

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

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SEP 12 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority)


SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3.8 - SPECIAL
REPORT 90-12

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the inoperability of the fire detection instruments in Fire Zone 356 for the Unit 1 No. 2 Reactor Coolant Pump. The two thermal fire detectors will be out of service until the next outage of sufficient duration. This report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement (b) of LCO 3.3.3.8.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. W. Proffitt at (615) 843-6651.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



E. G. Wallace, Manager
Nuclear Licensing and
Regulatory Affairs

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SEP 12 1990

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ENCLOSURE
SQN SPECIAL REPORT 90-12

This special report is being made in accordance with Action Statement b of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 because of the inability to repair inoperable fire detectors within 14 days.

On July 30, 1990, at 1030 Eastern daylight time, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (100 percent power, 2,235 pounds per square inch gauge and 578 degrees Fahrenheit), LCO 3.3.3.8 was entered when the Unit 1 No. 2 Reactor Coolant Pump fire detectors were removed from service. On July 10, 1990, during performance of Preventative Maintenance (PM) 00426, "Fire Protection SYS-PWR Failure Battery Charge," maintenance personnel observed the main trouble light on Electrical Panel 0-L-631 (Module CP-30) in the auxiliary building was indicating that a problem existed. A work request (WR-C004525) was initiated to troubleshoot the panel. The presence of the main trouble light without any of the associated trouble lights in the various fire zones or other modules generally indicates a grounding problem in the panel (i.e., the fire zone is not inoperable). On July 30, 1990, personnel in Electrical Maintenance who were troubleshooting the panel discovered the conductor wires for the two thermal fire detectors in Zone 356 were grounded.

An hourly monitoring of the containment air temperature was established in compliance with Action Statement 3.3.3.8.a. Fire suppression capability was still available through manual initiation by operators. The inaccessibility of the detectors, because of ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) considerations, has prevented a repair or replacement attempt. However, completion of Work Request C 004525 will restore the Fire Zone 356 fire detector system to operable status during the next Unit 1 outage of sufficient duration. A determination of the exact cause of the detectors' inoperability cannot be determined until that time.

SQN will remain in LCO 3.3.3.8, and the hourly lower containment temperature monitoring will be continued until the fire zone detectors are returned operable.