

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSING CODE: [0][1][S][I][V][C][S][I] (2) [0][0][0][0][0][0][0][0] (3) [4][1][0][0][0] (4) [ ] [ ] (5)

REPORT SOURCE: [L][ ] (6) [0][5][0][0][0][3][9][5] (7) [0][8][1][8] (8) [8][2] (9) [0][9][1][6][8][2] (10)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
[0][2] After calibrating the pressure transmitter for the RHR Train "A" suction
[0][3] isolation valve, the valve operator was reenergized. The suction
[0][4] isolation valve shut. The reactor operator tripped the Train "A" RHR pump
[0][5] due to loss of suction. There were no adverse consequences since the
[0][6] system has a minimum flow recirc line, and the pump was secured within one
[0][7] minute of the occurrence. Also, Train "B" RHR was OPERABLE.

SYSTEM CODE: [C][F] (11) CAUSE CODE: [A] (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: [C] (13) COMPONENT CODE: INSTRU (14) COMP SUBCODE: [S] (15) VALVE SUBCODE: [Z] (16)
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: [8][2] (17) EVENT YEAR: [8][2] (21) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: [0][0][2] (24) OCCURRENCE CODE: [ ] (27) REPORT TYPE: [L] (30) REVISION NO.: [10] (32)
ACTION TAKEN: [E] (18) FUTURE ACTION: [H] (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: [Z] (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: [Z] (21) HOURS: [0][0][0][0] (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: [Y] (23) NRRD-FORM SUB.: [N] (24) PRIME COMP SUPPLIER: [N] (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: [W][1][2][10] (28)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
[1][0] After performing calibrations for RHR Train "A" suction isolation valve
[1][1] pressure transmitter, maintenance personnel left the pressure switch in
[1][2] the test position. When the valve operator was reenergized, the valve
[1][3] shut due to the test signal. Maintenance personnel were instructed to
[1][4] explicitly follow procedural guidelines.

FACILITY STATUS: [B] (28) % POWER: [0][0][0][0] (29) OTHER STATUS: [N/A] (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: [B] (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Operator Observation (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: [Z] (33) [Z] (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: [N/A] (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE: [N/A] (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: [0][0][0] (37) TYPE: [Z] (38) DESCRIPTION: [N/A] (39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: [0][0][0] (40) DESCRIPTION: [N/A] (41)

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: [Z] (42) DESCRIPTION: [N/A] (43)

PUBLICITY ISSUED: [N] (44) DESCRIPTION: [N/A] (45) NRC USE ONLY

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#### DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On August 18, 1982, with the plant operating in Mode 5 with the Reactor Coolant System Loops not filled, maintenance personnel calibrated the pressure transmitter (PS-403A2) which provides an interlock for the Train "A" RHR suction isolation valve (8701A). This was being accomplished with the RHR Train "A" in service with the associated suction isolation valve open with power removed. At the conclusion of the calibration, the power to the valve was restored. At that time, the suction isolation valve closed. The reactor operator, upon receiving a corresponding low flow alarm, secured the Train "A" RHR pump at 0023 hours. This was accomplished less than one minute after receiving the alarm. The Train "B" RHR pump was then started.

#### PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT

There were no potential adverse consequences resulting from the event as Train "B" RHR was operable and was immediately started. By approximately 0040 hours, August 18, 1982, Train "A" was corrected for backup to Train "B" RHR.

#### CAUSE(S) OF EVENT

After calibrating the subject transmitter, maintenance personnel left the pressure switch in the test mode. The test signal generates a high pressure signal. When the valve operator was reenergized, the suction isolation went closed as designed.

#### IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The immediate corrective action was to trip the Train "A" RHR pump motor. The Train "E" RHR pump was then placed in service. Train "A" RHR was then corrected for backup to Train "B" RHR.

#### ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

A training class was held to instruct maintenance personnel to strictly adhere to procedural guidelines. This training is documented and is filed in permanent plant records.