

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 Docket Number (2) 0150100361 Page (3) 1 of 01
 Title (4) MANUAL ESF ACTUATION OF TGIS TO SATISFY TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT

EVENT DATE (5) 021094 LER NUMBER (6) 0011 Sequential Number 0011 Revision Number 0001 REPORT DATE (7) 031494 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) SONGS UNIT 3 Docket Number(s) 01501003612

OPERATING MODE (9) 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)
 POWER LEVEL (10) 098
 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Other (Specify in
 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below and
 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) in text
 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) Voluntary Report

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation TELEPHONE NUMBER 711436816255
 AREA CODE 7114

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1520 on February 10, 1994, Train A of the Control Room Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) [VI] was manually actuated as required by Technical Specification 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation," Action Statement B when both trains of TGIS instrumentation became inoperable. Train A was inoperable due to sample pump replacement. Train B became inoperable at approximately 1430 when the discharge fire damper of Control Room Cabinet Area Emergency Unit E426 became inoperable during surveillance testing. Train A TGIS components operated correctly. E426 was restored to operability at 1640 and TGIS Train A was reset at 1730.

The cause of E426 inoperability was the inadvertent dropping into the ventilation duct, during an 18-month surveillance test, of the fusible link that holds the discharge fire damper of E426 open. Corrective action was to retrieve and reinstall the fusible link, thereby restoring the fire damper to operability, and to reset TGIS Train A. No further corrective action is required for this event; however, the timing of the surveillance of the fire damper associated with E426 with respect to potential cross-train impact is being reviewed separately for lessons learned.

Because TGIS Train A was manually actuated and operated as designed, this event had no safety significance. Additionally, there was no toxic gas present.

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