Southern California Edison Company

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 82-084, 82-085, 82-086, 82-088, 82-091, and 82-092
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Operating License NPF-10, for San Onofre Unit 2, this submittal provides the required 30-day written reports and copies of Licensee Event Reports (LER's) for six similar occurrences, involving the Control Element Assembly (CEA).

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 3.1.3.1 states that, "All full length (shutdown and regulating) CEA's, and all part length CEA's which are inserted in the core, shall be operable with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7 inches (indicated position) of all other CEA's in its group", while the plant is operating in Mode 1 or 2.

A CEA is normally held in place by the upper gripper coil. During normal motion the lower gripper supports the CEA while the upper gripper moves to a new position. The lower gripper then releases, allowing the upper gripper to move the CEA. Between August 1, 1982 and August 7, 1982 while in Mode 2, several CEA's slipped or dropped violating LCO 3.1.3.1.

The cause of these slippages or drops is slow operation of the grippers which prevented one of the grippers (upper or lower) from making up to the CEA prior to the other gripper releasing.

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82-312

This type of problem is not uncommon in new plants and its frequency of occurrence has been observed to diminish with operation. The corrective measures adopted on the NSSS Vendor recommendation included, exercising the CEA's and reducing rod speed, increasing gripper voltage and duration of voltage application, and application of hydrazine to some drives in an effort to remove oxide deposits which might possibly be present. In addition, electronic circuit changes are being considered such that, if one gripper does not properly engage, this will be detected and the other gripper will not disengage. Engineering studies will be completed within 30 days and permanent circuit changes are expected to be implemented, if the studies prove out, by year end.

No other corrective measures are planned at this time. However, should this condition persist, replacement of the faulty Control Element Drive Mechanisms (CEDM's) will be considered.

These events have no effect on public health and safety since they do not affect the ability of the CEA to insert into the core when required.

LER's 82-084, 82-085, 82-086, 82-088, 82-091, and 82-092 respectively address events associated with CEA 57, 68, 38, 86, 68 and 77, on the dates indicated on the LER forms.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

HB Ray / RC Mundy

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2)

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Office of Management Information and Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations