



GARRETT D. EDWARDS
PLANT MANAGER

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

R. D. 1, Box 208

Delta, Pennsylvania 17314

(717) 456-4244

September 16, 1993

Docket No. 50-277

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2

This LER concerns a Technical Specification violation when a Primary Containment Isolation System Inoperable Valve was not logged or isolated.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277
Report Number:	2-93-013
Revision Number:	00
Event Date:	08/19/93
Report Date:	09/16/93
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

cc: R. A. Burricelli, Public Service Electric & Gas
W. P. Dornsife, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
INPO Records Center
T. T. Martin, US NRC, Administrator, Region I
R. I. McLean, State of Maryland
B. S. Norris, US NRC, Resident Inspector
C. D. Schaefer, DelMarVa Power
H. C. Schwemm, VP - Atlantic Electric

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TITLE (4) Technical Specification Violation when a Primary Containment Isolation System Inoperable Isolation Valve was not isolated and logged

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
08	19	93	93	013	00	09	16	93		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (8) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50. (Check one or more of the following) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Anthony J. Wasong, Manager - Experience Assessment	TELEPHONE NUMBER 711 17 415 16 1-17 10 11 4
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 08/19/93, while attempting to close an Isolation Valve (MO-68), the valve would not close. The Motor Control Center (MCC) was turned off to support a visual inspection of the MCC internals. The Reactor Operator (RO) attempted again to close MO-68 and it did close properly. MO-68 was stroked several times to verify valve operability. The Shift Supervisor (SSV) discussed this condition with the Shift Manager and valve status was considered to be operable. On 08/20/93, the RO attempted to close MO-68 and it did not close. MO-68 was considered inoperable. Further investigation revealed that this condition resulted in a violation of Tech Spec 3.7.D.2 and 4.7.D.2.a. Maintenance personnel identified that an auxiliary contact was not functioning properly. The cause of the event was that insufficient trouble shooting was performed on 08/19/93 and Shift Management considered the valve operable without thoroughly identifying the cause of the valve failure. The valve's auxiliary contact was replaced. The operability section of the Operations Manual will be reviewed to determine what revisions are necessary to ensure that Managements expectations are clear regarding valve operability. The pertinent information from the event will be provided to the appropriate Operations personnel. No previous similar events were identified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

Requirements of the Report

This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a result of a Technical Specification (Tech Spec) violation when a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) (EIS:JM) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and a Surveillance Requirement were not performed when an isolation valve became inoperable.

Unit Conditions at Time of Event

Unit 2 was in the "RUN" mode at approximately 8% of thermal reactor power. There were no systems, structures, or components that were inoperable that contributed to the event.

Description of the Event

On 08/19/93, while the Reactor Operator (RO) (Utility : Licensed) was attempting to close the Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) (EIS:CE) Return Isolation Valve (MO-68) (EIS:IV), the valve would not close. A Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) (Utility:Non Licensed) was immediately dispatched by the Shift Supervisor (SSV) to the valve Motor Control Center (MCC) (EIS:MCC). The MCC was turned off to support a visual inspection of the MCC internals which was satisfactory. The NPO restored power to the MCC. The RO attempted again to close MO-68 and it did close properly. MO-68 was stroked open and closed several times to verify valve operability. The SSV (Utility:Licensed) discussed this condition with the Shift Manager (SMR) (Utility:Licensed) and valve status was considered to be operable.

On 08/20/93 at 0925 hours, while another operator (Utility : Licensed) was initiating a work activity to address the MO-68 problem that occurred on 08/19/93, the concern regarding valve operability was raised again. To reconfirm the initial belief that the valve was operable, the RO attempted to close MO-68 and it did not close. In accordance with an approved Routine Test, electrical jumpers were installed into the valve control logic to determine the cause of the problem but the valve still did not close. MO-68 was considered inoperable for Primary Containment Isolation and the appropriate Tech Spec LCOs were entered. In addition, the necessary Tech Spec Surveillance Requirements were performed. Further investigation revealed that this condition resulted in a violation of Tech Spec 3.7.D.2 and 4.7.D.2.a on 08/19/93 when the affected penetration was not secured and daily logging of the penetration status was not initiated. Tech Spec 3.7.D.2 requires that in the event any isolation valve becomes inoperable for isolation, at least one isolation valve must be maintained operable in the affected penetration and within 4 hours either restore the inoperable valve to operable status or isolate the affected penetration. In addition, Tech Spec 4.7.D.2.a specifies that "Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table

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TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

3.7.1 is inoperable, the position of at least one other valve in each line having an inoperable valve shall be recorded daily". After discovery of the event, Maintenance personnel were immediately dispatched to trouble shoot the valve problem. Maintenance personnel identified that an auxiliary contact in the MCC associated with MO-68 was stuck and not functioning properly. The auxiliary contact was dislodged by Maintenance personnel. The RO verified that the valve properly stroked closed. A blocking clearance was applied to support maintenance activities. The valve's auxiliary contact was replaced and the blocking clearance was removed to support testing. MO-68 was stroke time tested satisfactorily per a Surveillance Test (ST-O-07G-480-2). At 1836 hours, MO-68 was considered operable for isolation purposes and the appropriate Tech Spec LCOs were exited.

Cause of the Event

The cause of the event was that insufficient trouble shooting was performed on 08/19/93 and Shift Management considered the valve operable without thoroughly identifying the cause of the valve failure. It is the expectation of Management that for all safety related valve failures, the valve should be declared inoperable and reasonable trouble shooting be completed. This would include notification of valve technicians who could investigate the valve condition. In this instance Shift Management did not pursue reasonable trouble shooting.

Analysis of the Event

No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event.

The consequences are considered minimal due to the fact that the Feedwater Check Valve in line with MO-68 was operable during the time that the LCO and Surveillance Requirement were not performed.

Corrective Actions

After discovery of the event, the valve's auxiliary contact was replaced and the blocking clearance was removed to support testing. MO-68 was stroke time tested satisfactorily per a Surveillance Test. MO-68 was considered operable for isolation purposes and the appropriate Tech Spec LCOs were exited.

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

In addition, the operability section of the Operations Manual will be reviewed to determine what revisions are necessary to ensure that Managements expectations are clear regarding valve operability. The Operations Manual will be revised as necessary pending the result of the review.

The event has been discussed with the involved SSV and SMR. The pertinent information from the event will be provided to the appropriate Operations personnel to re-emphasize the importance of thorough trouble shooting prior to considering equipment operable.

Previous Similar Events

No previous similar events were identified which involved declaring systems operable without thoroughly investigating causes of the component failure.