

MAY 18 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director  
Division of Licensing

FROM: G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Safety Assessment  
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS MEETING  
ON MAY 13, 1981

On May 13, 1981, an Operating Reactor Event meeting was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors, and their representatives on events which occurred since the last meeting. The list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Attachment 2. In addition to these events, the assignment of follow-up review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Attachment 3.

The next Operating Reactor Events meeting is scheduled for May 20, 1981.

*J.C. Lainas*

G.C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Safety Assessment  
Division of Licensing

Attachments:  
As stated

cc w/attachments:  
Meeting Attendees

ORAB Members

H. Denton

E. Case

R. Mattson

R. Vollmer

S. Hanauer

T. Murley

G. Zech

T. Novak

G. Lainas

R. Tedesco

J. Olshinski

~~G. Holahan~~

H. Thompson

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PDR FOIA  
UDELL82-261

PDR

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(17)

OFFICE	DL:ORAB	DL:ORAB/SL	DL:ORAB/BC	DL:AD/SA		
SURNAME	SWookey	GHolahan:sah	JOlshinski	GLainas		
DATE	5/14/81	5/14/81	5/14/81	1/81		

MEETING ATTENDEES

H. Denton  
E. Case  
D. Eisenhower  
G. Lainas  
D. Vassallo  
D. Wigginton  
D. Clark  
P. Erickson  
J. VanVliet  
R. Mattson  
B. Mills  
D. DeYoung  
E. Jordan  
G. Holahan  
R. Martin  
T. Novak  
R. Purple  
H. Thompson  
R. Vollmer  
S. Wookey

## OPERATING REACTORS EVENT MEETING

MAY 13, 1981

### • ZION UNIT 2, REACTOR TRIP/SI FROM 92% POWER

- LOSS OF INVERTER CAUSED LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS: 4:00 PM ON 5/7/81
- "C" MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED CONTROL ON BUS  
LOSS OF FLOW TO HEADER  
LOW LEVEL ON "A" STEAM GENERATOR  
REACTOR TRIP ON STEAM FLOW/FEED FLOW MISMATCH COINCIDENT WITH  
LOW LEVEL IN STEAM GENERATOR
- "C" AND "D" STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE ALSO ON BUS: FAILED LOW ON LOSS
- REACTOR TRIP CAUSED VARIABLE HIGH STEAM FLOW SETPOINT TO GO TO ZERO
- PROTECTION SYSTEM SENSED HIGH STEAM FLOW WITH LOW STEAM PRESSURE  
(STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENT) AND PRODUCED SAFETY INJECTION

### • BROWNS FERRY 2 AND 3 - MAY 6, 1981

- TRIP OF UNIT 2 CAUSED TRIP OF UNIT 3
- CAUSE OF UNIT 2 TRIP: CONSTRUCTION ELECTRICIAN WORKING ON B 4KV SHUTDOWN BOARD (WHICH IS SHARED WITH UNIT 1) WHILE PLANT WAS CONDUCTING BATTERY TEST. BATTERY FEED TO 3 ELEMENT FEEDWATER CONTROLLER HAD NOT BEEN TRANSFERRED TO UNITS 1 OR 3. LOSS OF I&C CHANNEL TO FW CONTROLLER RESULTED IN LOSS OF 2 OF 3 POWER SOURCES TO CONTROLLER, TRIPPING UNIT.

- UNIT 1 DOWN SINCE APRIL 10 FOR REFUELING, MAJOR ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS AND MARK I TORUS MODIFICATIONS
- CAUSE OF UNIT 3 TRIP: UNIT 2 TRIP CAUSED TEMPORARY UNDERVOLTAGE ON START BUS. IN SUCH CASE, SYSTEM DESIGNED TO TRANSFER PLANT PREFERRED POWER (PPP) TO PPP MG SET DID NOT PICK UP POWER AS RAPIDLY AS SHOULD HAVE. FIELD GROUND RELAYS ON UNIT 3 T.G. SET SENSED UNDERVOLTAGE AS GROUND, TRIPPING MAIN TURBINE.
- INCIDENT BEING REVIEWED BY NRR AS PART OF OUR REVIEW OF MAJOR ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS

● CRYSTAL RIVER 3, MAY 8, 1981 - CHARCOAL FILTER PROBLEM (AUX BLDG)

- MAY 8, 1981 AFTERNOON, AUXILIARY BUILDING CHARCOAL SAMPLES TAKEN FOR ANALYSIS  
  
SAMPLES TAKEN FROM CHARCOAL IN THREE FILTER BANKS BECAUSE NO SAMPLE CANISTERS WERE LEFT. RESULTED IN THREE OUT OF THE FOUR FILTER BANKS IN AN INOPERABLE STATUS BECAUSE A PARTIAL OR COMPLETE REPLACEMENT OF FILTER REQUIRES RETESTING.
- REACTOR BROUGHT TO HOT STANDBY IN ONE HOUR BECAUSE OF TECH SPEC 3.0.3. TECH SPEC REQUIRED THIS MODE IN ONE HOUR IF 2 OR MORE FILTERS ARE INOPERABLE.

- MAY 8, 1981, P.M., TO COLD SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.0.3. TWO OF FILTERS FAILED TO PASS TECH SPEC LEAK TEST.
- MAY 9, 1981, NEW CHARCOAL OBTAINED, INSTALLED AND TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC LEAK TEST.
- MAY 10, 1981, 0637, PLANT ONLINE (POWER OPERATIONS).

• ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT 2, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ISI RESULTS

- INSERVICE INSPECTION DURING REFUELING OUTAGE OF RCP A PUMP-TO-PIPING WELD
- FIRST INSTANCE WE KNOW OF INDICATIONS ON THIS TYPE PUMP/PIPING WELD
- ABOUT 1/2 THE INDICATIONS WERE BUFFED OUT
- REMAINDER WERE GROUND OUT (MAX DEPTH = 0.276 INCH)
- CAUSE IS UNDETERMINED. NRR/IE REQUIRING LICENSEE TO FOLLOWUP ON CERTAIN ITEMS
- REQUIRED TO INSPECT ONE OTHER PUMP
- IF INDICATIONS ARE FOUND, NRR/IE WILL REQUIRE CERTAIN FOLLOWUP ITEMS

● BRUNSWICK UNITS 1 AND 2 - FOLLOWUP

- LOSS OF S/D COOLING
- HEAT EXCHANGER BAFFLE FAILURE
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SAFETY INJECTION - DURING SHUTDOWN

BRUNSWICK 1, 5/6/81, MAINTENANCE OUTAGE - SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF CORE SPRAY

McGUIRE, 5/7/81, MAINTENANCE OUTAGE - SI SIGNAL CAUSED BY INSTRUMENT TECH  
(NO WATER DELIVERED)