

AUG 27 1982

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The Honorable John C. Danforth
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Danforth:

This letter is in response to the letter dated May 28, 1982 from Mrs. Kay Drey which you forwarded to this office on August 3, 1982.

Mrs. Drey has voiced three concerns in her letter, a copy of which is enclosed:

1. That the Callaway reactor containment building has honeycombing in the base mat and dome;
2. That there are defects in the longitudinal welds in piping and fittings in Callaway's emergency core cooling and residual heat removal systems; and
3. That the SNUPPS design is not safe enough for the British.

The NRC staff investigated the first two concerns in considerable detail several years ago. In addition a full hearing was held October 26, 1981 through December 5, 1981 by the NRC licensing board presiding over the application for the Callaway operating license, and testimony which included detailed analyses was presented by the NRC staff and by Union Electric engineers and their contractors. Because Mrs. Drey was the principal intervenor in these hearings, she was an active participant on these and related issues, and has in addition been provided with the related correspondence. Substantial cross-examination was conducted by Mrs. Drey on many of these and related issues. The NRC licensing board has not yet issued its decision on this matter, but it is expected in approximately the next six months.

Regarding the third concern above, the NRC staff believes it is premature for Mrs. Drey to conclude the SNUPPS design is not safe enough for the British. As the newspaper article attached to her letter notes, the British have proposed extra features at this conceptual design stage. However, it appears that one of the reasons the British selected the basic SNUPPS design, after looking at a wide range of other designs available in the world market, is that it has engineering safety features which help to make it an acceptable design for their purposes.

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The Honorable John C. Danforth

-2-

AUG 27 1982

The NRC staff has issued a Safety Evaluation Report, for the Callaway plant (NUREG-0830). The staff stated in that report (Chapter 23) that, with certain provisions on completion of construction and resolution of outstanding matters described therein, it will be able to conclude that the Callaway plant license application, construction, and operation will be in compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations.

Sincerely,

(Signed) T. A. Rehm

WJ
William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:
Ltr from Mrs. Kay A. Drey
dtd 5/28/82

de
8/20/82
WJ
8/21/82

* See previous yellow

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Regarding the third concern above, the NRC believes it is premature for Mrs. Drey to conclude the SNUPPS design is not safe enough for the British. As the newspaper article attached to her letter notes, the British have merely "proposed" extra features at this conceptual design stage. They may yet decide those extra features do not provide a significant improvement in safety and are not worth the added cost. However, it is likely that one of the reasons the British selected the basic SNUPPS design is that it has engineering safety features which help to make it a superior design for their purposes compared to other designs on the world market.

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OFFICE ▶
SURNAME ▶
DATE ▶



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

*R Lesny
Comments*

The Honorable John C. Danforth
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Danforth:

This letter is in response to your referral letter dated August 3, 1982 (Attachment 1).

Mrs. Drey has voiced three concerns in her letter (See Attachment 1):

1. That the Callaway reactor containment building has honeycombing in the base mat and dome;
2. That there are defects in the longitudinal welds in piping and fittings in Callaway's emergency core cooling and residual heat removal systems; *and*
3. That the SNUPPS design is not safe enough for the British.

The NRC staff investigated the first two concerns in considerable detail several years ago. In addition a full hearing was held October 26, 1981 through December 5, 1981 by the NRC licensing board, and testimony which included detailed analyses was presented by the NRC staff and by Union Electric engineers and their contractors. Because Mrs. Drey was the principal intervenor in those hearings, she was an active participant, and has been provided a full transcript of the hearing as well as all related correspondence. *pending on the Callaway application for the Callaway ops*
Mrs. Drey's concerns are being fully examined using due process. The NRC licensing board has not yet issued its decision on this matter.

Regarding the third concern above, the NRC believes it is premature for Mrs. Drey to conclude the SNUPPS design is not safe enough for the British. As the newspaper article attached to her letter notes, the British have merely "proposed" extra features at this conceptual design stage. They may yet decide those extra features do not provide a significant improvement in safety and are not worth the added cost. However, it is likely that one of the reasons the British selected the basic SNUPPS design is that it has numerous engineering safety features which make it a superior design for their purposes compared to other designs on the world market.

*These are
related
issues*

*Substantial con-
sideration
was conducted by Mrs. Drey on
most of these and related issues.*

*but it is expected
in approximately
the next 2-3
months*

FROM: Sen. John C. Danforth		ACTION CONTROL	DATES	CONTROL NO. 12208
TO: CA		COMPL DEADLINE 8/26/82	ACKNOWLEDGMENT	DATE OF DOCUMENT 8/3/82
DESCRIPTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LETTER <input type="checkbox"/> MEMO <input type="checkbox"/> REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		INTERIM REPLY	FINAL REPLY 159 Ribon for Danforth 8/27/82	PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF: <input type="checkbox"/> CHAIRMAN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OTHER:
Encloses ltr fr Kay Drey concerning Callaway Plant		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS		
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Denton, RRR	8/12/82	Lunderwood	ASSIGNED TO:	DATE
Essenhut	8/13/82	Case/Denton	4. Vollmer	
<i>Youngblood</i>	<i>2/16</i>	1. PPAS	5. Thompson	
<i>148-17</i>		2. Hanauer	6. Check	
		3. Mattson	7. Snyder	
		JCAE NOTIFICATION RECOMMENDED:		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

NRC FORM 232 (11-75)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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NRC SECRETARIAT

TO: Commissioner _____ Date _____
 Exec. Dir./Oper. _____
 Cong. Liaison _____
 Public Affairs _____

 Gen. Counsel _____
 Solicitor _____
 Secretary _____
 Inspector & Auditor _____
 Policy Evaluation _____

Incoming: Sen John C. Danforth, Const Ref
From: Kay Drey

To: OCA Date 8/3/82
Subject: unsafe conditions at the Callaway reactor

Prepare reply for signature of:
 Chairman _____
 Commissioner _____
 EDO, GC, CL, SOL, PA, SECY, IA, PE _____
 Signature block omitted _____
 Return original of incoming with response _____

For direct reply* Suspense: Aug XX 20
 For appropriate action
 For information

Rec'd Off. EDO
Date: 8-12-82
Time: 1:15 P.M.

Remarks: OCA to Ack

For the Commission: billie

* Send three (3) copies of reply to Secy Correspondence and Records Branch

NRC FORM 62A (3-82)

ACTION SLIP

JOHN C. DANFORTH
MISSOURI

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 3, 1982

Congressional Liaison
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Congressional Liaison:

A constituent has written me concerning a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of your agency.

I refer this matter to your office for a preliminary examination. I would appreciate receiving your comments, in duplicate, together with the return of the correspondence.

Your attention to this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,


John C. Danforth

Enclosure

MP

Mrs. Leo A. Drey 515 West Point Ave. University City, MO 63130

May 28, 1982

Messrs. J. A. Baer, II, W. L. Behan, Jr., Sam B. Cook,
Edwin S. Jones, Richard A. Meyer, John K. Riedy,
and Howard L. Young
Outside Directors, Union Electric Company

Gentlemen:

Doesn't it concern you to learn that the S'U'PPS' design is not sufficiently safe for the British? And especially when one contemplates the facts that the solitary Callaway reactor containment building has honeycombing in the base mat and dome — and that some of the piping and fittings in Callaway's emergency core cooling and residual heat removal systems have defects in the longitudinal welds? (The engineers with whom I've discussed the defective welds are surprised to learn this critical piping would have a seam at all)!

Sincerely,
Kay Drey

Encl: Kansas City Star article, May 17, 1982

*Senator Comfort:
for your information —
Kay Drey*

intended to make a serious accident remote. Mr. Schworer said the British design is "an improvement in that it makes the control room...
"It's simply a different licens- sary."
Improvement of the emer- gency core cooling systems, the