

CONTROL BLOCK: [][][][][][][][][][] (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N Y I P S 2 | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | 3 4 1 1 1 1 | (4) | (5)
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7 | 0 8 1 7 8 2 | 0 8 3 1 8 2 | (9)
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2 | Steam Generator No. 22, Blowdown outer isolation valve PCV 1215A failed closed
0 3 | due to failure of its Solenoid Valve SOV 1315A. To obtain samples to control
0 4 | steam generator chemistry, the valve was manually opened twice under strict
0 5 | administrative control for a total period of approximately 2 hours and
0 6 | 10 minutes.
0 7 |
0 8 |

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | H 1 | CAUSE CODE | E | CAUSE SUBCODE | A | COMPONENT CODE | V A L V O P | COMP. SUBCODE | F | VALVE SUBCODE | Z |
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | 8 2 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 3 2 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 1 | REPORT TYPE | T | REVISION NO. | 0 |
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN | A | FUTURE ACTION | Z | EFFECT ON PLANT | B | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | HOURS | 0 0 1 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | A 6 1 0 |
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0 | Pilot Solenoid Valve SOV 1315A failed causing closure of PCV 1215A. Its coil
1 1 | was tested and found to be open circuited. The faulty coil was replaced with a
1 2 | new like and kind coil. Equipment Data: ASCO Solenoid Model No. 8300 B56R
1 3 |
1 4 |

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | % POWER | 0 8 2 | OTHER STATUS | NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Control room indication
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | Z | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | NUMBER | 0 0 0 | TYPE | Z | DESCRIPTION | NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | NUMBER | 0 0 0 | DESCRIPTION | NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | TYPE | Z | DESCRIPTION | NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | DESCRIPTION | NA | 8210040145 820928 PDR ADOCK 05000247 S PDR
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

NAME OF PREPARER Bob Fitzpatrick PHONE: _____

ATTACHMENT

Docket No. 05000247
LER No. 82-032/03L-0

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York Inc.
Indian Point Station Unit No. 2

Event Description & Probable Consequence

On August 17, 1982 Steam Generator No. 22 blowdown isolation Valve PCV 1215A closed to its safe position due to failure of its Solenoid Valve SOV 1315A. This was observed by Control Room operator at 1:35 a.m.

Because of minor condenser leaks, it was necessary to monitor the steam generator liquid samples for chlorides on a regular basis. An earlier sample, taken at 1:00 a.m. had indicated chlorides to be 0.05 ppm. Less than or equal to 0.05 ppm chloride concentration is an acceptable operational limit. At Indian Point Station a steam generator secondary liquid sample can only be obtained by opening the blowdown valves and establishing blowdown flow. Some amount of blowdown has to be established to obtain the current representative sample.

Therefore, to obtain samples and maintain steam generator chemistry, the subject blowdown isolation valve was opened manually from 4:15 a.m. to 5:45 a.m. Chloride content was found to be in the range of 0.05 to 0.1 ppm.

Since chloride concentration was marginal, blowdown was maintained for 1 hour and 30 minutes. The blowdown isolation valve was manually opened again from 12:35 p.m. to 1:15 p.m. Chloride concentration was found to be less than 0.05 ppm.

Strict administrative controls were established during the opening time in both cases by stationing an operator at the valve and establishing communications. Prior to opening, the inner isolation valve (PCV 1215) was tested to demonstrate its operability and isolation capability.

The fail safe mode of the Solenoid Valve is deenergized which in turn will cause the PCV 1215A to go to the closed (fail safe) position. Since failure of the coil of the Solenoid Valve caused the valve to fail closed, the containment isolation function of the valve was not jeopardized. Integrity and safety of the system were maintained.

Cause Description - Corrective Action

Pilot Solenoid Valve SOV 1315A failed causing a closure of blowdown Isolation Valve PVC 1215A. The coil of the pilot Solenoid Valve had developed an open circuit causing deenergization. The fail safe mode of this valve is deenergized to close. A failure of this nature is not a generic problem.

After finding the cause, the Solenoid Coil was replaced by like and kind and the valve was returned to service.

Equipment Description:

ASCO Solenoid Valve
Model No. 8300 B56R