



Carolina Power & Light Company

32 JUL 8 8:29

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429

July 2, 1982

FILE: B09-13510E
SERIAL: BSEP/82-1483

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
DOCKET NO. 50-324 AND 50-325
LICENSE NO. DPR-62 AND DPR-71
RESPONSE TO INFRACTION OF NRC REQUIREMENTS

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) has received IE Inspection Report 50-324/82-18 and 50-325/82-18 and finds that it does not contain any information of a proprietary nature.

The report identified one item that appears to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. This item and Carolina Power and Light Company's response are addressed in the following text.

Violation (Severity Level V)

Technical Specification 6.8.1a requires written procedures to be implemented for items 1.5.a and d.17 of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33.

Contrary to the above, procedures required by items 1.5.a and d.17 were not implemented in that the output breaker to 1A-1 battery charger was momentarily not positioned in accordance with clearance procedure 1-459 on April 19, 1982, and service water vital header crosstie valve, 1-SW-V118, was not positioned per operating procedure OP-43 on May 6, 1982.

Carolina Power and Light Company's Response

Carolina Power and Light Company acknowledges that this was a violation of NRC requirements. The event involving 1A-1 battery charger occurred due to an auxiliary operator (AO) performing a job in which he was not assigned, nor briefed, whereas the cause for crosstie valve 1-SW-V118 being found in the closed position could not be definitely determined.

July 2, 1982


While removing an equipment clearance on Division II 125 VDC battery, 1A-1, an AO assigned to perform a second verification for the clearance removal removed the red tag from and opened the battery charger output breaker. Prior to removing the clearance, an AO was assigned to remove this clearance from battery 1A-1 and had been briefed by the Control Operator on the proper sequence for removing the clearance and restoring the battery to service. A second AO, assigned to perform a second lineup verification following the removal of the clearance, decided to assist the first AO in the clearance removal. He removed the red tag from the battery charger breaker (the charger was supplying the bus at this time) and assuming that the breaker needed to be repositioned, opened the breaker. The first AO immediately realized the problem and the breaker was reclosed restoring power to the bus.

The two operators responsible for this violation were counseled by their Shift Foreman and Shift Operating Supervisor. A review of the incident was also conducted with the Plant Manager, Manager-Plant Operations, and the responsible individuals. Each operating shift will conduct a shift review on this incident. These reviews will be completed by July 31, 1982.

The exact cause for the service water vital header crosstie valve 1-SW-V118 being found in the closed position could not be determined. A review of plant documentation determined that PT-24.1, which requires the repositioning of the service water vital header crosstie valve V118, had been performed just prior to this event. A review of the PT determined that Step B.2 which requires that V118 be opened was initialed as not applicable (N/A). Discussions with the operators involved with this event could not determine why the step was declared to be "not applicable." The valve was immediately returned to its proper position.

To correct this problem and to prevent similar type occurrences, the plant established a double verification program on June 1, 1982, which requires that a second verification is performed on systems important to safety. This program will provide assurance that valves, breakers, and switches associated with equipment important to safety will be correctly positioned when returned to service. This item is considered closed.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/gvc

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung