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February 7, 1983

L. V. MAURIN Vice President Nuclear Operations

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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. G. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Containment Pressure Setpoint

Dear Sir:

NUREG 0737, item II.E.4.2. dealing with containment isolation dependability, calls for the development of a containment pressure setpoint at which containment isolation is initiated. The setpoint development is noted as an open item in Waterford's Safety Evaluation Report.

In compliance with this requirement a containment pressure setpoint (3.3psig) has been calculated using the explicit setpoint methodology. This information will be included in FSAR Amendment 31 scheduled for mid-March, 1983. Attached please find a marked-up copy of the FSAR change.

Yours very truly,

V. Maurin

LVM/MJM/ssd

Attachment

cc: W. M. Stevenson, E. L. Blake, J. Wilson



WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3

(5) Containment Setpoint Pressure

Waterford-3 will comply with this requirement. A containment setpoint study is being conducted. Upon completion of this study, the pressure setpoint selected will be far enough above the maximum expected pressure inside containment during normal operation so that inadvergent containment isolation will not occur during normal operation from instrument drift or fluctuations due to the accuracy of the pressure sensor. A margin of 1 psi above the maximum expected containment pressure is anticipated for use to account for instrument error. In the event that a value greater than 1 psi is required, detailed justification will be provided.

(6) Operability of Containment Purge Isolation Valve

An analysis has been performed to determine the operability of the containment purge valves. This analysis has shown that the valves are capable of closing against the most severe design basis accident flow conditions when the valve opening is limited to 40 degrees. Modifications are being made to limit purge valve opening.

In addition, the purge value isolation signals are designed such that they cannot be e locked, reset, or overridden.

The FSAR has been revised to reflect consistency with the changes to actuation signals for the containment isolation system indicated in FSAR Table 6.2-32.

(7) As indicated in FSAR Table 6.2-32, the Containment Purge Isolations Valves (Pens. Nos. 34 and 35) are automatically isolated on CPIS (high radiation).

Technical Specification revisions, as appropriate, reflecting Waterford-3's compliance to this requirement will be developed and submitted approximately six months prior to scheduled Operating License.

Waterford-3 Plant Operating Procedures OP-902-002 and OP-901-002 entitled "Loss of Coolant" and "High Airborne Activity" respectively, contain details of isolation initiation and subsequent action to be taken. Additionally, diverse isolation signals have been installed for the purpose of containment isolation. 1-

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The containment pressure trip setpoint and allowable value for initiating containment isolation have been derived using the explicit setpoint methodology. This methodology applies a statistical combination of the individual uncertainty components (instrument loop error, setpoint variance, instrument drift, etc.) to establish a total instrument channel uncertainty. The trip setpoint established, therefore, ensures sufficient margin between the technical specification limit and the nominal trip setpoint. At the same time the setpoint is high enough (3.3 psig) to minimize inadvertent actuation of containment isolation.