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JUNE 9, 1982

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SUBJECT: EXPERT REVIEW OF PROPOSED KRSKO STEAM GENERATOR MODIFICATIONS - INTERIM REPORT

THE SPECIALISTS WHO ARE REVIEWING THE PROPOSED KRSKO STEAM GENERATOR CHANGES HAVE SUPPLIED THE FOLLOWING INTERIM COMMENTS. THESE COMMENTS ARE BASED MAINLY ON THE FOUR DOCUMENTS GIVEN BY THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION DURING ITS MAY 25 VISIT TO NRC. REVIEW OF THESE FOUR DOCUMENTS, PLUS THOSE SENT BY MAVKO FROM JOZEF STEFAN INSTITUT, WILL CONTINUE HERE, WITH OBJECTIVE TO SEND FINAL TELEGRAPHIC COMMENTS ON JUNE 25. IF YOU COULD SEND ANY OF THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW, THAT WILL ALSO BE FACTORED INTO THE REVIEW.

IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS THESE COMMENTS WITH THE IAEA TEAM VISITING KRSKO THRU JUNE 10.

COMMENTS: A GENERAL COMMENT IS THAT THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS ENVISION USING THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM IN A MANNER FOR WHICH IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ORIGINALLY DESIGNED: THEREFORE, A

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VERY CAREFUL REREVIEW OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLANT WITH THIS IN MIND IS APPROPRIATE. WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE SUCH A REVIEW.

1. THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS SEEM REASONABLE BASED ON OUR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE SYSTEM AND THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS. A SMALL PURGE FLOW THROUGH THE MAIN FEEDWATER NOZZLE DURING 0-20% POWER AND A SMALL TEMPERING FLOW

2. There is a discrepancy in the feedwater flow control scheme between the feedwater system description prepared by Gilbert Associates, Inc. and the feedwater system control valves operation curves provided by Westinghouse.

Gilbert Associates	Westinghouse
0-20% power FBCV only	0-20% power FBCV only
20-70% power FCV	20-60% power FCV
70-100% power FCV (constant flow at 70%) Plus FACV	60-90% power FCV (constant flow at 60%) Plus FACV
	90-100% power FACV (constant flow at 30%) Plus FCV

3. The split flow scheme is designed to limit no more than 70% flow through the steam generator preheater. Although a high flow alarm is provided for the operator's action, flow limiting provisions (e.g., orifice or valve control) would be preferred.

4. The Westinghouse scheduled thermal hydraulics and stress analysis to determine the aux/main feed combined impacts should consider the worst combination of the aux/main feed flow assuming control system malfunction.

5. The main feedwater line break should be reanalyzed assuming a break in the 16" line at the main feed nozzle with 30% feedwater continuously feeding the broken steam generator through the auxiliary feed nozzle before the feedwater isolation signal is generated.

6. The piping design should be checked to assure that down-turned elbows are placed immediately upstream of the main and the auxiliary feedwater nozzles to mitigate water hammer. The idea is to minimize the horizontal lengths between the steam generator and the vertical run of piping.

7. According to BNL-NUREG-51248, "An Evaluation of Condensation-Induced Water Hammer in Preheat Steam Generators," a water hammer test is recommended at 20% of full power by using feedwater through the auxiliary feedwater nozzle at the lowest feedwater temperature that the plant standard operating procedure (SOP) allows and then switching the feedwater at that temperature from the auxiliary feedwater nozzle to the main feedwater nozzle by following the SOP. The transient should be observed and recorded. It should be noted that at low loads, there will be vapor voids at the preheater section of the steam generator.

8. The complicated new control system may lead to a higher probability of system malfunction and/or feedflow instability.

9. Please provide block diagrams of the control systems showing input parameters and output control signals. These diagrams should clearly differentiate safety-grade and non-safety-grade portions of the systems.

10. Please provide a discussion of plant operation near the power region where the flow split occurs - i.e., near 70% power - to verify that stable control system operation will occur at this power level.

11. Please provide additional information describing which valves are automatically operated and which are manually operated.

12. Discuss the purpose of the "loop feedwater isolation" discussed on page 16.

13. Please provide failure modes of the various solenoid valves, control valves, and isolation valves on loss of electric power, instrument air, etc.

14. Please provide a description of the consequences if the control system fails and results in an incorrect flow split. Additonally, described how the failure is detected and how rapidly operator action must be taken.

15.

16.

17.

18. Additional information is needed on the flow distribution in the Model D4 steam generator tube bundle. It is not clear how the flow from the auxiliary feedline affects the main feed flow and how it is distributed at different power levels. (END OF COMMENTS)

AS WE HAVE NOTED PREVIOUSLY, THE ABOVE ARE COMMENTS AND OPINIONS OF THE ASSIGNED EXPERTS AND NOT AN OFFICIAL FINDING OR A GUARANTEE OF SAFETY BY NRC.

REGARDS, J. D. LAFLEUR, JR., NRC.

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DATE ▶	6/9/82						