

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1][G][A][E][I][H][2][2][0][0][0][0][0][0][0][0][0][3][4][1][1][1][1][4] (5)  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 57 58

CON'T [0][1] REPORT SOURCE [L] (6) [0][5][0][0][0][3][6][6][7][0][8][2][5][8][2] (8) [0][9][2][1][8][2] (9)  
7 8 80 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  
[0][2] On Aug. 25, 1982, with the plant in hot shutdown, it was found that the  
[0][3] "B" reactor building to Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker had no closed  
[0][4] indication. Thus, it was declared inoperable, and a 7-day limiting  
[0][5] condition of operation was declared as per Tech. Specs. 3.6.4.2, Action  
[0][6] a. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.  
[0][7] This event was non-repetitive.

[0][9] SYSTEM CODE [S][A] (11) CAUSE CODE [E] (12) CAUSE SUBCODE [B] (13) COMPONENT CODE [V][A][L][V][E][X] (14) COMP. SUBCODE [X] (15) VALVE SUBCODE [C] (16)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

[17] LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [8][2] (21) EVENT YEAR [ ] (22) SHUTDOWN METHOD [ ] (23) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0][8][3] (24-26) OCCURRENCE CODE [ ] (27) REPORT TYPE [L] (30) REVISION NO. [0] (32)

ACTION TAKEN [B] (18) FUTURE ACTION [F] (19) EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] (21) HOURS [0][0][0][0] (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] (23) NRPD-4 FORM SUB. [N] (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [N] (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [G][2][0][2] (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  
[1][0] Cause of event attributed to component failure. It was caused by limit  
[1][1] switch not making in closed position because switch mount bracket was  
[1][2] loose and actuator out of adjustment. Switch bracket was tightened and  
[1][3] actuator adjusted. System tested per "Reactor Bldg.-Suppression Chamber  
[1][4] Vacuum Relief System Operability" procedure and returned to service.

[1][5] FACILITY STATUS [G] (28) %POWER [0][0][0] (29) OTHER STATUS [NA] (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY [A] (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [Operator Observation] (32)

[1][6] ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE [Z] (33) [Z] (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] (36)

[1][7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0][0][0] (37) TYPE [Z] (38) DESCRIPTION [NA] (39)

[1][8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0][0][0] (40) DESCRIPTION [NA] (41)

[1][9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] (42) DESCRIPTION [NA] (43) N/ 8210010098 820921 PDR ADOCK 05000366 S PDR

[2][0] ISSUED DESCRIPTION [N] (44) [NA] (45) PUBLICITY [ ] (46)

GPO 91-1-925

LER No.: 50-366/1982-083  
Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch  
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report  
for LER 50-366/1982-083

On August 25, 1982, with the plant in hot shutdown, it was found that the "B" reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breaker had no closed indication, and it was declared inoperable. Tech. Specs. section 3.6.4.2, Action a. requires that with one reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breaker inoperable, restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to operable status within seven days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next twelve hours and in cold shutdown within the following twenty-four hours. Thus, a seven-day limiting condition of operation (LCO) was initiated. Public health and safety were not affected. This event was non-repetitive.

The cause of the event has been attributed to component failure. It was caused by the "B" vacuum breaker limit switch "not making" in the closed position because the switch mounting bracket was loose and the actuator was out of adjustment. The switch bracket was tightened and the actuator was adjusted. The "B" vacuum breaker and limit switches were then successfully tested per the "Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Relief System Operability" procedure. The "B" vacuum breaker was then placed back in service within the time constraints of the LCO.