


Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
P.O. BOX 128
SAN CLAYMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

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REGION V

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

August 31, 1982

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
Licensee Event Report No. 82-036
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Reference: Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC),
14-Day Follow-up Report and LER 82-036
dated July 30, 1982

On July 30, 1982 the referenced letter transmitted the 14-day Follow-up Report and a preliminary Licensee Event Report (LER) involving the Pressurizer Heater Controls.

On July 17, 1982, while in Mode 3, Pressurizer Heater Control was inadvertently lost during performance of troubleshooting procedures to locate a ground in non-IE instrument power supply cabinets. The LER identified that the cause of the failure was a construction error. Investigation of the problem revealed the following:

1. The Pressurizer Heater Control circuits functioned per original design and no construction errors actually existed.
2. The design of the circuit did not allow operation from the Control Room following loss of off-site power.

As noted in the referenced letter, a temporary corrective measure was implemented which changed the circuit such that it will allow operation from the Control Room consistent with the FSAR. Details of the permanent modification were to be provided to you by August 31, 1982. This information is provided below and in the enclosed revised LER 82-036.

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82-313

August 31, 1982

The pressurizer backup heater banks E128 and E129, supplied from 480V 1E buses, are tripped out on high (pressurizer) pressure (greater than 2275 psi and greater than 2340 psi) through two separate relay contacts. The relays being non-safety related, are powered from Non-1E control power. The high pressure tripping contact (greater than 2340 psi) has a failsafe configuration, i.e. loss of relay power supply will put the contact in the "tripped" mode.

A loss of offsite power or the high pressure relay (non-1E) power supply (120 VAC supply No. 1 at cabinet RL071-2R, breaker 2Q065-26) results in tripping of the subject pressurizer heaters. The existing pressurizer heater control circuitry is such that these heaters will remain deenergized until the offsite power or the high pressure relay power supply is restored. The heaters could have been operated manually from the remote shutdown panel.

A design change, which will enable the operator to override the high pressure control function contacts by placing the manual control switches (located in the Control Room) in the "Manual-ON" position, will be implemented by September 30, 1982.

This is considered an isolated instance and, therefore, no further corrective action is warranted.

If there are any questions please contact me.

Sincerely,

HB Remy / JTC Morden

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information & Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations