



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

AUG 30 1982

Mr. David Rossin, Director
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
3412 Hillview Avenue
P.O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Dear Mr. Rossin:

SUBJECT: CASE STUDY OF THE ABNORMAL TRANSIENT OPERATING GUIDELINES
(ATOG) AS APPLIED TO THE APRIL 1981 OVERFILL EVENT AT
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1

On April 8, 1981, while operating at about 100% power, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 experienced a moderate feedwater overflow transient, but water did not enter the main steam line. Enclosed for your information and consideration is the AEOD case study of the event. The report contains a detailed description of what occurred along with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

The report recommendations concern:

- a) resolution of USI A-47 (Safety Implications of Control Systems), and
- b) control room human factors analysis given short time margins for operator actions.

The findings and recommendations contained herein are the results of studies completed to date by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. They are provided in support of other ongoing NRC activities concerning this event. They do not represent the position or requirements of the responsible program office of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact either myself or Harold Ornstein of my staff.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Carlyle Michelson".

Carlyle Michelson, Director
Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational Data

Enclosure:
As Stated

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