



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30343

Report Nos. 50-321/82-39 and 50-366/82-37

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
 P.O. Box 4545
 Atlanta, GA 30302

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia

Inspectors:	<u><i>P. Holmes-Ray</i></u>	<u>12/8/82</u>
	P. Holmes-Ray	Date Signed
	<u><i>R. V. Crtenjak</i></u>	<u>12/8/82</u>
	R. V. Crtenjak	Date Signed
	<u><i>J. F. Rogge</i></u>	<u>12/8/82</u>
	J. F. Rogge	Date Signed
Approved by:	<u><i>W. L. Brownlee</i></u>	<u>12/8/82</u>
	W. L. Brownlee, Chief, Section 2B, Division of Project and Resident Programs	Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on October 28 - November 20, 1982

Areas Inspected

This inspection involved 108 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, and surveillance activities.

Results

Of the 9 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in eight of the areas. A violation was identified in the one area (Failure to follow procedure - RHRSW valve positioning and locking, paragraph 5).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
- *T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
- *C. T. Jones, Assistant Plant Manager
- S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
- *C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

*Attended site exit interviews

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 5, and 19, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts.

During an inspection of the intake structure on November 2, 1982, the inspector noticed that RHR Service Water strainer valves were not per HNP-2-1117 in that valve 2E11-117B was locked open and should have been locked shut and valve 2E11-116B was shut as required but not locked.

another signal prevented the desired valve operation thus the monitor was repaired in place and the jumper was left installed.

Upon completion of repairs only the repaired components were tested by source check and the LCO cleared on November 6, 1982. At this time the monitor would indicate and alarm. Seven tanks of radwaste were discharged. On November 7, 1982 a SRO discovered that the jumper installed on November 5 was still installed and ordered it removed. The jumper had rendered the automatic valve trip function of this monitor inoperable. This is a licensee identified violation. A Notice of Violation will not be issued, since all the criteria of the current NRC enforcement policy were satisfied.

The recorder traces for all discharges made while the jumper was installed were reviewed and no challenges of the trip function occurred. The licensee is making a procedure change to insure all jumpers in safety-related systems are reviewed prior to installation. Also the jumper number is to be referenced on the maintenance request to insure tracking. In a review of the procedures associated with the radwaste monitor the inspector discovered that the Functional Test and Calibration Procedure (HNP-1-3559) did not test that trip function of this Instrument. The licensee was informed of this inadequacy and he performed HNP-1-3556, Liquid Radwaste Discharge Line Automatic Isolation Valve Operation, which does check the trip function. The frequency of HNP-1-3556 was changed from quarterly to monthly. A similar inadequate surveillance problem was written as a violation in Report Nos. 50-321/82-35 and 50-366/82-33 (82-35-01 and 82-33-01) 50-366/82-33 (82-33-01). Since Response to the previous citation has not been received this example will not be separately cited.