



**Commonwealth Edison**  
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station  
22710 206 Avenue North  
Cordova, Illinois 61242  
Telephone 309/654-2241

50-254  
50-265

NJK-83-48

February 3, 1983

Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Case:

Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of January, 1983, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis  
Station Superintendent

bb

Enclosure

cc: T. J. Rausch

### SPECIAL TEST 1-66

On January 27, 1983, Special Test 1-66 was completed. This test was performed to provide an added indication of proper connection of TIP machine number 3 on Unit One following maintenance.

#### Summary of Safety Evaluation

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report was not increased because all rod movements will be performed using Station approved procedures for scram timing. Power will be maintained between 20% and 30% core rated thermal power. Thus, there are no additional safety implications from a rod drop accident or rod withdrawal error than discussed in the FSAR.
2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the rod maneuvers will be performed at normal operating conditions but at reduced power. All rod movements will be performed using existing Station approved procedures.
3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because all rod movements will be performed using approved operating procedures and within Technical Specifications, thus no Technical Specification safety margins are reduced.

### SPECIAL TEST 1-67

On January 27, 1983, Special Test 1-67 was completed. This test was performed to determine the effects of various feedwater pump combinations on calculated feedwater flow while holding Reactor power constant. The amount of leakage through the idle feedwater pump for each combination was also determined.

#### Summary of Safety Evaluation

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the performance of this test will not affect the feedwater heating function.
2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the availability of feedwater to the Reactor vessel will be sufficient to maintain proper vessel level.
3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because feedwater pump availability is not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification.

## RPS Bus Protective Relays

M-4-1-81-19

### Description

Redundant Class 1E protective relays have been installed between the RPS power supplies (MG Sets 8, MCC 15-2) and the RPS bus. The NRC postulated that with the existing relays in the RPS bus, an earthquake could simultaneously cause degradation of the RPS supply and inhibit the relays from tripping the RPS.

Installed as part of this modification are two Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) on each RPS supply, connected in series to provide redundancy. They will trip RPS on overvoltage, undervoltage, and under-frequency.

### Evaluation

The new protective relays reduce the probability of the RPS malfunctioning due to degraded power supply. Tripping of the RPS on out-of-specification supply is ensured by these relays. Included in the modification are shield plates around the RPS MG Sets to prevent them from damaging nearby Class 1E equipment.

## Anchorage of Safety Related Electrical Equipment

M-4-2-80-22

### Description

This modification installed additional bracing and tack welds on safety related buses and MCCs. This anchorage ensured these pieces of equipment would not tip over. This modification was a result of recommendations from the Systematic Evaluation Program.

### Evaluation

The additional bracing will improve the availability of the equipment by preventing it from tipping over. None of the bracing affected the operability of the buses or MCCs.