

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I | L | Q | A | D | I | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

0 1 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

0 2 | On July 19, 1982, while performing the Reactor high pressure scram functional test,  
0 3 | pressure switch PS-1-263-55A was found to trip at 1061 psig. This is 1 psig higher  
0 4 | than the LCO in Technical Specification Table 3.1-1. The other three switches in  
0 5 | the one-out-of-two-twice logic were found to be below the required setpoint, so a  
0 6 | Reactor scram would have occurred at the correct pressure if high pressure had  
0 7 | occurred. Thus the consequences were minimal.

0 9 | I | A | 11 | X | 12 | Z | 13 | I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | S | 15 | Z | 16

17 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 3 | L | 0

E | 18 | 2 | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | N | 25 | B | 0 | 6 | 9 | 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ⑳

0 | This occurrence was caused by instrument setpoint drift. The switch was recalibrated  
0 1 | to less than the required setting. The switch was then functionally tested  
0 2 | satisfactorily. No further corrective action is deemed necessary.

5 | E | 28 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 29 | NA | 30 | B | 31 | Functional Instrument Test | 32

6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36

7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39

8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41

9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43

0 | N | 44 | NA | 45

8209300306 820916  
 PDR ADOCK 05000254  
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 82-28/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit One
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-254
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On July 19, 1982, while performing the Reactor High Pressure Scram Functional Test, QIS-5, pressure switch PS-1-263-55A was found to trip at 1061 psig. This is 1 psig higher than the limiting condition for operation setpoint of 1060 psig defined in Technical Specification Table 3.1-1.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The failure of this pressure switch did not effect plant safety. Instrument PS-1-263-55A is an "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel sensor wired in conjunction with PS-1-263-55C in a one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic scheme. The setpoints of pressure switch PS-1-263-55C and both "B" RPS channel pressure switches (PS-1-263-55B and PS-1-263-55D) were found to trip within the required limits. The 55C pressure switch, in conjunction with either "B" RPS channel pressure switch, would have provided for a Reactor scram if a high Reactor pressure situation had occurred. In addition, pressure switch 55A would have tripped at less than 0.1 percent over the setpoint. Thus, the safety of the Reactor was not affected as a result of this occurrence.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence was instrument setpoint drift. This is a Barksdale Bourdon Tube/316SS pressure switch, Model Number B2T-A12SS.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action taken was the calibration of the pressure switch to less than the required setpoint. After calibration, the pressure switch was functionally tested satisfactorily. This pressure switch has not shown a propensity to drift. Therefore, no further corrective action is deemed necessary.