



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 16, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-102/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station  
Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,  
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable  
Occurrence 82-102/03L. This report is required within  
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. J. Midura".

H. J. Midura  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

RH:ks *252*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311  
S PDR

The Energy People

Handwritten initials "IER" in a cursive script.

Report Number: 82-102/03L  
Report Date: 09-16-82  
Occurrence Date: 08-23-82  
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Air Lock - 130' Elevation - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-249.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 81% - Unit Load 890 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1400 hours, August 23, 1982, during surveillance testing, it was discovered that the 130' Elevation Containment Air Lock had excessive leakage past the seals on the inner door. The air lock was declared inoperable, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered at 1400 hours. The outer door was operable and maintained closed in compliance with the action statement.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The seal had been damaged by personnel closing the door with excessive force. This caused the rubber seal to partially leave the retaining groove. Subsequent door closures cut the seal.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the Containment Building while providing a redundant boundary as part of overall containment integrity. This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident. Since the other door was maintained closed, providing containment integrity, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. Therefore, this event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

## Action Statement 3.6.1.3 requires:

With one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the operable air lock door closed, and either restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours, or lock the operable air lock door closed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, the outer door was operable and maintained closed in compliance with the action statement. The cut seal was replaced and the leak rate surveillance was performed satisfactorily. At 1500 hours, August 23, 1982, the 130' Elevation Air Lock was declared operable and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was terminated.


Proper operation of the air lock doors is presently addressed in radiation worker training. In view of recurrent problems with air lock seals, special emphasis has been placed on the importance of closing the doors slowly. Caution signs reminding personnel to operate the door slowly have been placed at all air lock doors.

Design Change Requests 2SC-0931 and 1SC-0930 have been submitted to have snubbers installed on the air lock doors of both units. The purpose of these changes is to preclude shutting the doors with excessive force, and thereby eliminate the source of the recurrent problems that have been experienced.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By     R. Heller    

  
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General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No.     82-84