

Attachment II

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-397
LICENSE NO. CPPR-93
10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #226
125VDC MOTOR OPERATOR CONNECTED TO 250VDC POWER SOURCE

INTERIM REPORT

Description of Potential Defect or Noncompliance

The 125 Volt DC motor operator for valve RCIC-V-69, as installed, represents a nonconforming condition to the design in that the nameplate voltage (125 Volt DC) is incorrect and inconsistent with the design voltage specified (250 Volt DC).

This inconsistency was originally discovered by the Architect Engineer while reviewing vendor drawings submitted for approval. This inconsistency was evaluated as a noncompliance, but not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). However, as the nonconforming motor operator was not returned to the vendor and was in fact installed, it constitutes a noncompliance.

Analysis of Safety Implication

In the highly unlikely event that any one or all of the startup functional test programs would not have detected the noncompliance, the following safety significant condition would result.

RCIC-V-69 is designed to provide containment isolation and vacuum pump discharge valving to the suppression pool.

Failure of the valve in the open position would degrade primary containment isolation capability. However, containment integrity would not be violated, since a check valve is located outboard from RCIC-V-69. The condition would be a violation of containment isolation criteria and would be considered reportable.

Failure of the valve in the closed position would eliminate vacuum to the barometric condenser. This vacuum loss would prevent and/or terminate RCIC turbine operation. The reactor core isolation cooling system is designed to maintain or supplement reactor vessel water inventory during the following conditions:

1. Normal Operation. When the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and maintained in the hot standby condition.
2. Normal Operation. When the reactor vessel is isolated and accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow from the reactor feedwater system.
3. When required as a backup to the High Pressure Core Spray System to mitigate the consequences of the rod drop accident by automatically supplying cooling water to the reactor if vessel low water is sensed.

Due to item 3 above, the failure would be considered reportable.

Status of Corrective Action

The Project is endeavoring to obtain a replacement 250V motor operator. Additionally, the Supply System has instituted a series of actions to identify the failure mechanism which allowed the installation of the nonconforming valves. The actions currently underway include: Initiating nonconformance reports for the installed valves; determine if it was a programmatic breakdown that allowed the valves to get installed and if so, correct. A review of a larger population of valves is being conducted to ascertain if similar conditions exist with other motor operated valves.