

Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project P. O. Box 10429 Southport, N.C. 28461-0429 October 4, 1990

FILE: B09-13510C SERIAL: BSEP/90-0687 10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-324 LICENSE NO. DPR-62 SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-90-006

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and was submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, 1 for J. L. Harness General Manager Brunswick Nuclear Project

TH/th

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. N. B. Le BSEP NRC Resident Office

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(6-89)		U.E. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO										SION	APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARI COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORD AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.530). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFIC OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503								TH THIS DRWARD RECORDS NUCLEAR AND TO OFFICE 503					
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Unit 2 was in cold shutdown (Mode 4). At 1603 on 6-4-90, while venting a reactor pressure instrument following maintenance, a hydraulic perturbation of a shared reference leg resulted in isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup system, an automatic initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment system, and an isolation of the Reactor Building Ventilation system.

This event poses no safety significance since the affected systems functioned as required and the unit was in cold shutdown. Maintenance generated an interim policy which provided for a data gathering phase to determine long term corrective actions. As a result, it has been determined that caution notes should be added to the Process Instrument Calibration procedure for the valving evolution. The revisions are expected to be completed by October 30, 1990.

Other perturbations have been reported in LERs 1-90-006, 2-89-017, 1-87-017, and 2-86-020 .

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EVENT

While performing maintenance activities on a Unit 2 reactor pressure transmitter on 6-4-90, a hydraulic perturbation resulted in an isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system, an automatic initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system, and an isolation of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB HVAC) system at 1603.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 2 was in cold shutdown (Mode 4) with Core Spray (CS) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) loop A in standby readiness. RHR loop B was in shutdown cooling.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

A low level 2 (Tech. Spec. setpoint greater than or equal to 112") signal was generated when Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians were returning C32-PT-N008 (non-Tech.Spec. instrument), narrow range reactor pressure transmitter, to service following the replacement of the drain valve, C32-PT-N008-6. At the time of the event, one of three assigned company technicians was venting the air from the transmitter.

Operations personnel responded to annunciator alarms which were received on A-06 1-6 and 2-6 (Reactor Vessel Low-Low Water Level System A and System B) coincident with the event. The Control Operator verified that the automatic actions (RWCU isolation, SBCT initiation, and RB HVAC isolation) occurred. Plant response to this event was as expected. Affected systems were restored to service by 1710.

EVENT INVESTIGATION

The drain valve for C32-PT-N008 was being replaced since it had been identified on Work Request/Job Authorization (WR/JO) 88-ALUQ1 as leaking by. WR/JO 88-ALUQ1 had originally been assigned and planned by the Unit 2 Reactor Building I&C group. The WR/JO was subsequently reassigned to the I&C Periodic Test (PT) crew since they were more familiar with the equipment and the precautions that needed to be exercised when working around sensitive instrument racks. The original repair instructions were changed to reflect the change in modes of operation (Mode 1-power to Mode 4-cold shutdown). To provide the additional flexibility of being able to use the process flow path to vent the transmitter and reduce the not be required. Positive valve control was ensured by adhering to the administrative procedure (Volume 1, Book 1) provided for those times when a clearance is not being used.

A senior technician was placed in charge of the maintenance. After the drain valve was replaced, the senior I&C technician vented the transmitter to remove any possible trapped air by loosening the tubing fitting at the bottom of the transmitter and cracking open the previously shut instrument isolation valve. During the venting process, a hydraulic perturbation occurred on the reference leg of instrument rack H21-P005 located on the 50' elevation of the Reactor Building. The following reactor vessel level instruments were affected by the perturbation: B21-LT-N025A-1, B21-LT-N025B-1, B21-LT-N025A-2, B21-LT-N025B-2, B21-LT-N031B, and B21-LT-N031D. These instruments were affected because C32-PT-N008 is tied into the reference leg for these instruments.

LICENSEE EVENT TEXT CONTIN	REPORT (LER)	APPROVED DME NO. 2160-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST NOO HRS FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-330). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20665 AND TO THE FAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20603.							
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The Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation was caused by B21-LT-N025A-1 and B21-LT-N025B-1 (setpoint 118" plus or minus 6"). B21-LT-N031B and B21-LT-N031D (setpoint 118" plus or minus 6") did not generate an isolation signal. The Emergency Response Facility Information system (ERFIS) computer indicated that the transient was over in less than one second and the lowest indicated level reached was 122.27" on B21-LT-N031B and 118.35" on B21-LT-N031D. A low level 2 initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems did not occur because both of these instruments (B21-LT-N031B and B21-LT-N031D) were calibrated in January of this year and were left at a setpoint of 112". B21-LT-N025A-2 and B21-LT-N025B-2 did not generate an isolation signal since their setpoint is 45" plus or minus 6" (low level 3). The setpoints being referred to are inches above the top of active fuel.

EVENT CAUSE

The hydraulic perturbation of the reference leg was caused by a pressure spike of the reference leg when the tubing that had been loosened for venting was suddenly tightened and flow stopped which resulted in an increased differential pressure (low level) being sensed by the level instruments. Instrumentation sensitivity became a secondary consideration with the unit in cold shutdown. The technician was primarily concerned with the possibility of air being entrapped in the transmitter and connecting lines since the plant had recently experienced a hydraulic perturbation on Unit 1 involving some of the same level instruments (LER 1-90-06). From the available venting options, the technician chose the process flow path since this would substantially reduce the possibility of air entrapment.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

The technician restored C32-PT-N008 to service and Operations personnel restored affected systems to service by 1710.

On an interim basis, maintenance established a Maintenance Policy Notice (90-009). This policy required the presence of either quality control personnel or, in their absence, an I&C Foreman to witness velving evolutions on wide range reference leg instruments. The purpose of this policy was to serve as a data gathering phase to determine what long term corrective actions will be appropriate. No further concerns have been noted with the valving process associated with this instrument; however, it was determined that caution notes should be added to the Process Instrument Calibration procedure (OPIC)-PTOOL for both Unit 1 and Unit 2, for the valving evolution. The procedure revisions are expected to be completed by October 30, 1990.

EVENT ASSESSMENT

This event poses no safety significance since the affected systems functioned as required and the unit was in cold shutdown. Other perturbations have been reported under LERs 1-90-006, 2-89-017, 1-87-017, and 2-86-020.

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