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September 16, 1980

TO: Dr. Thomas McCreless
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Attached is a recent LER which I would like to have one of the ACRS Fellows check, if possible.


As noted, the LER pertains to the isolation of the HPCI system at Hatch, Unit 2, due to failure of the steam leak detection relay.

My questions are these: They state that "This is a non-repetitive event." Do they mean for Hatch, only? And, if so, do they mean only for this specific type of failure? -- that is, someone bumping the relay.

In our review of LERs pertaining to failures in air monitoring systems, we noted a number of cases of isolation of HPCI systems due to failures of fans in the compartments through which the steam lines to the system passed. I would personally classify this event as one of a very similar nature and therefore would not say that "This is a non-repetitive event." since very similar problems appear to be commonplace in BWRs.

Please have someone check into this and let me know what they find out.

Sincerely yours,



Dade W. Moeller
ACRS Member

A15

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ACCESSION NBR: A0006260439 DOC. DATE: 80/08/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: SG-366 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Georgia Power Co 05000366
 AUTH. NAME: COGGIN, C.L. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Georgia Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME: REGION 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: *Air Monitor*

SUBJECT: LER-80-111/03L-0: on 800724, while operating at steady state, HPCI steam line inboard isolation valve 2E41-F002 isolated, making HPCI inoperable. Probably caused by personnel bumping HPCI steam leak detection relay.

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Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 442
Baker, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 357 7781
912 537 9444

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant



Georgia Power

The Southern Electric System

August 19, 1980
PM-80-836

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to section 6.1.9.1.b of Hatch Unit II Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-366/1980-111.

M. Manry
M. Manry
Plant Manager

CLC/pebc

xc: J. H. Miller, Jr.
R. J. Kelly
W. A. Widner
C. L. Coggin
R. D. Baker
Control Room
File

PPM

~~9008260434~~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [][][][][][][][][][][] 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[1] [8] [9] [G][A][E][I][H][2] [14] [2] [0][0]-[0] [0][0][0][0] [25] [3] [4][1][1][1][1] [4] [57] [5] [58]

CON'T
[0] [1] [8] REPORT SOURCE [6] [L] [0] [5] [0] [0] [0] [3] [6] [6] [7] [0] [7] [2] [4] [8] [0] [8] [0] [8] [1] [9] [8] [0] [9]

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0] [2] On 7-24-80, while operating steady state at 99% thermal power, the HPCI
[0] [3] steam line inboard isolation valve 2E41-F002 isolated, making HPCI inop-
[0] [4] erable (Tech Specs 3.5.1.a). The isolation was reset, 2E41-F002 was op-
[0] [5] ened, and HPCI was operable. ADS, core spray, RCIC, and LPCI were oper-
[0] [6] able. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this
[0] [7] event. There was no impact on Unit 1. This is a non-repetitive event.

[0] [8] [7] [8] [9] [80]

[0] [9] [7] [8] SYSTEM CODE [9] [S][F] [10] CAUSE CODE [11] [A] [12] CAUSE SUBCODE [12] [C] [13] COMPONENT CODE [13] [Z][Z][Z][Z][Z][Z] [14] COMP. SUBCODE [15] [Z] [15] VALVE SUBCODE [16] [Z] [16]

(17) LER/RD REPORT NUMBER [21] [8] [22] [0] [23] [] [24] SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [24] [1][1][1] [27] [] [28] OCCURRENCE CODE [28] [0] [29] [3] [30] REPORT TYPE [30] [L] [31] [] [32] REVISION NO. [32] [0]

ACTION TAKEN [37] [H] [18] [34] [Z] [19] EFFECT ON PLANT [35] [Z] [20] SHUTDOWN METHOD [36] [Z] [21] HOURS [37] [0][0][0][0] [40] ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [41] [Y] [23] NRPD-4 FORM SUB. [42] [N] [24] PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [43] [Z] [25] COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [44] [Z][9][9][9] [47] [26]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1] [0] The probable cause of the spurious HPCI isolation was plant personnel
[1] [1] bumping an HPCI steam leak detection relay. Personnel have been cau-
[1] [2] tioned to avoid bumping relays when working in panels. The unit is now
[1] [3] in full compliance with the requirements and no further reporting is
[1] [4] required.

[1] [5] [7] [8] [9] FACILITY STATUS [8] [E] [28] % POWER [9] [0] [10] [9] [11] [9] [29] OTHER STATUS [30] NA [44] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [45] [A] [31] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [32] Operator Observation

[1] [6] [7] [8] [9] ACTIVITY CONTENT [8] [Z] [33] [10] [Z] [34] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [35] NA [44] LOCATION OF RELEASE [36] NA [45]

[1] [7] [7] [8] [9] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES [11] [0] [12] [0] [13] [0] [37] [Z] [38] DESCRIPTION [39] NA

[1] [8] [7] [8] [9] PERSONNEL INJURIES [11] [0] [12] [0] [13] [0] [40] DESCRIPTION [41] NA

[1] [9] [7] [8] [9] LOSS OF OIL DAMAGE TO FACILITY [11] [Z] [42] DESCRIPTION [43] NA

[2] [0] [7] [8] [9] PUBLICITY ISSUED [11] [N] [44] DESCRIPTION [45] NA

NAME OF PREPARER C. L. Coggin, Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv.

PHONE: 912-367-7781

NRC USE ONLY

LER #: 50-366/1980-111
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report
for LER 50-366/1980-111

On 8-24-80, while Hatch Unit 2 was operating steady state at 99% thermal power, the HPCI system steam line inboard isolation valve 2E41-F002 isolated on a spurious isolation signal. HPCI was inoperable while the isolation valve was closed (Tech Specs 3.5.1.a). The isolation was reset, 2E41-F002 was opened, and HPCI was again operable. ADS, core spray, RCIC, and LPCI systems were operable. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this event. There was no impact on Unit 1. This is a non-repetitive occurrence.

The cause of the HPCI isolation was not annunciated. Plant personnel were working in the leak detection instrumentation panel in the control room when the isolation occurred. The probable cause of the isolation was a HPCI steam leak detection relay being bumped. Plant personnel have been cautioned against bumping relays while working in panels. The unit is now in full compliance with the requirements, and no further reporting is required.