

**NIAGARA  
MOHAWK**

NINE MILE POINT—UNIT 2 P.O. BOX 63 LYCOMING NY 13093 TELEPHONE (315) 343-2110

August 3, 1987

Mr. Thomas E. Murley  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit #1 and Unit #2  
Docket No. 50-220/50-410  
DPR-63/NPF-54

Dear Mr. Murley:

In accordance with 10CFR 73.71(c), enclosed for your information is a copy of a Report of Physical Security Event reported to the NRC Region I office by telephone on July 28, 1987.

This information concerns subject matter which is exempt from disclosure under 2.790(d) of the NRC's Rules of Practice, Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Accordingly, we request that the attachment not be placed in the Public Document Room and that they be disclosed only in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR 9.12.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

*Joseph P. Beratta*

Joseph P. Beratta  
Supervisor, Nuclear Security

JPB/kac

Enclosure

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REPORT OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EVENT

REGION I, USNRC, OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
631 PARK AVENUE, KING OF PRUSSIA, PA. 19406  
PHONE (215) 337-5000

Date of Occurrence: 07/28/87

Time of Occurrence: 1120 hrs

Facility and Location: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station  
Unit #2, Lycoming, NY 13093

Docket Nos.: 50-410  
License Nos.: NPF-54

Licensee's Occurrence Report No. 87-03

Brief Title (Subject): Breach of Vital Area Barrier

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: On Tuesday, July 28, 1987, at approximately 1120 hours, it was identified to Security supervision by two cognizant guards that a potential breach in the [REDACTED] was accessible to an unauthorized individual, as a result of an unsecured "access hatch" leading to the [REDACTED]. Incidentally, the "access hatch" is located approximately 18 feet from the roof of the [REDACTED] building, however, an existing ladder allowed an individual employable means for gaining access to the subject Vital Area.

RESPONSE BY LICENSEE: Immediately upon being made aware of the breach, the Sergeant, Nuclear Security (unit 2 supervisor) established a fixed post in accordance with the Security Safeguards and Contingency Plan. At this point, with the concurrence of Walter Martin, Region I (I&E) Inspector, Security Management secured the "access hatch" with a security lock and incorporated this area in the [REDACTED] watchtour. The results of further investigation into the incident and actions taken to correct the root causes are contained on attached page.

CONSEQUENCES AT FACILITY: Minimal; if an individual attempted to gain access to the [REDACTED] he must first gain access to the Protected Area, then request a specific key controlled by Security and the Station Shift Supervisor (SSS), then receive approval from the SSS prior to unlocking this door, or climb the outer walls of the [REDACTED] which in most areas is approximately 30 feet.

Licensee Employee Reporting: Daniel D. O'Hara, Asst. Nuclear Security Specialist (315) 349-1319

NRC Staff Employee Receiving Phone Call: John MacKinnon, H.O.O.

Date of Phone Call: July 28, 1987

Time of Phone Call: 1804 hours

SECURITY EVENT REPORT 87-03  
Nine Mile Point Unit #1 and Unit #2  
50-410/NPF-54

On July 28, 1987, at 1120 hours, Security Management was made aware of the subject incident. An investigation was immediately initiated to ascertain the circumstances involved and to identify the causes.

The Nuclear Security Department, as noted in a recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report (SALP), "demonstrates a continued commitment to excellence and self improvement". Consequently, a new "Commitment to Excellence" program is being developed which encourages guards to become more actively involved in the overall security operation. A particular segment of this program encourages the guard to spend more of his/her off-hours time in their respective plants identifying any potential problems. Accordingly, on Tuesday, July 28, 1987, two guards patrolling Unit 2 identified a potential breach in the [REDACTED] to Security Management.

Statements taken from the guards indicated that they entered the [REDACTED] roof at approximately 11:15 and proceeded to climb a ladder leading to the [REDACTED] accessible through a access hatch. At this point they discovered the "louvers" in the open position and questioned the 96 square inch requirement. The two guards then climbed back down the ladder; one remained posted while the other guard contacted Security Supervision for further evaluation.

In consultation with Security Management it was determined that the louvers in the open position did in fact exceed the 96 square inch requirement. However, the problem was not so much the louver but the accessibility to the "access hatch" also it was determined that the physical barrier was not sufficient to meet the criteria of 10CFR 73.2(f)(2). Upon discovery, as previously noted, the breach was immediately and effectively addressed by Security Supervision in accordance with the Site Security Safeguards and Contingency Plan.

At approximately 1500 hours on Thursday, June 30, 1987, the ladder was permanently removed from the wall on the [REDACTED] roof precluding unauthorized entry to the "access hatch". Additionally, the access hatch remains locked with the security padlock and access to the [REDACTED] roof continues to be controlled by security and the Station Shift Supervisor.

Furthermore, a work request is currently being circulated to remove the existing wire and replace it with materials sufficient to meet the criteria of 10CFR 73.2(f)(2).

Security Management has reiterated the importance of each and every one of us involved in the Security Operation and we strive to continue our commitment to excellence and self improvement.