

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-528/83-01
Docket No. 50-528 License No. CPPR-141 Safeguards Group _____
Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company
P. O. Box 21666
Phoenix, Arizona 85036

Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 1

Inspection at: Palo Verde Site (Wintersburg, Arizona)

Inspection conducted: January 4-7, 1983

Inspectors: *Talbert Young Jr.* 1-28-83
P. H. Johnson, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: *Talbert Young Jr.* 1-28-83
T. Young, Jr. Date Signed
Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2

Summary:

Inspection on January 4-7, 1983 (Report No. 50-528/83-01)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of preoperational test records and operational staff training; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. R. Bynum, Manager of Nuclear Operations
- *J. A. Roedel, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager
- *J. H. Allen, Technical Support Manager
- *R. A. Bernier, Operations Supervisor, Unit 1
- T. L. Cotton, Engineering Manager
- T. T. Green, Training Support Supervisor
- F. E. Hicks, Training Manager
- *J. E. Kirby, Startup Manager
- *R. W. Kramer, Licensing Supervisor
- *C. N. Russo, Operations QA/QC Manager
- R. L. Simmons, General Training Supervisor
- B. Solakiewicz, Records Management Analyst

The inspector also talked with or interviewed other members of the applicant's staff, including document control custodians and clerical personnel.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Preoperational Test Records

The applicant's program and facilities associated with preoperational test records were examined. The inspection included review of administrative controls, staffing, assignment of responsibilities, tracking and filing methods, accountability, and access controls. The inspector also examined record storage facilities and talked with records custodians.

The records program was defined principally by Procedure 90GA-0zz02, "Startup Document Control." The inspector observed that by the definition in the applicant's procedures, 90GA-0zz02 should have been issued as an Administrative Control (AC) procedure.

If this procedure governs document control activities beyond fuel load (as its purpose section indicates), Proposed Technical Specifications would also require it to be reviewed by the Plant Review Board (PRB). However, the applicant had recently decided that startup testing activities would be conducted by the operations organization following fuel load, and document control methods during these phases were still being considered.

Document control for startup phase maintenance and QA/QC records will be examined during a future inspection. (83-01-01)

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Operational Staff Training

Certain aspects of the applicant's operational staff training program were examined, principally those associated with training for PRB members, I&C technicians, mechanical and electrical maintenance personnel, and non-licensed operators. The General Employee Training (GET) Program was also examined. This review showed the various training programs to have been well documented. Implementation of the programs will be inspected at a later date, along with further examination of other areas such as fire team training, QA/QC training, and licensed operator training.

Documents examined during this inspection included:

Procedure 80TR-0ZZ01, Plant Review Board Training

Procedure 81TR-0ZZ01, Control of Training Aids

Program 80PR-0ZZ01, Training Program

Program 80PR-0ZZ02, Personal Qualifications Standards Program

Procedure 80AC-0ZZ01, New Employee Indoctrinations

Procedure 83TR-0ZZ04, General Employee Training Pathway

Procedure 83TR-0ZZ07, Fire Team Training

Procedure 83TR-9ZZ01, Maintenance Specialty Training

Procedure 81AC-0ZZ01, PVNGS Training Records

Selected Training Department Instructions

Individual Training Records for PRB Members

Training Department Quarterly Status Report, October 1982

Manual, "PVNGS Instructor Training" (course text for formal Instructor Training Course)

The review of PRB members' training records showed that not all had completed the required reading list provided in Procedure 80TR-0ZZ01. This was discussed further at the exit interview.

The applicant is preparing a procedure to address training requirements for Duty Managers. This will be examined during a future inspection.
(83-01-02)

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Independent Inspection Effort

While touring a portion of the facility, the inspector observed that the four swing-check valves in the diesel-generator air start systems were installed with the disc hinge at the bottom, which is upside down the orientation in which swing-check valves are normally installed. Upon initial inquiring, the inspector was told that the diesel-generator vendor had recommended that orientation to minimize the effect of the valve repeatedly slamming open on diesel start. However, FSAR Figure 9.5-11 shows the valves (items 19 and 20) to be installed normally (with disc hinge at the top). Reference to Cooper-Bessimer Drawing CES-KSV-548-01 showed ball-check valves to be perscribed.

Each of the two diesel-generator units has two separate air-start systems. Upon diesel start, both systems are activated. Each air-start system has a pilot-operated air start (admission) valve, with the swing-check valve in question immediately downstream. The two starting-air systems for each diesel generator are cross-connected downstream of the swing-check valves. The purpose of the swing-check valves appeared to be to prevent a rupture in one starting-air system from compromising the other system via the cross-connect.

During a subsequent telephone conversation, a Bechtel representative stated that vendor drawing KSV-23-17 showed the valves to be installed "upside down," and that a letter confirming this as the correct orientation was being requested from the vendor. The inspector asked whether the back-flow needed to seat the disc in the swing-check valve was greater or less than the amount of back-flow needed to defeat an intact starting-air system, given a rupture in the opposite system. This matter is considered an unresolved item and will be reexamined during a future inspection. (83-01-03)

5. Exit Interview

The inspector met with APS representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the close of the inspection. The inspection findings identified in paragraphs 2 through 4 were discussed. In response to a comment regarding PRB Training (paragraph 3), an APS management representative stated (during a subsequent telephone conversation) that all PRB members and alternates would complete the required PRB training by February 1, 1983. (83-01-04)