

LER No. 82-018
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 05000285

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

The District recently conducted a re-review of the need to include electro-pneumatic (E/P) positioners/controllers as part of the safety-related electrical equipment at the Fort Calhoun Station which must be environmentally qualified. Electrical equipment that must be qualified is that equipment which performs a critical function during an accident. Resulting from this re-review, the District determined that E/P's should not be exempted (as previously determined) from the environmental qualification criteria. All E/P positioners/controllers that perform a critical function at the Fort Calhoun Station, except the Honeywell E/P positioners associated with the SI leakage cooler system, are Fisher Model No. 546 controllers which have complete qualification documentation. The District has recently completed an industry-wide search for test or analysis qualification documentation for the Honeywell E/P positioners and no documentation could be located. With no definitive qualification data available for these E/P's, the District conservatively assumed that a failure of a Honeywell E/P during a Design Basis Accident (DBA), which could then permit the leakage of instrument air across the E/P and drive the applicable isolation valve (PCV-2909, 2929, 2949, or 2969) open. The opening of one or more of these valves would then partially divert SI flow through the one-inch leakage cooler line and reduce SI flow to the reactor where this coolant flow is needed.

The District believes the interim corrective action identified in Attachment No. 2 is sufficient to justify continued operation until a modification can be completed to permanently resolve this potential E/P positioner failure concern. The Fort Calhoun Station operators have been instructed by an Operations Memorandum to fail instrument air to these E/P's if control room indication identifies that the leakage cooler isolation valves are opening during a DBA; thus, ensuring the valves reclose to preclude SI flow loss. Position indication of PCV-2909, 2929, 2949, and 2969 during all operating conditions is considered reliable since these valves are equipped with LOCA qualified limit switches. Accordingly, these administrative procedures will ensure that adequate SI flow will be provided to the RCS upon a LOCA condition.

RA

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Corrective Action

As an interim measure, an Operations Memorandum has been issued that requires the operators to monitor valves PCV-2909, 2929, 2949, and 2969 under accident conditions and to fail air to containment if these valves move from the closed position. By securing air to these electro-pneumatic (E/P) positioners, the valves will fail to their closed position.

The District will issue an Engineering Evaluation and Assistance Request to redesign the valve actuation circuit such that a fully LOCA qualified solenoid valve will vent air from the valve diaphragm upon de-energization. Therefore, the E/P positioner can have no impact on valve position without energizing this solenoid. This modification will be completed during the 1983 refueling outage.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

This is the first reportable occurrence involving non-qualification of an electro-pneumatic positioner.

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