

February 16, 1983

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*DMB 016*

Docket No. 50-302

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*R. WRIGHT  
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Mr. John A. Hancock  
 Vice President, Nuclear Operations  
 Florida Power Corporation  
 ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing  
 & Fuel Management  
 P. O. Box 14042; M.A.C. H-2  
 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Dear Mr. Hancock:

SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF VALVE OPERABILITY REVIEWS FOR LARGE PRATT BUTTERFLY VALVES USED FOR PURGE OR VENT AT CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

In our letter of November 29, 1978 we identified the generic concerns of purging and venting of containment to all operating reactor licensees and requested your response to these concerns. Our review of your response was interrupted by the TMI accident and its demands on staff resources. Consequently, an Interim Position on containment purging and venting was transmitted to you by letter dated October 23, 1979. You were requested to implement short-term corrective actions to remain in effect pending completion of our longer term review of your response to our November 29, 1978 letter.

One of the remaining interim corrective actions (and the subject of this letter) still in place while our longer term review is being completed is to:

"Maintain the containment purge and vent isolation valves closed whenever the reactor is not in the cold shutdown or refueling mode until such time as you can show that:

- a. All isolation valves greater than 3" nominal diameter used for containment purge and venting operations are operable under the most severe design basis accident flow condition loading and can close within the time limit stated in your Technical Specifications, design criteria or operating procedures. The operability of butterfly valves may, on an interim basis, be demonstrated by limiting the valve to be no more than 30 to 50 open (90 being full open). The maximum opening shall be determined in consultation with the valve supplier. The valve opening must be such that the critical valve parts will not be damaged by DBA-LOCA loads and that the valve will tend to close when the fluid dynamic forces are introduced."

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Mr. J. A. Hancock

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Your letter of December 27, 1979 provided only a limited commitment to operate in conformance with this Interim Position pending completion of our long-term review of valve operability. This limited conformance was to block the valves at 35 from the closed position. You stated your intention to operate with the valves in this position.

However, recent information concerning the operability of large-diameter Pratt butterfly valves (of the generic family RIA or NRIA) in the event of a DBA-LOCA has raised concern whether your justification for operability provides the required assurance that these valves will close. Enclosure 1 provides the background information and the bases for our concern.

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), you are requested to inform us in writing within 15 days of receipt of this letter:

1. Your assessment of the operability of your large-diameter Pratt purge and vent valves in light of the concerns outlined in Enclosure 1, and
2. Whether or not you intend to maintain the purge and vent valves sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4, II.6.f and to verify them to be closed every 31 days whenever the reactor is not in the cold shutdown or refueling mode until such time as you submit acceptable information that demonstrates that your large-diameter Pratt purge/vent valves will operate in the event of DBA-LOCA.

This information will enable the Commission to determine whether or not further action should be taken to modify, suspend, or revoke your license.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.

Sincerely,

\*ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
JOHN F. STOLZ\*

John F. Stolz, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/enclosure:  
See next page

OFFICE	ORB#4:DL	ORB#1:DL	C-ORB#4:DL			
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