEM OPERABILITY" procedure.