



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 16, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-094/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-094/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks *PSJ*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
S PDR

The Energy People

IE22

Report Number: 82-094/03L

Report Date: 09-16-82

Occurrence Date: 08-25-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System - Vital Bus 2C
Under Voltage Relay - Improper Setpoint.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-259.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 80% - Unit Load 880 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1053 hours, August 25, 1982, during performance of surveillance testing of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS), it was discovered that Vital Bus 2C failed the undervoltage test. The undervoltage relay did drop out on undervoltage, but at a lower setting than required by the surveillance procedure. The channel was declared inoperable, placed in the tripped condition, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.2a Action 14 was entered at 1053 hours, August 25, 1982.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation revealed that the cause of this occurrence was drift of the undervoltage trip setpoint.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the protective and Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Instrumentation Systems and interlocks ensure that; 1) the associated ESF action and or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters. The operability of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analysis.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Redundant trip capability is provided by two other independent channels, therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health or safety of the general public.

Action Statement 3.3.2a Action 14 requires:

With the number of operable channels one less than the total number of channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required channel functional test, provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

Inoperability of one trip channel, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Vital Bus 2C undervoltage relay trip setpoint was properly adjusted and tested satisfactorily. The channel was declared operable, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.2a Action 14 was terminated at 2032 hours, August 25, 1982.

FAILURE DATA:

General Electric Corporation
Undervoltage Relay
Model 121AV74A1A

Prepared By R. Heller



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-84