

# COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP

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BRANCH

In the Matter of  
The Regents of the University  
of California  
UCLA Research Reactor  
Docket 50-142

RE: Emergency Planning Contention

Memo to Board and Parties:

The Board has requested CBG to amend its emergency planning contention and indicate what discovery it needs thereon.

## Contention

The proposed new emergency plan resolves none of the concerns identified in CBG's original contention. The University has responded to the deficiencies identified by CBG in the contention and the deficiencies identified in the original Staff review of the previous plan by essentially declaring it need not have an emergency plan, except for the reactor room itself. It does so on the sole basis of its assertion that no offsite consequences in excess of 5 Rem thyroid are possible from any credible incident.

As the issue of offsite consequences is already in dispute in Contention VIII and also XIX, and since those contentions assert accidents more serious than UCLA asserts, with consequences far in excess of the 5 Rem thyroid threshold level for requiring emergency response planning, CBG believes UCLA's new plan to be far worse than the old one, because the new one is no plan at all.

Furthermore, the sole plan for firefighting, a letter of one page from the City Fire Department, is completely inadequate. It says, in essence, that if there is a fire at NEL and the reactor is not involved, the Fire Department will put it out; if the reactor is involved, they will "confer." "Conferring" at the scene of an emergency as to what to do is precisely the opposite of having an emergency plan as to what to do. Given the unique hazards in fighting a reactor fire, and the complete lack of detail as to how such fire suppression would be undertaken in a way as to avoid making the situation worse, that part of the plan likewise is no plan.

Finally, as CBG has stated elsewhere, there is no discussion of emergency response, post-accident dose assessment, and other plans for dealing with criticality accidents in the emergency plan.

In sum, the umbrella statement of the contention remains more true after the amendments than before; the plan is more inadequate than before; the previous bases still hold; and CBG therefore modifies the contention by merely adding three additional bases to the contention, attached.

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
Discovery

CEG will need discovery against Applicant, Staff, the Fire Department, and agencies which the Fire Department may rely upon in responding to a fire at the facility. This discovery may entail any or all of the normal discovery methods (interrogatories, production, admissions, depositions).

CEG will need two rounds of interrogatories, as was provided for by the Board with regards the other contentions. CEG respectfully suggests the first round of interrogatories occur after completion of response (i.e. provision of the requested documents) to the first production request, so as to avoid duplication of questions that can be answered by review of documents, and so as to provide a way of obtaining information lacking in said documents.

Were the hearing process to be expedited, CEG might consider, as it did before (to naught) voluntarily giving up certain discovery in order to get to hearing sooner. But in the absence thereof, the above discovery rights will not voluntarily be surrendered.

Respectfully submitted,

  
Daniel Hirsch  
President

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cc: service list  
w/ attachment

MODIFICATIONS TO CONTENTION XXI  
Emergency Plan

add the following items to the bases of the contention; all else remains unchanged--

10. There are no plans for responding to emergencies that have the potential for consequences outside the reactor room.
11. The fire response plan lacks specifics as to how to safely and correctly fight a fire in which the reactor is involved; the provision to "confer" at the site is inadequate from an emergency planning standpoint.
12. There is no provision for adequately dealing with criticality accidents.