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SEP 18 1990

Docket No. 50-254  
Docket No. 50-265

Commonwealth Edison Company  
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed  
Senior Vice President  
Opus West III  
1400 Opus Place  
Downers Grove, IL 60515

Gentlemen:

This refers to an investigation performed by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) at your facility. A copy of the Synopsis of Investigation Report 03-89-015 is enclosed with this letter.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you may have relative to this letter or the referenced material.

Sincerely,  
Original signed by  
A. Bert Davis  
A. Bert Davis  
Regional Administrator

Enclosure: OI Investigation  
Report 03-89-015 Synopsis

cc w/enclosure:  
D. Galle, Vice President - BWR  
Operations  
T. Kovach, Nuclear  
Licensing Manager  
R. L. Bax, Station Manager  
DCD/DCB (RIDS)  
OC/LFDCB  
Resident Inspectors LaSalle  
Dresden, Quad Cities  
Richard Hubbard  
J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public  
Utilities Division  
L. Olshan, NRR LPM  
Robert Newmann, Office of Public  
Counsel, State of Illinois Center

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## SYNOPSIS

On November 20, 1989, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI:RIII) received a request for investigation from the NRC Region III Administrator. The request evolved from information provided by the licensee, Commonwealth Edison Company's Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). As a result of their own investigation, the licensee determined that on October 17, 1989, during the process of reloading fuel into the reactor core during a Unit 1 refueling outage, a fuel handling foreman (FHF) failed to follow station operating procedure when repositioning fuel out of sequence. The matter was referred to OI:RIII to determine whether the FHF and other personnel at Quad Cities may have willfully made an incorrect movement of a fuel assembly and attempted to correct and cover up the error without documenting the event or notifying management of the error.

The OI:RIII investigation substantiated that the FHF willfully violated a station operating procedure when he directed two fuel handlers to correct a fuel move error without notifying the control room and without a revised Nuclear Component Transfer List (NCTL) authorizing the corrective moves, in violation of Technical Specification 6.2.A.2. The FHF made that decision in spite of the fact that one of the fuel handlers reminded him of the proper procedure to be followed. OI:RIII also substantiated that the two fuel handlers willfully violated station operating procedures by correcting the fuel move error without notifying the control room and without receiving the required, revised NCTL. Both fuel handlers on the bridge at the time, admitted to OI:RIII that they knew that the corrective moves should not have taken place without prior notification and revised NCTLs.