

Ferinensise Valley Authonly, Post Office Box 2000. Soddy-Darsy, Tennessee, 37379

March 22, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority

Docket Nos. 50-327 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 -SPECIAL REPORT 94-03

The enclosed special report provides details concerning Fire Barrier Wall A8 in the auxiliary building between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 480-volt board rooms being breached and nonfunctional as a fire barrier for a period greater than the allowable TS timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).


If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

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Ken Powers Site Vice President

Enclosure cc: See page 2



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cc (Enclosure): Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

> NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624

Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-03

AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE BARRIER WALL A8

Description of Condition

On February 16, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 1, the fire barrier wall between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 480-volt board rooms on Elevation 749.0 of the auxiliary building was breached, and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 was entered.

Cause of Condition

A design change notice (DCN) modification involving the installation of heating and ventilating ductwork is being implemented. This DCN requires the breaching of Fire Barrier Wall A8 between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 480-volt board rooms on Elevation 749.0 of the auxiliary building. The breach will be necessary until the installation of the ductwork and the associated fire damper and the testing of the system are completed. The time necessary to accomplish this exceeded the timeframe allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.12.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the operability of the fire detectors on one side of the nonfunctional fire barrier was verified, and an hourly fire patrol was established to inspect the area affected by the breach. The patrol will be maintained until the modification is completed, the wall is reestablished as a functional fire barrier, and LCO 3.7.12 is exited.