

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E. Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 16, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-068/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-068/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.


Sincerely yours,

H.J. Stichen

H. J. Midura General Manager -Salem Operations

RH:ks 7.91

CC: Distribution



TELL

Report Number:	82-068/03L	
Report Date:	09-16-82	
Occurrence Date:	08-27-82	
Facility:	Salem Generating Station, Public Service Electric &	

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Air Lock - 100' Elevation - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-261.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 35% - Unit Load 280 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1600 hours, August 27, 1982, during performance of leak rate testing of the Containment 100' Elevation Air Lock, following maintenance, it was discovered that the inner door had excessive leakage past the seals. The air lock was declared inoperable and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was entered at 1600 hours.

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DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Prior to this occurrence, maintenance was performed on the air lock door operating mechanism to replace broken cam followers. It is believed that the cause of this occurrence was personnel shutting the door with excessive force, which broke the cam followers and caused the door seal to partially leave its retaining groove. Subsequent closure of the door cut the seal.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the Containment Building while providing a redundant boundary as part of overall containment integrity. This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident. Since the outer door was maintained closed, providing containment integrity, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. Therefore, this event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Action Statement 3.6.1.3 requires:

With a containment air lock inoperable, restore the air lock to operable status within 24 hours or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, the outer door was operable and maintained closed providing containment integrity. The damaged seal was replaced, and the leak rate surveillance was satisfactorily performed. The 100' elevation air lock was declared operable and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.6.1.3 was terminated at 2115 hours, August 27, 1982.

Proper operation of the air lock doors is presently addressed in radiation worker training. In view of recurrent problems with air lock seals, special emphasis has been placed on the importance of closing the doors slowly. Caution signs reminding personnel to operate the door slowly have been placed at each operating station.

Design Change Requests 2SC-0931 and 1SC-0930 have been submitted to have snubbers installed on the air lock doors of both units. The purpose of these changes is to preclude shutting the doors with excessive force, and thereby eliminate the source of the recurrent problems that have been experienced.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller

N.J. mfidur

General Manager -Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-84