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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION	NA	03/17/94	MADM-03	V1	V1	V1	V1	V1	V1	V1	V1	V1	V1	V2	V7	V2	V1	V1	V1	V7	V1	71
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REMARKS: MINOR CHANGE TO SLC MANUAL  
 REPLACE PAGES 1, 2 OF LOEP & PAGES 16.5-1 & 16.5-2

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 VICE PRESIDENT  
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*ADK 9/1*

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BY L J KUNKA LJK/CDC MG01RC

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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATION WITH IRRADIATED FUEL IN CORE

16.5-1 INVENTORY CONTROL

COMMITMENT

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Prior to reducing the Reactor Coolant System (NC) level to less than 60" Wide Range NC system level, the following conditions shall be met:

- a. If steam generator (S/G) nozzle dams are in use, at least one hot leg vent path shall remain open whenever the reactor vessel head is in place. The vent path may be satisfied by no hot leg nozzle dam installed and removal of either: 1. hot leg diaphragm and manway or 2. cold leg diaphragm and manway in the vented loop.
- b. If the reactor coolant system cold leg side is to be opened with total openings of one square inch or greater, a hot leg vent path shall be provided. The vent path may be satisfied by the removal of either 1. hot leg S/G manway and diaphragm (no hot leg nozzle dam) or 2. no hot leg nozzle dam and cold leg manway and diaphragm in the same steam generator or by the removal of the reactor vessel head.
- c. A detailed review of each outage schedule which involves operation at reduced inventory shall be conducted, looking in particular at evolutions which could perturb the NCS.
- d. Actions that could perturb the NCS during reduced inventory operation shall require prior notification of the shift supervisor.
- e. The reactor has been subcritical for at least 7 days; or as specified in Design Study CNDS-0242 based on unit rated power operation time; or as specified in Design Study MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

- a. With the vent paths of 16.5-1a and b not available immediately initiate action to provide the required hot leg vent path and suspend all activities which may perturb NCS level or which may reduce the reliability of the operating ND Loop.

- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

None

REFERENCES:

- 1) Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal
- 2) NUREG 1410, Loss of Vital AC Power and Residual Heat Removal During Mid-Loop Operation at Vogtle
- 3) Integrated Scheduling Management Procedure 3.1, Outage Planning and Execution Responsibilities
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- 7) Design Study: MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218, McGuire/Catawba Nuclear Stations, Loss of Decay Heat Removal With Steam Generator Mitigation, Safety Analysis, Engineering Support Section, Design Engineering Department

BASIS:

Generic Letter 88-17 and NUREG 1410 involve concerns associated with a loss of Residual Heat Removal during NC system reduced inventory. Numerous events have occurred in the industry that resulted in a loss of residual heat removal during reduced inventory operation. This is of great concern due to the potential for substantial core damage occurring in a relatively short time period. This Selected Licensee Commitment depicts those commitments which are extremely important to nuclear safety, however, are not presently covered by Technical Specifications.

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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATION WITH IRRADIATED FUEL IN CORE

16.5-1 INVENTORY CONTROL

COMMITMENT

Prior to reducing the Reactor Coolant System (NC) level to less than 60" Wide Range NC system level, the following conditions shall be met:

- a. If steam generator (S/G) nozzle dams are in use, at least one hot leg vent path shall remain open whenever the reactor vessel head is in place. The vent path may be satisfied by no hot leg nozzle dam installed and removal of either: 1. hot leg diaphragm and manway or 2. cold leg diaphragm and manway in the vented loop.
- b. If the reactor coolant system cold leg side is to be opened with total openings of one square inch or greater, a hot leg vent path shall be provided. The vent path may be satisfied by the removal of either 1. hot leg S/G manway and diaphragm (no hot leg nozzle dam) or 2. no hot leg nozzle dam and cold leg manway and diaphragm in the same steam generator or by the removal of the reactor vessel head.
- c. A detailed review of each outage schedule which involves operation at reduced inventory shall be conducted, looking in particular at evolutions which could perturb the NCS.
- d. Actions that could perturb the NCS during reduced inventory operation shall require prior notification of the shift supervisor.
- e. The reactor has been subcritical for at least 7 days; or as specified in Design Study CNDS-0242 based on unit rated power operation time; or as specified in Design Study MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

- a. With the vent paths of 16.5-1a and b not available immediately initiate action to provide the required hot leg vent path and suspend all activities which may perturb NCS level or which may reduce the reliability of the operating ND Loop.



- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

None

REFERENCES:

- 1) Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal
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BASIS:

Generic Letter 88-17 and NUREG 1410 involve concerns associated with a loss of Residual Heat Removal during NC system reduced inventory. Numerous events have occurred in the industry that resulted in a loss of residual heat removal during reduced inventory operation. This is of great concern due to the potential for substantial core damage occurring in a relatively short time period. This Selected Licensee Commitment depicts those commitments which are extremely important to nuclear safety, however, are not presently covered by Technical Specifications.

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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATION WITH IRRADIATED FUEL IN CORE

16.5-1 INVENTORY CONTROL

COMMITMENT

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- a. If steam generator (S/G) nozzle dams are in use, at least one hot leg vent path shall remain open whenever the reactor vessel head is in place. The vent path may be satisfied by no hot leg nozzle dam installed and removal of either: 1. hot leg diaphragm and manway or 2. cold leg diaphragm and manway in the vented loop.
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- c. A detailed review of each outage schedule which involves operation at reduced inventory shall be conducted, looking in particular at evolutions which could perturb the NCS.
- d. Actions that could perturb the NCS during reduced inventory operation shall require prior notification of the shift supervisor.
- e. The reactor has been subcritical for at least 7 days; or as specified in Design Study CNDS-0228-2 based on unit rated power operation time; or as specified in Design Study MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

- a. With the vent paths of 16.5-1a and b not available immediately initiate action to provide the required hot leg vent path and suspend all activities which may perturb NCS level or which may reduce the reliability of the operating ND Loop.

- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

None

REFERENCES:

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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

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16.5-1 INVENTORY CONTROL

COMMITMENT

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- d. Actions that could perturb the NCS during reduced inventory operation shall require prior notification of the shift supervisor.
- e. The reactor has been subcritical for at least 7 days; or as specified in Design Study CNDS-0242 based on unit rated power operation time; or as specified in Design Study MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

- a. With the vent paths of 16.5-1a and b not available immediately initiate action to provide the required hot leg vent path and suspend all activities which may perturb NCS level or which may reduce the reliability of the operating ND Loop.

- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

None

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REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

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- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

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REFERENCES:

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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATION WITH IRRADIATED FUEL IN CORE

16.5-1 INVENTORY CONTROL

COMMITMENT

Prior to reducing the Reactor Coolant System (NC) level to less than 60" Wide Range NC system level, the following conditions shall be met:

- a. If steam generator (S/G) nozzle dams are in use, at least one hot leg vent path shall remain open whenever the reactor vessel head is in place. The vent path may be satisfied by no hot leg nozzle dam installed and removal of either: 1. hot leg diaphragm and manway or 2. cold leg diaphragm and manway in the vented loop.
- b. If the reactor coolant system cold leg side is to be opened with total openings of one square inch or greater, a hot leg vent path shall be provided. The vent path may be satisfied by the removal of either 1. hot leg S/G manway and diaphragm (no hot leg nozzle dam) or 2. no hot leg nozzle dam and cold leg manway and diaphragm in the same steam generator or by the removal of the reactor vessel head.
- c. A detailed review of each outage schedule which involves operation at reduced inventory shall be conducted, looking in particular at evolutions which could perturb the NCS.
- d. Actions that could perturb the NCS during reduced inventory operation shall require prior notification of the shift supervisor.
- e. The reactor has been subcritical for at least 7 days; or as specified in Design Study CNDS-0242 based on unit rated power operation time; or as specified in Design Study MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

- a. With the vent paths of 16.5-1a and b not available immediately initiate action to provide the required hot leg vent path and suspend all activities which may perturb NCS level or which may reduce the reliability of the operating ND Loop.

- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

None

REFERENCES:

- 1) Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal
- 2) NUREG 1410, Loss of Vital AC Power and Residual Heat Removal During Mid-Loop Operation at Vogtle
- 3) Integrated Scheduling Management Procedure 3.1, Outage Planning and Execution Responsibilities
- 4) McGuire Nuclear Station responses to Generic Letter 88-17 dated January 3, 1989, February 2, 1989, March 10, 1989 and February 24, 1993.
- 5) McGuire Station Directive 3.1.3 (MSD403) Shutdown Risk Management Guidelines
- 6) Design Study: CNDS-0242, Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations, Shutdown By Decay Heat Level Before Mid-Loop Operation, Safety Analysis, Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Services
- 7) Design Study: MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218, McGuire/Catawba Nuclear Stations, Loss of Decay Heat Removal With Steam Generator Mitigation, Safety Analysis, Engineering Support Section, Design Engineering Department

BASIS:

Generic Letter 88-17 and NUREG 1410 involve concerns associated with a loss of Residual Heat Removal during NC system reduced inventory. Numerous events have occurred in the industry that resulted in a loss of residual heat removal during reduced inventory operation. This is of great concern due to the potential for substantial core damage occurring in a relatively short time period. This Selected Licensee Commitment depicts those commitments which are extremely important to nuclear safety, however, are not presently covered by Technical Specifications.

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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATION WITH IRRADIATED FUEL IN CORE

16.5-1 INVENTORY CONTROL

COMMITMENT

Prior to reducing the Reactor Coolant System (NC) level to less than 60" Wide Range NC system level, the following conditions shall be met:

- a. If steam generator (S/G) nozzle dams are in use, at least one hot leg vent path shall remain open whenever the reactor vessel head is in place. The vent path may be satisfied by no hot leg nozzle dam installed and removal of either: 1. hot leg diaphragm and manway or 2. cold leg diaphragm and manway in the vented loop.
- b. If the reactor coolant system cold leg side is to be opened with total openings of one square inch or greater, a hot leg vent path shall be provided. The vent path may be satisfied by the removal of either 1. hot leg S/G manway and diaphragm (no hot leg nozzle dam) or 2. no hot leg nozzle dam and cold leg manway and diaphragm in the same steam generator or by the removal of the reactor vessel head.
- c. A detailed review of each outage schedule which involves operation at reduced inventory shall be conducted, looking in particular at evolutions which could perturb the NCS.
- d. Actions that could perturb the NCS during reduced inventory operation shall require prior notification of the shift supervisor.
- e. The reactor has been subcritical for at least 7 days; or as specified in Design Study CNDS-0242 based on unit rated power operation time; or as specified in Design Study MGDS-0228/CNDS-0218.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

- a. With the vent paths of 16.5-1a and b not available immediately initiate action to provide the required hot leg vent path and suspend all activities which may perturb NCS level or which may reduce the reliability of the operating ND Loop.

- b. If the vent path of 16.5-1b cannot be provided, ensure containment closure can be achieved prior to the onset of core boiling and suspend any activities that may reduce NCS inventory.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS:

None

REFERENCES:

- 1) Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal
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BASIS:

Generic Letter 88-17 and NUREG 1410 involve concerns associated with a loss of Residual Heat Removal during NC system reduced inventory. Numerous events have occurred in the industry that resulted in a loss of residual heat removal during reduced inventory operation. This is of great concern due to the potential for substantial core damage occurring in a relatively short time period. This Selected Licensee Commitment depicts those commitments which are extremely important to nuclear safety, however, are not presently covered by Technical Specifications.