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D. A. Haddon
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Mr. David L. Meyer, Chief
Rules, Review and Directives Branch
Division of Freedom of Information
and Publication Services
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Meyer,

DRAFT REPORT, NUREG-1022, REVISION 1, "EVENT REPORTING GUIDELINES,
SECOND DRAFT REPORT FOR COMMENT"

Wisconsin Electric Power Company is submitting the following comments in response to the Federal Register notice (February 7, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 5614) announcing the availability of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's second draft of NUREG-1022 regarding event reporting guidelines. NUREG-1022 provides proposed clarification of the immediate notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and the 30-day written licensee event report (LER) requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 for nuclear power plants. Wisconsin Electric appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft report.

Wisconsin Electric endorses the comments which have been submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute. This letter provides Wisconsin Electric's specific comments on the draft NUREG and are intended to supplement the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute. As requested, our comments are limited to the same scope as the document, which involves clarifying rather than changing the reporting requirements. We wish to emphasize the importance of providing clear examples and guidance in order to maximize correct interpretations of reporting requirements. NUREG-1022 revealed examples which we believe would not necessarily lead to a correct interpretation of the reporting guidelines. Our specific comments on draft NUREG-1022 follow.

Section 2.7, Relief Valve Testing, page 14

We believe the example of common-mode failure used here is misleading. Although the valves were outside of tolerance, the valves were operable. No failure occurred. The safety valves were "degraded" in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, however, this was not reportable as a common-mode failure. Wisconsin Electric urges the selection of a clearer example of common-mode failure for use in this context.

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Section 3.2.4, Discussion item (1)(f)(ii), page 35

This example would only be reportable if the valve will not shut as required, the penetration cannot be isolated by other means, and the CIV failure results in containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits.

Section 3.2.4, Example (1), page 38

The last sentence states that a "voluntary LER was submitted within 30 days." The sentence implies that the NRC would expect a voluntary LER under the circumstances described, even though it was determined to be not reportable. Since there is no 30 day requirement for filing a voluntary LER, this sentence should be deleted.

Section 3.3.2, Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature of the Reactor Protection System, page 57, third full paragraph

Not all plants classify their emergency diesel generators as Engineered Safety Features, therefore it is not always necessary to report diesel starts. This distinction needs to be made. We suggest the following wording: "In this regard, the staff considers actuation of a diesel-generator, if classified as an ESF at the facility in question, to be actuation of a train..."

Section 3.3.2, Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature of the Reactor Protection System, Example (8), page 62

We believe this example is weak and misleading. The actuated charging pump was capable of compensating for the indicated RCS leak and, therefore, reactor scram and safety injection were not necessary. With these facts it is difficult to conclude that the charging pump was performing an ESF function and should be reported as an actuation of an ESF. The example should be deleted.

Section 3.3.2, Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature of the Reactor Protection System, Table 2 Example Systems, page 64

Anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) Mitigating Systems are not considered ESF or safety-related at PWR's. There is no apparent basis upon which to request that a voluntary LER be filed.

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Section 3.3.3, Event or Condition That Alone Could Prevent..., page 66, last paragraph


We do not agree with this characterization. The section title states "Event or condition that alone could prevent shutdown of the reactor." Loss of offsite power does not alone prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. Emergency power provides a fully redundant backup supply. A complete loss of offsite power alone could not prevent fulfillment of a safety function without assuming additional contingencies.

Section 5.2, LER Content Requirements and Preparation Guidance, page 105

Since not all fields on the LER form necessarily pertain to a given event, we recommend that the last sentence of the first paragraph be reworded as follows: "Make entries for all items on the LER form which are applicable to the event." Alternatively, if "none" or "n/a" is the required entry, that should be stated here.

In summary, Wisconsin Electric encourages the NRC to reexamine the specific examples we have cited and provide further clarification where appropriate. Wisconsin Electric appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments. Should you have any questions or require additional information regarding our comments, please contact David Butschli at (414) 221-2550.

Sincerely,



Bob Link
Vice President
Nuclear Power

DLB/cms

cc: NEI

NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Regional Administrator, Region III