

UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

AUG 3 0 1982

Mr. Eugene P. Wilkinson, President Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1820 Water Place Atlanta, GA 30339

Dear Mr. Wilkinson:

SUBJECT: CASE STUDY OF THE ABNORMAL TRANSIENT OPERATING GUIDELINES (ATOG) AS APPLIED TO THE APRIL 1981 OVERFILL EVENT AT ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1

On April 8, 1981, while operating at about 100% power, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 experienced a moderate feedwater overfill transient, but water did not enter the main steam line. Enclosed for your information and consideration is the AEOD case study of the event. The report contains a detailed description of what occurred along with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

The report recommendations concern:

- a) resolution of USI A-47 (Safety Implications of Control Systems), and
- b) control room human factors analysis given short time margins for operator actions.

The findings and recommendations contained herein are the results of studies completed to date by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. They are provided in support of other ongoing NRC activities concerning this event. They do not represent the position or requirements of the responsible program office of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact either myself or Harold Ornstein of my staff.

Sincerely,

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Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

Enclosure: As Stated

