#### APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95

South Texas Unit 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MMBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 498 PAGE (3) 1 OF 4

TITLE (4) Inadvertent ESF Actuation of Standby Diesel Generator 12 During Testing

EVENT DATE (5)		LER NUMBER (6)				REPOR	RT DATE	(7)	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIA: NUMBER	L	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILIT	Y NAME	D	05000	
12	31	93	93	023		01	01	31	94	FACILIT	Y NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000		
OPERATING 5		5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT			TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 9: (Check one or more) (11)						(11)		
MODE	(9)	"	20.	402(b)			20.405(	c)		X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
PO	WER	10	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
LEVEL	(10)	U	20.405(a)(1)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv)		405(a)(1)(iii	05(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Ab.		pecify in Abstract below and			
					50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
			20.	405(a)(1)(v)	-		50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)		Danieli va.	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Jairo Pinzon - Senior Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (512) 972-8027

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTU	RER		NPRDS
		SUPPLEMENT	AL REPORT EXPE	CTED (14)				FX	PECTED	MONTH	DAY	y T	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On December 31, 1993, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 at 0% power. At approximately 0206 hours, a non-emergency Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 12 occurred. Instrumentation & Control (I&C) Technicians were installing test leads to a recorder which would measure the voltage, frequency and the presence of a 125 vdc start signal. The test leads for the voltage and frequency transducers were connected without incident. When the second lead of the 125 vdc pair was connected to the appropriate terminal, the technician noticed an electrical arc. When the connection was made, ESF SDG 12 started. This condition was not recreated during the investigation. The test equipment and diesel circuitry were checked for malfunction and degradation. All were found satisfactory.

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NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY	COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-03 EXPLOSES 5/31/95
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# DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On December 31, 1993, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 at 0% power. At approximately 0206 hours, a nonemergency Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 12 occurred. Instrumentation & Control (I&C) Technicians were installing test leads to a recorder which would measure the voltage, frequency and the presence of a 125 vdc start signal per the "Standby Diesel Generator 12 LOOP-ESF Actuation Test," the "Standby Diesel 12 LOOP Test" and the "Standby Diesel 12 Auto-Start on ESF Actuation Test Signal" procedures. The test leads were first connected to the recorder and then to the test point. This prevents a test lead from grounding out while being hooked to a measurement test point. The test leads for the voltage and frequency transducers were connected without incident. When the second lear of the 125 vdc pair was connected to the appropriate terminal, the technician noticed an electrical arc. When the connection was made, ESF SDG 12 started.

The Unit Supervisor and the I&C Supervisor verified the test connection terminations and determined that the connections were correct. The test connections were left in place to try to determine the cause of the unplanned SDG start. The SDG was placed in the cooldown mode and secured.

A review of the test connections against the procedure showed that the installation was per the approved procedures. These procedures had been previously performed using the same test equipment and by the same technicians without incident.

The recorder and test leads, which were used during the test activity were tested to determine if the unplanned Standby Diesel Generator start could have been caused by faulty test equipment. The input module for the 125 vdc input channel was tested for possible breakdown of internal circuitry. The test leads were checked for breakdown of insulation. Voltage measurements were made in the panel where the test connections were made. All tests were satisfactory and there was no degradation of the test equipment or the test leads. The panel voltage measurements were in the acceptable bands. A review of the electrical drawings did not reveal any abnormal circumstances that could have caused the unplanned SDG start from connection of the recorder to the appropriate terminals.

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South Texas, Unit 1

## CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of the inadvertent start was most likely the result of an electrical arcing between the SDG panel and the test equipment. This condition was not recreated during the investigation of this event. A review of the test connections against the procedure showed that the installation was per the approved procedures. The Test equipment was checked for malfunction and degradation. All tests were satisfactory and equipment function was correct.

### ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The inadvertent start of SDG 12 is classified as an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature and therefore is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The testing of SDG 12 was subsequently completed without further incident.

The Standby Diesel Generators are part of the Class 1E 4.16 KV AC Power System. The Class 1E 4.16 KV AC Power System is composed of three trains designed to provide a reliable source of power to safety-related equipment essential to all modes of plant operation including emergency shutdown following any design basis event. Upon a loss of offsite power, each of the three SDGs starts automatically to supply back-up power to its associated 4.16 KV bus to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents.

# CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The following corrective action has been or will be taken:

- The Test equipment was checked for malfunction and degradation. All tests were satisfactory and equipment function was correct without degradation.
- 2) Voltage measurements and checks of the panel where the connections were made determined there were no deficiencies.
- 3) Standby Diesel Generators will be placed in "Pull-to-Stop" whenever maintenance activities are performed which involve connecting Measuring or Test Equipment to the Standby Diesel Generator electrical circuits.
- 4) An evaluation will be performed to analyze modifying the Standby Diesel Generator start circu: to remove Fiber Optic Boards.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)	U.S. NUCLEAR REG	GULATORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95
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# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

The Standby Diesel Generators are type KSV-20-T, four-stroke turbocharged engines manufactured by Cooper Energy Services.

During the past three years one event was reported regarding an inadvertent start of an SDG. Unit 2 LER 93-015 was submitted on November 18, 1993. The cause was attributed to the spurious failure of a transistor.

On October 11, 1993, SDG 12 had an ESF actuation while the diesel was still inoperable which was the result of an invalid signal. SDG 12 appeared to receive a spurious start signal. The cause of this event was determined to be the degradation of the transistors of a circuit board the same as Unit 2 LER 93-015. This was the result of degraded varistors causing voltage spikes which degraded the transistor's operational characteristics. This event was not reportable because the SDG was inoperable at the time of the start signal, additionally, the start signal was invalid.