

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 3, 1983

BLRD-50-438/82-40

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

03 FEB 8 AS: 35

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - OVERPRESSURIZATION OF MAKEUP AND
PURIFICATION PIPING AND VALVES - BLRD-50-438/82-40 - REVISED FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
D. Quick on May 28, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1808.
This was followed by our interim reports dated June 28 and August 10,
1982 and our final report dated October 12, 1982. As discussed with
Inspector P. E. Fredrickson by telephone on January 31, 1983, enclosed is
our revised final report.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with
R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DS Kammer

for L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION PIPING AND VALVES
NCR 1808
BLRD-50-438/82-40
10 CFR 50.55(e)
REVISED FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During a recent preflush leak test, the piping and valves on the suction side of the unit 1 makeup pumps were inadvertently subjected to a pressure of 1530 lb/in² g. The pressure was applied in increments of 200 lb/in² after an initial pressurization of 100 lb/in². The design pressure for the subject piping and valves is 675 lb/in². The cause of the deficiency was site personnel failed to take into account differences in pressure boundaries during leakage testing.

Safety Implications

TVA does not know the exact safety implication; thus, TVA assumes overpressurization of the subject piping system has jeopardized its integrity. Therefore, the subject condition could have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

The following actions are being taken to ensure that the subject valves are adequate:

The valves will be used "as is" upon the completion and successful results of the following actions. Any valves that are found deficient will be replaced.

1. Each valve will be visually examined for signs of distress.
2. The Borg-Warner valve gland retainers will be inspected and replaced, if necessary.
3. Each valve will be fully cycled and timed for successful valve operability.
4. Each valve will be checked for functionally adequate seat tightness during a valve leak rate test.