CAR 1419
CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 N Y R E G 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 6 57 CAT 58 5
CON'T SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 7 0 1 2 0 8 3 8 0 2 0 3 8 3 9 EVENT DATE $\frac{1}{7}$ On $\frac{1}{2}$
approximately 20 feet in the Screen House suction bay. The level continued to drop to
approximately $12\frac{1}{2}$ feet. That level is below the suction of the Motor Driven and Dieselj
Driven Fire Pumps. This rendered the Fire Suppression System inoperable and is a
violation of Tech. Spec. 3.14.2.
0 7
7 8 9
SYSTEM COUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SU
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The cause of the low water level was frazil ice in the suction of the Circulating Water
Pumps. Upon receipt of the alarm, power was reduced to approximately 50% and a
Circulating Water Pump was removed from service. This allowed the water level to
return to normal in the Screen House suction bay, restoring the Fire Suppression
System to operable status.
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS ** POWER OTHER STATUS OTHER STATU
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 NA I 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA N
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8 9 11 12 8302230570 830204 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 PDR ADDCK 05000244 S
1 9 Z 42 NA PDR
PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NA 10 NA
James C. Bodine PHONE 315-524-4446, ext. 241

Attachment to LER 83-006/01T-0
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

On January 20, 1983, at approximately 0400, an alarm was received in the Control Room indicating low screen house level. This level is an indication of the water level in the screen house suction bay. An investigation into possible sensing line problems due to the cold temperatures was initiated to verify that the level indication was not a false indication due to instrument problems. The results indicated that the instrument was reading correctly, so a visual inspection was made of the screen house suction bay. This inspection indicated that the water level was low.

Cperations started reducing power to less than 50% so that a Circulating Water Pump could be taken out of service. Power was continued to be decreased to approximately 25% at which time an increase in water level was starting. An investigation of the intake tunnel heaters was initiated and it was determined that the heaters whose operating voltage had been reduced to 240 volts from 480 volts as a result of a Station Modification should be returned to 480 volt service. Slowly an increase in the water level in the screen house suction bay was achieved.

During this event the water level decreased below the suction of the Fire Service Water pumps, thereby rendering the Fire Suppression System inoperable.