

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-245/90-24  
50-336/90-26  
50-423/90-26

Docket Nos. 50-245  
50-336  
50-423

License Nos. DPR-21  
DPR-65  
NPF-49

Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 270  
Hartford, Connecticut 06141

Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2, and 3

Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut

Inspection Conducted: September 24-27, 1990

Type of Inspection: Special, Fitness-For-Duty

Inspector: Edward B. Long for 10/10/90  
G. C. Smith, Senior Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by: A. Della Ratta for 10/10/90  
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date  
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Inspection Summary: Special Fitness-For-Duty Inspection (Inspection  
Nos. 50-245/90-24, 50-336/90-26, 50-423/90-26)

Areas Inspected: Follow-up to licensee-reported Fitness-For-Duty event.

Results: One apparent violation was identified relative to an individual with a presumptive positive drug screen being granted unescorted access to the protected area.

## DETAILS

### 1. Key Persons Contacted

#### Licensee

- S. Scace, Millstone Station Director
- R. Factora, Millstone Unit Services Director
- W. Hutchins, Licensing
- J. Haynes, Unit 1 Director
- G. Hallberg, Manager-Nuclear Security, Northeast Utilities (NU)
- P. Weekly, Security Manager
- D. Heritage, Manager Occupational Health

#### USNRC

- P. Habighorst, Resident Inspector

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel.

### 2. Follow-up to Licensee FFD Event

- a. Background - On September 19, 1990, the licensee notified the NRC Region I office that a Fitness-For-Duty (FFD)-related event had been identified earlier that day. The event involved a contractor employee who tested positive on a pre-employment drug screen and was inadvertently badged and granted unescorted access to the station from September 15-19, 1990. The employee was granted unescorted access prior to receipt of his test results from the certified laboratory, which verified the positive drug screen for marijuana. This is contrary to the Northeast Utilities FFD program and 10 CFR 26.

As a result of this event, and one other FFD-related event that was reported from the Haddam Neck Station on September 13, 1990, an inspector was dispatched to review the circumstances of both events and two additional inspectors were dispatched on September 24, 1990, to conduct the NRC's initial inspection of the Northeast Utilities' FFD program, in accordance with TI 2515/106. The FFD Program inspection is documented in NRC Region I Combined Inspection Report Numbers 50-245/90-22, 50-336/90-24, 50-423/90-22 and 50-213/90-17, and the inspection of the Haddam Neck FFD-related event is documented in NRC Region I Inspection Report No. 50-213/90-18.

- b. NRC Review - On September 24, 25 and 27, 1990, an on-site inspection of the Millstone event was conducted. The inspection included a review of documentation related to the event and applicable portions of the Northeast Utilities' (NU) FFD Policy and Manual, interviews



with key FFD program administrators and personnel involved in the event, and discussions with the NRC inspectors who were conducting the NRC's initial inspection of the Northeast Utilities' FFD program.

- c. NRC Findings - The NU FFD Policy and Procedures, NUP-90, NU FFD Manual Section 007.1, and 10 CFR 26.24 require that a pre-employment FFD test be performed. The licensee's program requires a urine specimen to be collected at the station collection facility to be analyzed for drugs. The specimen is screened at the station laboratory and the screening results are sent to the Station Health Facility. The Station Nurse at the Health Facility reviews the results and sends the names of those persons that have tested negative to the station Processing Center by telefacsimile. Split samples of positive screens are forwarded to a Health and Human Services certified laboratory for further analysis. When the Processing Center receives the negative drug screen, the date that the screen result was received is entered into the Central Repository security computer. Prior to badging a prospective contractor employee for unescorted access, the computer is consulted for the date of the negative drug screen result. This date is then entered on a contractor/vendor check-in sheet, which is a pre-badging check list that has been developed to ensure that all pre-badging elements are completed prior to issuance of an unescorted access badge for the station.

During the first two weeks of September, 1990, approximately 400 prospective contractor employees were processed to support a Unit 2 outage that was scheduled to start on September 15, 1990. However, the Central Repository security computer terminal in the Process Center was out-of-service on several occasions during the period of September 10-15, 1990. When the security computer terminal was out-of-service and pre-employment negative drug screen dates could not be entered, the processing clerk either entered the dates when the computer terminal was returned to service or referred to copies of the negative drug screens that were provided by telefacsimile from the Health Facility for the dates in question.

On September 15, 1990, a contractor employee's check-in sheet was reviewed by badging personnel and determined to contain all the elements necessary for badging except for his pre-employment negative drug screen date. The Central Repository security computer was consulted for the date, using the employee's social security number as the key identifier. No date was found in the computer system. Site badging personnel then reviewed the telefacsimile copies of the negative drug screens for the week of September 10-14, 1990 for the date.

The telefacsimile copies were reviewed using the employee's name, instead of his social security number, and a negative drug screen was found indicating the date of September 11, 1990. The individual's pre-badging check list was completed on that basis and he was badged for unescorted access to the station protected area on September 15, 1990. He was not authorized access to any vital areas.

On September 19, 1990, the Station Nurse received the results of this individual's drug analysis from the Health and Human Services certified laboratory where a split sample of his specimen had been sent because the drug screen done by the station had indicated positive for marijuana. The certified laboratory confirmed the station's screening result. The nurse contacted the individual's prospective supervisor to tell him that the individual was to see the Medical Review Officer (MRO) before continuing his access badging process. The nurse was informed by the supervisor that the individual was not onsite, but that he already had been badged. The nurse immediately notified the appropriate security personnel of the improper badging and the individual's station access authorization was suspended.

On September 20, 1990, the individual was interviewed by the MRO. The MRO confirmed the positive drug indication and the individual was denied future access to the station.

Investigation by the licensee into the improper badging revealed that the date of the negative drug screen that had been entered on the individual's pre-badging check list was actually the date of a negative screen for another contractor employee with the same surname and first initial. On September 22, 1990, the licensee concluded that the individual who tested positive did not enter any vital areas, did not work on any vital equipment and that the root cause of the event was administrative error.

Based on a review of licensee documentation of the event, a walk-down of the badging process, review of badging records, and interviews with FFD and security personnel, the inspector agreed with the licensee's findings.

However, failure to provide reasonable assurance that nuclear power plant personnel are not under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal and, that the workplace is free of the effects of such substances, is an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 26.10(a) and (c). An individual with a presumptive positive drug screen, which was later confirmed to be positive by laboratory analysis and review by the licensee's MRO, was granted unescorted access to the station for work assignments for a period of about four days.



3. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 27, 1990. At that time the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection were presented.