

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | P | A | S | E | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | (5)

01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During the Startup Testing Program, while reviewing Technical Specification
03 | surveillances with the implementing procedures, it was determined that one
04 | surveillance had not been performed. The Main Steam Isolation Valve closure
05 | position switches had not been verified operable per the monthly channel
06 | functional check. This is reportable per 6.9.1.8.f.

09 | SYSTEM CODE: C D 11; CAUSE CODE: A 12; CAUSE SUBCODE: X 13; COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z 14; COMP. SUBCODE: Z 15; VALVE SUBCODE: Z 16
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 8 3; SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 0 2; OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1; REPORT TYPE: T
18 | ACTION TAKEN: X 18; FUTURE ACTION: X 19; EFFECT ON PLANT: Z 20; SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21; HOURS: 0 0 0 0; ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 23; NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N 24; PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z 25; COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | This surveillance had been inadvertently omitted from the implementing pro-
11 | cedure. Upon determination of the event, a procedure was written, approved
12 | and performed. The position switches were determined operable. A review is
13 | ongoing to verify this was an isolated case.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: B 28; % POWER: 0 7 4 29; OTHER STATUS: n/a 30; METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A 31; DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: determined by engineer 32

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z 33; AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: n/a 34; LOCATION OF RELEASE: n/a 36

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 37; TYPE: Z 38; DESCRIPTION: n/a 39

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 40; DESCRIPTION: n/a 41

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z 42; DESCRIPTION: n/a 43

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N 44; DESCRIPTION: n/a 45

NRC USE ONLY

Attachment

Licensee Event Report 83-002/017-0

During a review of Technical Specification surveillance requirements, versus implementing procedures, it was determined that one surveillance requirement did not have a corresponding procedure. The monthly channel functional test of the Main Steam Isolation Valves closure position switches (Technical Specification Table 4.3.1.1-1) were the omitted surveillances. This is reportable per 6.9.1.8.f. There were no adverse consequences, in that, upon performance of the surveillance, the switches were functional. Further, the switches did initiate the Reactor Protection System when the MSIV's inadvertently closed.

The surveillance was originally identified as the responsibility of the Instrument and Controls Section when it was determined that entry into a high radiation area would be required. As an alternative, the surveillance was to be included with required valve cycling surveillances from which proper function of the position switches can be determined. During development of various draft revisions to the procedure, the channel functional test was inadvertently deleted and not addressed in another procedure.

Upon discovery of the event, a procedure was written, approved and the surveillance satisfactorily performed.

To prevent recurrence of this event, a review is underway to verify that all Technical Specification surveillance requirements are properly incorporated into implementing procedures.