
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT



LER No: 50-366/1982-091

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch

Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report for LER 50-366/1982-091

On 8/25/82, with Unit 2 in hot shutdown and a scram recovery in progress, the "H" ADS safety relief valve failed to open manually and the drywell pressure and temperature exceeded Tech. Specs. requirements. T.S. 3.6.1.6 requires that drywell pressure be maintained less than .75 psig; however, drywell pressure reached 2.7 psig. T.S. 3.6.1.7 requires that average drywell air temperature be maintained less than 135°F. The high drywell pressure also prevented the suppression chamber/drywell vacuum breakers from opening during the "SUPPRESSION CHAMBER TO DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER SYSTEM OPERABILITY" procedure. T.S. 4.6.4.1.a. requires that the suppression chamber/drywell vacuum breakers be proven operable within 2 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety-relief valves. The plant was placed in cold shutdown within the 24 hours as required by T.S. 3.6.4.1, Action b. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repatitive event.

he cause of the "H" valve failure has been attributed to component failure. The manual control switch for the failed valve was found to have worn parts. The faulty switch was replaced. It is believed that the "A" SRV tailpipe vacuum breaker failed to shut when the "A" SRV was actuated for a second time. This would allow a steam release to the drywell. The pressure differential between the suppression chamber and the drywell was equalized. Cooling via the drywell chillers was restored. Subsequently, the drywell pressure and temperature returned to allowable levels. All SRV tailpipe vacuum breakers were inspected and found to be operable. The suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker was satisfactorily functionally tested per the "SUPPRESSION CHAMBER TO DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER SYSTEM OPERABILITY" procedure.